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Introduction 
Coming to Terms with the Nazi Past 
   
 
Arriving in Berlin in the middle of the 2006 Fédération Internationale de Football 
Association (FIFA) World Cup, I noticed nothing out of the ordinary for a population 
hosting an international tournament in which their nation participated. German flags flew 
from cars, buildings, flagpoles and even people; the tri-colors -- Rot, Schwarz, Gold (red, 
black, gold) – adorned bracelets, t-shirts, and every trinket imaginable. Amidst all the 
revelry and celebration, German flags flew amongst those of every other soccer-loving 
country in the world. To me as an American nothing seemed out of the ordinary; what 
could be more natural than to show pride for one’s national team in a world 
championship? Yet, it took only a short conversation with any German to realize that the 
patriotism so openly expressed by the German population was something out of the 
ordinary. Just a short time prior to this, for reasons I will discuss later, most Germans 
considered flag-waving and national pride to be indicative of the radical right. The flag-
waving and patriotism I experienced in World Cup Germany diverged radically from the 
attitudes of the nation in the decades prior because before that time, Germany had not yet 
finished struggling with or reached a resolution of its Nazi past. People could not begin to 
feel pride in the history or identity of their Volk, of Germany, until their nation had come 
to terms with the National Socialist past in some significant way.  
Since World War II, Germans have often seemed to be trapped by their collective 
memory. Deeply involved with their traumatic Nazi past, they have sometimes dwelled 
on it to the point of obsession, one example of which has been an intense debate over 
how to memorialize the Holocaust. Since the end of World War II, 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung, coming to terms with their National Socialist history, has 
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stimulated numerous debates over memory that have greatly affected German national 
identity. This thesis explores the subject of German national identity through the 
framework of conflicts in the 1990s about the memory of the Holocaust, focusing on the 
debate over building a national Holocaust memorial in Berlin.  I propose to explore two 
questions. First, what were the fundamental issues under debate and the arguments 
pertaining to each issue? Second, how have these memory issues affected German self-
perception and thus national identity? 
In order to begin to answer these questions, it is necessary to clarify what the 
national Holocaust memorial actually is. Then, the debate over its construction must be 
set in the historical context of German debate and discussion of the Holocaust and the 
memory of the Third Reich. Central to this debate was the question of whether the Nazi 
period was part of the larger trend of German history or if it was an aberration from it, a 
question that a number of prominent historians discussed during what came to be called 
the Historikerstreit (Historian’s Debate) of the 1980s. An examination of the 
Historikerstreit will reveal the particular relevance and importance of the issues it raised, 
as they would later give life to the debate over the national Holocaust memorial.  
Das Denkmal für die Ermordeten Juden Europas 
The Denkmal für die Ermordeten Juden Europas (DEJE), literally, the Memorial 
for the Murdered Jews of Europe, was unveiled in May, 2005, and it is by far the most 
unique memorial Berlin has to offer. This memorial consists of three thousand Stele 
(concrete columns), identical in width and depth, but ranging in height from almost flat 
on the ground to nine feet high. The ground, which rises and falls as the viewer walks, 
further exaggerates this height differential. As the columns are completely blank, the 
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Denkmal (memorial) itself is an aesthetic and symbolic experience, severed from a 
rational, fact-based exploration of the Holocaust. To walk through the memorial is to 
enter a world of contemplation, shadows, and isolation.  
Yet at any moment, life can interrupt reflection. Children run and play amongst 
the great columns; municipal employees and business people alike walk through the 
columns to reach the other side, talking on their cell phones; adolescents stand atop the 
columns shouting to each other; some sit on the smaller columns eating an ice cream 
cone or drinking coffee on their lunch break. Something seems to have gone awry. Unlike 
other memorials in Berlin, the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe is not enclosed 
or set to the side; it is located completely unrestricted right in the heart of Berlin. Looking 
over the tops of the columns one can see the Reichstag and Brandenburg Tor, the 
Tiergarten, and the buildings of Potsdamer Platz. This memorial is completely exposed, 
open to everyone regardless of how he/she makes use of the memorial.1 
The memorial is enhanced by its second part, a Dokumentations Zentrum 
(Documentation Center), that is built into the ground underneath the memorial, the 
entrance and exits to which are among the Stele. After a brief history of the Jews in 
Germany and Europe, there are several rooms full of additional information. They 
contain stories of deportation, names of victims, computer consuls full of information 
pertaining to particular concentration camps and more consuls that provide information 
about Holocaust memorials throughout the world. On this level, the goal is clearly to give 
a visitor the information necessary to know about and understand the history and 
complexities of the Holocaust.  
                                                 
1
 Granted, some restrictions. There are rules listed on the ground as you walk into the memorial, and it is 
under surveillance. 
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There is also, however, a highly aesthetic element to this Documentation Center, 
akin to that found in the Washington D.C. Holocaust museum. Most of the dimly lit 
rooms contribute to a thoughtful, meditative mood, while exhibits detail personal stories, 
full of quotes, pictures and sound. The most striking room is empty; in it visitors listen to 
a speaker who reads the names of Jews who fell victim to the Nazis during the Holocaust.  
The Historical Context 
The overall effect of both parts of this memorial is intense. Visitors leave the 
memorial feeling extremely emotional, deeply contemplative, motivated to action, or in 
some cases anger about the memorial’s inadequacies and misrepresentations. The debate 
over the construction of the Holocaust memorial that began in 1989 and technically 
ended with its opening in 2005 reflected the intensity and variety of reactions people had 
to it.2 In order to fully understand this debate and why it took the form that it did, it is 
essential first to understand the historical context of public discussion over memory in 
Germany, of which the debate over the Holocaust memorial inevitably became a part. 
This conversation changed as each generation of Germans approached the Holocaust 
from a different viewpoint. The Cold War further complicated the development of 
German memory as the division of the country into East and West created two different 
collective memories. 
Immediately after World War II, the occupying powers of West Germany – 
Britain, France and the United States – pursued a course of de-Nazification. De-
Nazification was an attempt to eliminate the Nazi elements from German society, 
prosecute former Nazis, and educate German citizens about the crimes their nation had 
committed. In other words, it was the allied attempt to force Germans to think about 
                                                 
2
 This is arguable because the issues particularly relating to the memorial continue to be debated today. 
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events like the Holocaust and deal with them in the direct aftermath of the war. The 
Germans were not ready for this, however, and the policy ended up producing a state of 
collective amnesia – an all but complete silence on the subject – among the German 
people. The primary reason for this was the continued popularity of Hitler and Nazi 
beliefs among Germans at the time. Even after the Nuremberg Trials of October 1946, as 
many as 37% of Germans in the American zone agreed that exterminating non-Aryans 
was a necessity for German security. As late as 1952, 25% of West Germans still had a 
“good opinion” of Hitler.3 With this continued presence of Hitler and Nazi-ideology 
among the German people post-war, it was unlikely that any efforts made by the Allies to 
have Germans acknowledge their crimes were going to succeed. 
Knowing this, West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer called for the Allies to 
halt the de-Nazification process and instead encourage silence on the subject. His main 
reason for this was his fear that forcing Germans to deal with the Nazi past at this time, as 
historian Tony Judt said, “was more likely to provoke a nationalist backlash than induce 
contrition.”4 As the Cold War became increasingly ominous and imminent, the Allies 
largely gave up their all-encompassing efforts at de-Nazification. Instead, they focused 
on efforts like the claims conference held by West Germany in 1951. This conference 
gathered together Jewish organizations, which worked together with the government to 
pay out DM 10 billion in reparations to individual Holocaust victims.5 In general, 
however, a self-induced amnesia with regard to the Holocaust and the Third Reich fell 
over West Germany.  
                                                 
3
 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945, (New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2005), 58. 
4
 Judt, Postwar, 57. 
5
 See, for example: Marilyn Henry, Confronting the Perpetrators (Portland, OR: Valentine Mitchell, 2007).  
John Authers and Richard Wolffe, Victim’s Fortune (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 
2002).  
 6 
East Germany, the Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR), too, was suffering a 
form of amnesia with regard to the Nazi crimes, although for a different set of equally 
understandable reasons. The most fundamental issue here was the change from Fascism 
to Communism. The DDR viewed Nazism as a system rooted in capitalism that had 
misdirected the working class who were merely manipulated enactors of the Nazi 
policies. 6 In the immediate post-war period, the primary goal of the Soviets was to 
completely eradicate Nazism from everyday life in order to strengthen the Communist 
hold. Because Nazism simply meant Fasicism to the Soviets, the Soviets tended to 
overlook the characteristic of Nazism that made it distinctive: virulent racism. As a result, 
de-nazification in the East did not focus on the punishment of those who had committed 
genocide. Rather, it meant ridding East Germany of its capitalist and business elements 
so that the Communists could achieve a “socio-economic transformation.”7 As in the 
West, apart from those affiliated with capitalist enterprises, former Nazi party affiliation 
was generally ignored.8  
That the racist elements of Fascism were not generally considered by Communists 
was not the only reason for silence about the Holocaust, however. The Stalinization of 
East Germany eventually led to the Communist persecution of the Jews in the early 
1950s, causing Jews to flee to West Germany in great numbers. Thus, it was not 
necessarily prudent to exhibit any sympathy for the Jewish victims of the Holocaust. The 
Holocaust was not left out of East German historical writing altogether, though, because 
it served an important role in the promotion of Communism through the negation of 
                                                 
6
 Mary Fulbrook, German National Identity After the Holocaust, (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 1999), 111, 
114-115. 
7
 Judt, Postwar, 58-59. 
8
 Judt, Postwar, 60. 
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Fascism. Writing about the Nazi crimes usually made Konzentrationslagers (KZs) places 
in which Communist sorrows were to be mourned and Communist bravery against the 
Fascists was to be praised. Persecution of other victim groups was generally not 
mentioned.9 Due to the unique constraints placed on memory as a result of the 
Communist system, there was no real growth in terms of dealing with the Nazi past in 
East Germany as we will see shortly there was in West Germany.  
In West Germany, despite the willful ignorance of the past, the Holocaust and the 
memory of the Third Reich refused to remain dormant. The first instance of this was the 
trial of former SS member Adolf Eichmann in April 1961. The trial, Eichmann’s death 
sentence and the subsequent debate over the trial began to raise the questions of German 
accountability and the capacity of humans to commit crimes such as the Holocaust.10 
Another dimension of the 1960s was the fact that a new generation of Germans was 
growing up, one that was not directly connected to the Nazi past and that confronted the 
status quo regarding Holocaust memory. As this new student generation came of age, 
they were no longer willing to let questions about this part of their national past go 
unanswered.11 They pressed their parents and grandparents for answers, reasons and 
explanations: How could you have done this? What were you thinking? How could a 
nation that produced some of the Enlightenment’s greatest philosophers have produced 
this evil? Some of the older generation still could not face their children out of fear; as 
                                                 
9
 Thomas C. Fox, “The Holocaust under Communism,” The Historiography of the Holocaust, ed. Dan 
Stone (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 435-436. 
10
 Fulbrook, Identity After the Holocaust, 116. See also: Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report 
on the Banality of Evil (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1994). David Cesarani, Eichmann: His Life and 
Crimes (London: W. Heinemann, 2004).  
11
 Fulbrook, Identity After the Holocaust, 119. See also: Nick Thomas, Protest Movements in 1960s West 
Germany: A Social History of Dissent and Democracy (New York, NY: Berg, 2003). Generations in 
Conflict: Youth Revolt and Generation Formation in Germany, 1770-1968, ed. Mark Roseman, (New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995).   
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one man who was a teenager at the time explained, “my Grandfather feared that I would 
put shame on him and this is the main reason why people did not talk about such 
things.”12 A docent at the German Historical Museum observed that the conversations 
surrounding this topic during the 1960’s resulted, “through many families” in there being 
“a line drawn of accusation, the younger generations against the older.”13 
Among the historians, too, and not just German society at large, there was a first 
wave of discussion challenging the traditional view of and silence about the Third Reich. 
Fritz Fischer argued controversially that Germany’s history between imperial times and 
the Third Reich had been continual and that therefore Nazi rule had not been an 
aberration from history.14 He did not believe that imperialism ended with the fall of the 
monarchy in 1914; rather that the “mental attitudes and aspirations which were active in 
German policy during the First World War . . . remained operative later.”15 This 
argument stood in stark contrast to the traditional viewpoint of German historians that 
portrayed Germany as guilt free and “saw the Third Reich as an aberration from the 
sound traditions of German history.”16 Fischer’s argument brought forth a great deal of 
historical literature in response from more conservative historians who saw Fischer’s 
arguments as defaming German tradition. While this debate was intense throughout the 
1960s and 1970s, by the 1980s, the traditional perspective had been discarded and 
historians had generally accepted the view that German history had a continual path that 
led to the Third Reich.17 
                                                 
12
 Dr. Serge Embacher, administrative coordinator for Dr. Michael Buersch (MdB) at the German 
Parliament, interview by author, 4 July 2006, Berlin.  
13
 Rainer Karrais, docent at the Deutsches Historisches Museum, Interview by author, 29 June 2006, Berlin.  
14
 Richard J. Evans, In Hitler’s Shadows (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1989), 113. 
15
 Fritz Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War (New York, NY: WW Norton & Co., 1967), xxii. 
16
 Evans, Hitler’s Shadows, 113. 
17
 Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship (London: Edward Arnold, 1989), 188.  
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Der Historikerstreit 
The events of the 1960s and the 1978 Holocaust television miniseries that opened 
German eyes to the Nazi crimes opened the door for a more dramatic debate over the role 
of the Nazi period and the Holocaust in German history. Genocide and the mass murder 
of peoples increasingly became a discussion topic as the Nazis and the German Volk 
became increasingly seen as one and the same.18 As a product of this view that 
emphasized the active role of the German people in the Holocaust, memory and 
discussion of the Holocaust became increasingly dark and depressing; as Dr. Serge 
Embacher said, “to go to a Holocaust memorial was like going to a funeral, this makes a 
contrast to the life of people.”19 In 1986, three Conservative historians published articles 
that sought to revise this view of history that connected Nazism to the entire German 
past, indirectly saying that it was time to put the Nazi past in perspective. The reaction to 
this call and the subsequent debate that lasted through the rest of the 1980s became 
known as the Historikerstreit. It was out of this debate that calls for the building of a 
national Holocaust memorial came, and the debate that surrounded the memorial emerged 
directly from the issues raised during the Historikerstreit. 
The writing of three conservative historians, Andreas Hillgruber, Ernst Nolte, and 
Michael Stürmer, prompted the Historikerstreit. Significantly, two of the three pieces of 
writing that began this debate were published in the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, which sided with the conservative historians. Hillgruber’s Two Kinds of 
Downfall called for an understanding of both the genocide of the Jews and the atrocities 
                                                 
18
 Fulbrook, Identity After the Holocaust, 120, 122-3. 
19
 Interview by author with Dr. Serge Embacher. 
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committed against the Germans expelled from Eastern Europe.20 As Hillgruber stated in 
his forward, “both catastrophes belong together,” thus, emphasizing his argument that the 
Holocaust had to be placed in the context of other historical events occurring at the 
time.21 Hillgruber also made the argument that one should sympathize with the 
Wehrmacht’s difficult position on the Eastern Front as surrendering sooner to the Soviet 
Army would have meant almost certain retribution against not just the Wehrmacht, but 
also the civilian population, even though it might have resulted in the earlier liberation of 
KZs.22 
Nolte’s article, “The Past that will not Pass Away,” like Hillgruber’s essays, 
argued that it was time for historians to put the Holocaust into the wider perspective of 
German history. While he believed the Holocaust was a unique event, Nolte said it could 
not be isolated from a larger historical context suggesting that the KZs, for example, were 
merely imitations of Soviet Gulags; in Nolte’s words, “was not the ‘Archipelago GULag’ 
the original ‘Auschwitz?’”23 By constantly allowing the Nazi past to resurface, Nolte 
argued that Germans were preventing themselves from a positive identity with their own 
culture and nation, but by putting that past in historical context, the Germans could begin 
to leave it in the past.24 Stürmer’s “Land without History” argued that the history of 
Germany was shaped by a geopolitical struggle because of its location in the middle of 
the European continent.25 He went beyond this to say, like Nolte, that it was time to 
                                                 
20
 Evans, Hitler’s Shadows, 49. 
21
 Andreas Hillgruber, Zweierlei Untergang (Berlin: Siedler, 1946), 9. 
22
 Evans, Hitler’s Shadows, 49. 
23
 “war nicht der ‘Archipel GULag’ unsprünglicher als ‘Auschwitz?’” Ernst Nolte, “Die Vergangenheit, 
die nicht vergehen will,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (6/6/1986).  
24
 Evans, Hitler’s Shadows, 20. 
25
 Michael Stürmer, “Land ohne Geschichte,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (4/25/1986).  
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change the fact that Germans could not positively identify with their history or 
nationality; it was time for a redefinition of German national identity.26  
Liberal historians like Jürgen Habermas, Martin Broszat and, significantly, 
Eberhard Jäckel reacted strongly against these revisionist conservative historians. The 
liberal historians saw the conservative perspective as apologetic. In other words, the 
conservatives were trying to defend the crimes of the Third Reich by saying the 
geography and need for tactical defense were the underlying reasons for the actions of the 
Nazis. Additionally, the liberal historians said that the type of comparability that Nolte 
suggested would lead to a normalization of the crimes, making them seem not quite so 
atrocious when compared to the other crimes of the 20th century. The liberal historians 
feared that normalization would lead to historicization, or a taking of history that was still 
alive and debated and putting it forever in the past. They suggested that historicization 
would lead to an attempt to portray the history of the Holocaust from a single, “objective” 
perspective that ignored the experiences of so many, “devaluing the role of another 
perspective, the victims’ memories, as ‘mythical’ and not historical.”27 The path of 
normalization would lead to a time when Germans could simply forget the Holocaust like 
any other “historical” event. To many, this was a terrifying prospect.28  
Ultimately, the Historikerstreit opened several important issues for the overall 
issue of Germany’s coming to terms with the Nazi past, but also for the debate over the 
national Holocaust memorial. The first issue concerned how much shame and guilt 
contemporary Germans should feel for the Nationalist Socialist crimes. Revisionist 
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 Evans, Hitler’s Shadows, 21. 
27
 Fulbrook, Identity After the Holocaust, 128. 
28
 Peter Baldwin, Reworking the Past: Hitler, the Holocaust, and the historians’ debate, ed. Peter Baldwin 
(Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1990), 6.  
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conservatives suggested that Germany was obsessed with guilt and that it was time to 
move beyond that. The social liberals believed that shame must always be a part of the 
German identity process, that it was something that could not simply be gotten rid of. 
Stemming from this issue was that of forgetting, whether the Germans should be able to 
confine the Holocaust to historical memory or keep it alive in contemporary debate and 
thought. The third issue was that of the singularity of the Holocaust. Here the 
conservatives sought to make the Holocaust comparable to the crimes of other nations 
and regimes, while the liberals maintained that no other regime in history had sought the 
complete extermination of an entire people, not just in their territory, but throughout the 
world. A fourth issue concerned Germans as victims and the extent to which 
contemporary Germans could empathize with the decisions and policies of the German 
army. Finally, the Historikerstreit also raised the issue of redefining Germany and the 
need for Germany to develop a new national identity in which they could take pride.  
Der Denkmalstreit 
To a large degree, historians consider the Historikerstreit to have had no concrete 
results and to be concerned with “abstract concepts without stimulating historical 
research or the production of public history.”29 However, as a direct consequence of this 
Historikerstreit and liberal fears that normalization of the Holocaust could occur in 
Germany, the idea for a permanent, national Holocaust memorial was born. In 1988, 
television personality Lea Rosh and historian Eberhard Jäckel created the citizen’s 
initiative Perspektive Berlin to generate support for a central Holocaust memorial, 
specifically to the murdered Jews, on the former Gestapo-Gelände (Gestapo territory) in 
                                                 
29
 Wulf Kansteiner, In Pursuit of German Memory: History, Television and Politics after Auschwitz  
(Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2006), 260. 
 13 
Berlin. Since 1987, this property had held a temporary documentation center about the 
Third Reich called the Topography of Terror.  Perspektive Berlin’s proposal for a 
permanent memorial received support from notable public figures such as historian 
Joachim Braun, CEO of Daimler-Benz Edzard Reuter, former Bundeskanzler Willy 
Brandt and author Christa Wolf, among others.  
In October 1989, the local finding commission in charge of deciding what should 
be done with the Gestapo-Gelände denied Perspektive Berlin’s proposal for a permanent 
Holocaust memorial to the Jewish victims at this location. Instead, they accepted the 
proposal from the association Aktives Museum Faschismus und Widerstand to build a 
permanent documentation center on the property, similar to the temporary one already in 
existence. Later that year, Perspektive Berlin was rolled into a new association called 
Förderkreis Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas (Society for the Promotion of 
the Memorial for the Murdered Jews of Europe, FEDJE). This organization had the same 
leadership as Perspektive Berlin and its goal was to find a new location for a memorial to 
the murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin. The website of the FEDJE said “the future needs 
memory,” and a quote from supporter Willy Brandt followed that expressed their 
purpose: our future “will be offered an immense expression of the memory of the 
murdered Jews of Europe.”30 
When the Berlin Wall fell in November 1989 and as reunification was completed 
in October 1990, the impetus for a national Holocaust memorial grew even stronger. As I 
have suggested, East and West Germany dealt with the memory of the Holocaust 
similarly at first but while Eastern memory remained amnesiac, West Germany slowly 
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 Förderkreis Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europes, homepage, http://www.holocaust-denkmal-
berlin.de/index.php?s=0, (Accessed 9 April 2008). 
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began to deal with the issue of the Nazi past in the 1960s and even more so through the 
Historikerstreit. Merging these two vastly different memories of the Nazi past alone 
would prove to be a difficult task, but German reunification also meant the sudden 
combination of two different peoples with different histories, cultures, languages, 
economic systems, etc. In a way that almost no other event in history has produced, 
German reunification required a complete redefinition of what it meant to be German. 
German national identity had to be re-characterized, which raised in an extreme way the 
question of dealing with the Nazi past and the Holocaust and how those events would fit 
into the new Germany that was being created. Thus, reunification played an extremely 
significant role in driving the Denkmalstreit that really began to gain momentum in the 
early 1990s.31 
 Initial questions of where the monument was to be located, exactly who the 
monument would memorialize and what form the monument would take were heatedly 
debated in newspaper articles and editorials, in speeches, and in public forums. Key 
participants from the Historikerstreit became active again as the issues from the previous 
debate took a new form. They included historians Eberhard Jäckel, Jürgen Kocka and 
Klaus Hildebrand and philosopher Jürgen Habermas. In the Denkmalstreit, however, 
there were many new important figures who were not historians, including architectural 
experts James Young and Salomon Korn, politicians Ulrich Roloff-Momin and Peter 
Conradi, and journalists Henryk Broder and Thomas Lackmann.  Instead of debating 
these issues raised by the Historikerstreit on a theoretical level, the Denkmalstreit took 
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the issues and applied them to a tangible object, a Holocaust memorial that would be 
visible to the world, but especially to Germany.   
From its inception, the memorial caused controversy, particularly because it was 
to be dedicated only to the Jews and not to all victim groups. This was unacceptable to a 
large faction of people, and particularly to Romani Rose, the major leader of the Sinti and 
Roma people. In October 1992, the Berliner Senat decided that the monument would, as 
originally proposed, memorialize just the Jewish victims of the Third Reich and other 
victim groups would have their own government-supported memorials nearby. In 
November, the Berliner Senat also approved the FEDJE proposed location for the 
memorial: the Ministergärten (Minister Gardens) on the area where the old 
Reichskanzlerei (Chancellery of the Empire) used to sit. The Senat also decided during 
this time that the funding for this memorial would flow in part from the national 
government (Bundregierung or Bund), the government of Berlin (Land Berlin or Land) 
and in part from individual and corporate sponsors to be brought in by the FEDJE.   
These important factors having been decided, beginning in April 1994 these three 
sponsoring agencies – Bund, Land and FEDJE – held an artistic competition for the 
design of the memorial. A combination of professional and amateur artists, engineers and 
architects submitted 528 designs. In March 1995, a committee of representatives from the 
disciplines of politics, history, architecture, urban design and art, selected by the three 
primary stakeholders, recommended two of the proposals as finalists to the FEDJE. 
Christine Jakob-Marks proposed a large concrete slab that would cover the entire open 
area on which the names of the approximately 4.2 million Jewish victims for whom there 
were documented deaths would be engraved. This slab would be tilted upwards across the 
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area to give an odd feeling of perspective distortion. Simon Ungers proposed giant steel 
beams, supported by T-bars, which would have the names of the concentration camps cut 
out of them. As the light shone through it would project the names of the camps onto the 
ground.  
Both of these designs elicited immense debate about the ability of art or concrete 
to capture the enormity of the Holocaust in a physical structure. Further, this argument 
about design renewed earlier debates over for whom the memorial should be built, this 
time adding the complex question whether this memorial was actually more for the 
Germans than the victims. Finally, the disappointment over the failure of the first 
competition without the debate over Holocaust memory fading raised the question 
whether there was need or justification for a memorial at all. The controversy persisted 
throughout 1995, and the public increasingly criticized the Jakob-Marks design, which 
was seen as the favorite of the two. Interestingly, a third design received the most public 
attention at this time. The design proposed by Frieder Schnock and Renata Stih, involved 
a series of bus-stops throughout Berlin at which people could board colored buses labeled 
with the name of a concentration camp, that would take them to the specified camp. 
While this proposal was a clear favorite among the public, the committee did not 
seriously consider it following the first competition.  
Unable to make any progress because of the controversies and mounting debates 
surrounding the first competition, in April 1996 the Bund, Land Berlin and FEDJE 
agreed to end the first competition without declaring a winning memorial design. 
Additionally, they decided to begin a new discussion about a memorial to the Jewish 
victims on the same location. Following a debate over the DEJE in the Bundestag, in 
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August 1996 the Bund, Land Berlin and FEDJE agreed to hold a multi-part colloquium 
about how best to proceed with the memorial in early 1997. Meanwhile, the debate about 
the memorial continued in the newspapers. In January, February and April 1997 the three 
forums discussed the problems of the first competition and the topics of why Germany 
needed a national Holocaust memorial, where it should be located, and what it should 
represent. The result of these forums and government consultation with international 
experts was a second competition that took place beginning in June 1997. 
In the second competition the Bund, Land Berlin and FEDJE allowed entry by 
invitation only. The nominating committee invited the nine first, second and third place 
winners from the original competition in addition to sixteen new artists and architects. 
Once again this competition produced no clear winning design immediately. But after a 
renewed period of public and government discussion throughout late 1997 and early 
1998, a design proposed by Peter Eisenman and Richard Serra began receiving the most 
attention. This design originally consisted of more than four thousand concrete blocks 
filling the entire proposed area. After much discussion and debate, Eisenman modified 
his proposal to be just 3,000 Stele and to include an information center below the 
memorial, as had been proposed by Michael Naumann, Minister of Culture and Media.  
Finally in June, 1999, the German Parliament voted decisively for the building of this 
monument by agreeing to pay for most of its fifty-four million Mark cost.32 
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Thesis 
As I have suggested, the Historikerstreit of the 1980s raised important but 
complicated questions about German memory of the Holocaust. The decade long process 
of determining whether and how a national German Holocaust memorial should be built 
was largely a product of the important issues that developed out of the Historikerstreit: 
the singularity of the Holocaust, the need for continued shame, the fear of forgetting the 
crimes and the desire for a new national identity. The Denkmalstreit proceeded from this 
larger discussion about the Holocaust and German national identity. Current 
historiography on the Denkmalstreit, however, remains thin and primarily discusses the 
debate over the German national Holocaust memorial as one of many debates that prove a 
particular point. Here I will discuss three of the most relevant works and will end with a 
statement as to how my thesis will fit into this historiography. 
Brian Ladd’s The Ghosts of Berlin breaks apart the debate over the DEJE as one 
of many examples of how memory of the historical events has been created, debated and 
displayed in Berlin over time. His argument is that the history of a location can be 
revealed through the stories of the monuments and buildings within that place and that 
the controversies over these memorials are ways of dealing with the past.33 Karen Till’s 
The New Berlin describes the debate over the Holocaust memorial and agrees that the 
constructed memorial reveals a German consensus on many of the issues raised. 
However, she emphasized the failure of the memorial as a national memory place in 
Berlin because she saw the final design as permanently establishing in German memory 
the difference between “German” and “Jew.”34 Peter Carrier’s Holocaust Monuments and 
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National Memory Cultures in France and Germany since 1989 compares the debate over 
the Holocaust memorial in Berlin to similar debates in France in order to make a 
statement about how, in some cases, memorials do not actually honor history. Rather, 
Carrier argues that memorials serve a contemporary purpose of developing debate and 
discussion over controversial issues in order to promote a societal consensus.35 
In this study, I seek to extend this historiography by breaking down the key issues 
and arguments of the Denkmalstreit by theme and analyzing them with relation to 
theoretical concepts of national identity. In each chapter I will examine one significant 
theme from the debate and show how the Germans struggled with the issue before 
coming to some kind of consensus on the topic. These agreements, though not pleasing 
everyone involved, finally not only enabled the memorial to be built, but also exhibited 
the German nation’s strength and persistence in coming to terms with its past.  
I argue that it was not that these issues were resolved, because they certainly 
continue today, that has made a difference for national identity. Rather, a new German 
national identity has developed because these public discussions have produced a 
concrete piece of public historical remembrance. Once and for all, the “defensive 
amnesia” of earlier generations that has affected German national identity has broken. 
Moreover, in choosing a memorial that did not limit German memory of the Holocaust to 
a single statement of universal experience on its history, but left it open to continued 
discussion, the Germans have shown that openness and debate will create their national 
identity. Through the process of the Denkmalstreit, the Federal Republic of Germany has 
proven itself to be capable of dealing with its tragic past in a mature way that many other 
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nations can only admire. It was through the agonizing and tedious Denkmalstreit that 
Germans were finally able to reveal a pride in their nation. 
Chapter I 
Learning from the Holocaust:  
The Debate over Meaning and Responsibility 
   
 
During the debate over the German national Holocaust memorial, publisher Wolf 
Jobst Siedler made the observation that “one devalues a memorial who inflates its 
meaning.”1 The discussion about what the Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas 
(DEJE) would mean for the German nation was an extremely prolonged one that 
vacillated between placing too much import on the memorial and not seeing its potential 
well enough. In this chapter I explore the larger question of whether or not to build a 
Holocaust memorial at all and, having determined to build a memorial, what that 
memorial would mean for Germany and the world. I will begin to discuss this debate over 
meaning by examining the reasons why Germany needed to consider a memorial in the 
first place. In turn, I examine the discussion about whether Germany actually did need a 
national Holocaust memorial. Finally, I look at the collective nature of memory stored in 
memorials and its role in developing a national identity. As this chapter will show, the 
DEJE and even just the debate surrounding it was essential for the development of a new 
German national identity after reunification that included atonement for the Nazi crimes.  
High Time to Consider This 
As I suggested in the introduction, the question of how to deal with Holocaust 
memory in Germany was a topic of heated discussion throughout the 1980’s and the 
Historikerstreit. The conservative faction sought to finally put the Holocaust into 
historical memory instead of having to live with it in the present. The liberals, in 
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 “Man entwertet ein Mahnmal, indem man es inflationiert” - Wolf Jobst Siedler, “Wie ein Mahnmal durch 
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opposition, thought that the Holocaust was an event that should not be forgotten or put in 
context with other historical events but kept as a unique and shameful part of German 
society. As we have seen, the issue of a permanent memorial came to the fore in 1988 
when the Berliner Senat debated what to do with the land of the former Gestapo 
headquarters. In 1989, under the auspices of the civic action group Perspektive Berlin, 
historian Eberhard Jäckel and television journalist Lea Rosh, suggested a permanent 
memorial to the murdered Jews. When they did so, the SPD-GP (Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands – Die Grünen) coalition that led the Land Berlin agreed that it was 
finally time to realize this permanent form of Holocaust memory. The primary reason 
“why” people seemed to agree with Perspektive Berlin that Germany needed to consider 
a permanent memorial to the Jews needed was this issue of time. As Die Tageszeitung 
said, “it is a shame that forty-five years after the Holocaust in Germany there is still no 
national memorial for the victims of National Socialism.”2 Especially after 1991, with 
reunification and the decision to move the German capital back to Berlin, the liberals’ 
hope was that “the question of a national holocaust memorial in the place of the 
murderers will become again highly urgent,” as the typically liberal-center Die 
Tageszeitung wrote.3 As time passed, increasingly articles said that the German nation 
was late in discussing, never mind building, this memorial and that it was therefore 
imperative that it be built now.4 This sense of urgency and the need to make a decision 
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Gedenkstätte für die Opfer des Nationalsozialismus geht” - Igal Avidan, “Inzwischen wird bereits mit 
‘Viertel-Juden’ und ‘Achtel-Zigeunern’ argumentiert,” Die Tageszeitung (7/31/1991), 80. 
3
  “Denn mit dem Umzug der Regierung nach Berlin wird die Frage eines bundesrepublikanischen 
Holocaust-Mahnmals am Ort der Täter wieder höchst akut.” Anon. (Usche), “Der geteilte Holocaust: ein 
Denkmal-Streit,” Die Tageszeitung (7/8/1992), 99. 
4
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about the memorial continued to overshadow the entire course of the debate over the 
design and building of the DEJE.  
 Besides the government’s move back to Berlin, another reason that made the issue 
of a permanent Holocaust memorial urgent was that the 45 years between Nazi times and 
this discussion meant that many people directly involved in the Holocaust, both 
perpetrators and surviving victims, had died. Until those who had supported or perhaps 
even carried out the policies of racial genocide began to die, it would have been arguably 
difficult to begin a truly critical examination of the Nazi past. With many of the Nazi 
generation having passed away and at least retired from positions of power out of the 
public eye, liberals thought of a Holocaust memorial that “now can one finally begin,” as 
historian and author Ute Frings stated in the progressive Frankfurter Rundschau.5 
Journalist Henryk Broder accurately wrote that “now the time is ripe for a holocaust 
memorial.”6 This is precisely what the debate over the Holocaust memorial, all ten years 
of it, was about – bringing this long overdue memorial to fruition. 
 The third argument for considering a national Holocaust memorial compared 
Germany’s Holocaust memory to the world’s. The conclusion: everyone else already had 
a memorial, so Germany ought to have one too. The Holocaust did not just affect 
Germans and Germany, but people and nations across Europe. As such, it was relevant to 
make the following comparison, as Lea Rosh did in 1988:  
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In Germany, the land of the murderers, the land of the 
inventors of this singular genocide, there is no single 
memorial that remembers the murder of the more than five 
million dead Jews murdered by the Germans. France has 
one such memorial. Italy has one, Belgium as well. The 
Norwegians remember their dead, as do the Hungarians. 
Only we do not.7 
 
She ended with an imperative to end the scandal and bring about such an act of 
remembrance and reconciliation in Germany. The completion of Washington DC’s 
Holocaust memorial and museum in 1993 brought this comparison to the fore. A country 
not directly involved in the propagation of the Holocaust as it happened having at least 
one Holocaust memorial made it apparent that Germany was in fact lagging severely 
behind in terms of historicizing its own Holocaust memory when compared to other 
nations.8 This negative comparison was not the complete argument, however; liberals and 
those who supported the Holocaust memorial drew the important conclusion that 
Germany actually shamed itself by not having one, a topic that I will discuss later in this 
chapter.9 
The opposition generally considered arguments of urgency and shame to be 
“irritating.”10 Their thought was that, after years of hearing that it was time and that the 
matter was urgent, the little forward progress that could be seen was disheartening. This 
was especially true after 1996 when the Bund, Land and FEDJE effectively voided the 
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first design competition, as discussed in the introduction and Chapter Four.11 However, 
especially by 1998 while the results of the second design competition were under 
discussion, those in favor of building the DEJE were not willing to accept the arguments 
that said the memorial was not necessary. The pro-DEJE faction argued that for the three 
years between competitions it was still alright to be against the memorial, but “now it is 
wrong. The Memorial must be built, even now.”12 The Land Berlin and FEDJE were 
steadfast in their determination to build the memorial throughout the course of the more 
than ten-year long debate.  
Who says we need this? 
 The desire for a DEJE was not definitive even within the Jewish community; they 
believed that it was actually the German nation that had a need for the memorial, even 
though the German public seemed not to want it. The thoughts of the Jewish community 
on this topic were important because, after all, this was the community for whom the 
Bundesregierung was supposedly building the memorial, as I will discuss in the early 
parts of the “for whom” debate in Chapter Two. The editor of Der Tagesspiegel, Thomas 
Lackmann, said in 1996 that “even from many Jews one hears that not they themselves, 
above all the Germans need this memorial.”13 In 1998, the liberal Süddeutsche Zeitung 
quoted German Culture Minister Michael Naumann, SPD, as saying that none of his 
American Jewish friends supported the memorial.14 This seems to reveal that at least a 
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portion of the Jewish community did not need or want a Holocaust memorial because 
they knew and would always know what happened in the Holocaust. It was the 
perpetrators who they thought would forget. That is not to say, however, that all Jews 
agreed with this perspective because, as we will see later in this chapter and thesis, many 
Jews spoke out in favor of the memorial and argued on various sides of each topic. 
 More importantly, there was a consistent undercurrent of popular opposition to 
the DEJE that expressed itself in different ways throughout the debate. One example of 
this was four periodicals that presented what they portrayed as general “public opinion” 
about the memorial’s conceptualization and design process. Interestingly, most 
newspapers claimed that the public did not want a national Holocaust memorial, which 
seems to indicate that the movement to build one was driven by an elite, not the general 
population. In 1994, as the first design competition progressed, the conservative weekly 
Focus posited that most people were unhappy with so many Holocaust memorials already 
in Berlin.15 Reflecting the increasing dismay with the inability of the Bund, Land and 
FEDJE to pick a winning design, the liberal Berlin-daily, Der Tagesspiegel, said in 1996 
that “the Berliners need no national Holocaust memorial.”16 In 1997, as the competition 
progressed, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung wrote that most Germans found 
memorials to be “horrors.”17 Finally, in 1998, as Eisenman and Serra began to discus 
revamping their proposal, the liberal monthly publication Merkur stated that “daily in 
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Germany a culture against the memorial has been built.”18 This seems to have been a 
result of the length of the debate, which had lasted for almost ten years at that point; 
people were tired of this DEJE proposition and thought that it would be better to forget it. 
According to the press, despite the supposed necessity and urgency of considering such a 
national Holocaust memorial, it was no longer the public that called for it – it was the 
political and intellectual elite. I believe this revealed the desire of the elite to make 
Germany favorable once again in their own eyes and in the eyes of the world, while at the 
same time showed that the public did not yet want to actively deal with this part of their 
history. 
 The skeptical conclusion many reached was that only the politicians wanted this 
memorial. This view became especially prominent in the aftermath of the failed first 
design competition in 1996 and again in 1998 as the second competition passed the one-
year mark with no definitive decision. In 1996, Thomas Lackmann said that it was only 
the politicians who “above everything carry the opinion of the necessity” of a national 
memorial.19 Many newspaper articles echoed this sentiment, that “it is a wish of 
politicians,” especially following the first competition.20 The feeling seemed to be that if 
Germany was incapable of deciding on a memorial design and of actually getting the 
DEJE built, than they did not really need this memorial. Therefore, it must have been the 
politicians who, despite knowing the public did not need the memorial, sought “to 
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increase memory of the crimes of NS times.”21 Professor of Political Science Peter 
Reichel argued further that “no one in Parliament would like to put forward” that the 
memorial was unnecessary because that would be a bad political move.22 Overall, the 
arguments for and against the necessity of the DEJE presented an interesting 
contradiction: it was a shame both that Germany did not have a memorial and that it had 
waited so long to consider one, but only a particular group of elites actually wanted the 
memorial. That really seems to say, as I have previously stated, that there was a large 
segment of German society that was not yet ready or willing to deal with the Nazi past. 
What is left to consider, therefore, is whether Germans really needed a Memorial to the 
Murdered Jews of Europe – the next topic of this chapter. 
Not Needed: We have the real places 
In Chapter Three and 4, I will briefly touch on the issue of the memorial’s design 
and form as it related to real historical locations related to the Holocaust. While in those 
chapters I will show how this was used as an argument against a museum design for the 
memorial, here I will discuss how some thought that the DEJE itself was superfluous 
because the real historical places in which the Holocaust occurred still existed. In 
particular, these real historical locations refer to KZs, whose remnants still exist 
throughout Germany. As early as 1995, as everyone waited for the review of the first 
design competition to begin, Der Tagesspiegel argued critically that that the attention put 
on creating a memorial could be better spent preserving real Nazi sites.23 The argument 
supporting this criticism was two-fold. First, as Der Tagesspiegel noted, building a 
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national Holocaust memorial would lead to the development of the artificial instead of 
the real.24 Given the fact that these real places were still available, should Germans not 
root their memories deeply in those locations instead of in a construct meant to represent 
them conceptually? According to this argument, memory of the Holocaust could only be 
genuine “where the history itself occurred” and the DEJE was therefore unnecessary 
because it did not further memory of the Holocaust.25 Second some feared that, despite 
government reassurance to the contrary, the new memorial would turn Bund funding and 
everyone’s attention from these historical places.26 The fear was that this would cause the 
Germans to forget the real, or at least to let the real sites fall into disrepair. 
A counter-argument arose to the idea that the real historical locations should 
supersede a central memorial. While most other victim groups had a particular KZ, a 
place of persecution or even a country to which they could go in order to mourn and 
remember, the Jewish victims were without such a place. As Eberhard Jäckel suggested, 
the murder of the European Jews was not just in one place, it was everywhere. They 
therefore had no one gravesite, no one place of mourning. Since Germany had created 
this need, it should provide such a place.27 Anja Paumen, a woman with Berliner-Jewish 
background, wrote in the liberal-centrist Die Zeit that she “would like to have a central 
place in Germany, in which [she] can think of the dead relatives, in which [she] can think 
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of the sorrows of the descendents, and the appalling consequences of those years.”28 Both 
Jäckel and Paumen, however, were speaking out against Andreas Nachama, a Rabbi and 
director of the Topography of Terror exhibit, who argued that the Jewish community did 
not need a Holocaust memorial as they had had “one such memorial in the Jewish 
Cemetery in Weissensee since 1945.”29 It is important to note that this is a substantially 
different argument than that which the Jewish community will make in Chapter Two – 
that the national Holocaust memorial be to the Jews alone. In Chapter Two I will show 
that if there was to be a memorial, despite being a topic of disagreement among the Jews 
to begin with, the Jewish community and German society reached a consensus that it 
should be to the Jews alone. This does not imply that the Jewish community agreed that 
the memorial was necessary in the first place, and as shown here, there was in fact dissent 
within the Jewish community about its necessity.  
Returning to the primary argument that the real historical locations had to be 
considered, in the wake of the first competition the argument changed slightly to include 
disappointment with the winning designs. As Thomas Krüger, MdB-SPD, argued, he 
thought there would never be a design for the memorial that was capable of expressing 
“these infinitely terrible crimes” as the real locations inevitably would.30 He went on to 
say that any attempt to displace historical locations with an artistic design would be 
“artificial” and could therefore easily be overlooked or even forgotten, meaning the 
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DEJE would fail.31 As people began to lose hope that the first design competition could 
produce worthwhile memorial proposals, these arguments seem appropriate because 
people were disheartened. 
However, as Germany moved towards a second design competition, the 
arguments changed again to accept a memorial as long as it was ascertained “that the 
memorial will not be erected at the cost of the preservation of historical scenes.”32 The 
support for this argument was so strong that renowned memory scholar and architecture 
expert James E. Young, who supported building the memorial, emphasized that 
regardless of the government’s decision on the memorial, it would never be complete 
outside the context of the real historical locations.33 In other words, a Holocaust 
memorial would only succeed if it did not intend to replace the places of history; it ought 
to refer to them and direct visitors to those locations as well. This balance of supporting 
the real locations while moving forward with a DEJE was the consensus reached. 
Reconciliation and Antisemitism: Remembering the Victims 
In Chapter Two I will emphasize the continued awareness of perpetrator versus 
victim identity in Germany and discuss how it played out in terms of the question for 
whom the DEJE would be built. In the discussion over the need for a DEJE, this 
victim/perpetrator conflict took a different form – in the conservative call for a memorial 
that would serve a reconciliatory function. As early as 1994, going into the first design 
competition, the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung focused on the DEJE as “a 
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sign of the reconciliation” between victims’ descendents and the German majority 
society.34 According to Salomon Korn, this memorial would be “an important step in the 
still long outstanding normalization in contact between Jews and non-Jews in 
Germany.”35 In this view, the German majority would offer this memorial to the victims, 
the Jews, as a peace offering. This would then lead to forgiveness and the ability to move 
on from the past. Obviously for a nation still aware of its internal divisions between 
perpetrator and victim the DEJE, through the reconciliation it would theoretically bring, 
would become an important step towards establishing an inclusive national identity, a 
topic I will discuss again later in this chapter. As time progressed and this language of the 
memorial as a form of reconciliation strengthened, more liberal voices, like historian 
Christian Meier, began to fear that a memorial would be an alibi for “real” reconciliation 
with the victims. From this perspective, the fear was that that Germany would use the 
memorials instead of public apologies or monetary compensation for the victims.36  
Another liberal argument that arose out of the overall discussion over finding a 
balance between the victims and perpetrators was that in attempting to bring the 
Holocaust into public memory it would provoke right-wing factions in Germany. The 
liberals feared that it would stir reactions against the memorial and be the “basis for the 
practical radicalization of German ideologies” because a memorial that represented 
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sympathy for Jewish victims would undoubtedly provoke a response from those who still 
retained anti-Semitic feelings.37 Hungarian author and later President of the Academy of 
Art in Berlin, Gyorgy Konrad, suggested that building the memorial for the Jews alone, 
in the proposed scale, would automatically “provide new anti-Semitism,” developed out 
of resentment from other victim groups and perhaps even the public.38 The Sinti and 
Roma were unhappy with the decision for a memorial to the Jews alone, and others 
agreed with them as Chapter Two will show. Der Tagesspiegel, however, pointed out that 
if a memorial concerning the Holocaust, a part of Germany’s past that had to be dealt 
with, increased anti-Semitism, than German society was “threatened by something far 
worse than a memorial.”39 Further, that perhaps it was this concern, that anti-Semitic 
sentiments were so strong they were actually a political threat, that the country ought to 
consider.  
German Shame and Collective Memory 
As discussed in the Introduction, the Historikerstreit raised the issue of German 
shame to a level of high importance. During the debate, two sides were clearly 
established: what I call Normalizers, who supported the conservative perspective that 
thought Germany should move past shame and what I call Resisters, who supported the 
liberal perspective that thought Germany should continue to deal with the consequences 
of its past actions. Those who proposed the DEJE came from this latter perspective and 
suggested that Germany needed a Holocaust memorial because finally “the murderers 
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must be shamed.”40 Following the end of World War II and the fall of the Nazi regime, 
there were too many Germans who had sympathized with the Nazi party to punish all of 
them in any appropriate way. Since the end of the war, therefore, these former Nazi 
supporters had slowly reassumed their roles in positions of power and of cultural 
influence, allowed to return to work by the occupying forces because, simply, they knew 
their jobs best. According to President of the Academy of Art and Kultursenator (Senator 
for Cultural Affairs) Ulrich Roloff-Momin, in those positions they “contributed to 
displacing the memory of the crimes in which they were not even disinterested.”41 
Without a proper reckoning with history, without a memorial, this German majority at the 
time was able to engage again in the world without ever accounting for their crimes. 
Already in this chapter, the issue of shame has arisen twice. In the first instance, it was a 
shame that the Germans did not have such a memorial. In the second, it was to say that 
other nations were shaming the Germans by having memorials first. 
Resisters also believed, however, that while the memorial would bring German 
shame to public view, “no matter how successful the memorial, it will not relieve this 
blame.”42  A memorial would not reduce the shame that the Germans felt for their past. 
According to this perspective, a present day German could and must feel shame for the 
Nazi past. Further, the monument “should express shame, the collective shame that one 
as a German belongs to the people, that the main culprits produced, tolerated, carried and 
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supported.”43 Berliner Zeitung Feature’s editor Jens Jessen suggested that German shame, 
established in the memorial, would actually be a way of purifying the Germans and their 
culture.44 Jessen took the position that the memorial would force Germans to deal with 
shame, reconcile with it and thereby move on. 
Even among those who believed that shame was a necessity, there were concerns 
about the use of shame in a memorial. First, while recognizing that “one cannot think 
about the murdered without shame,” social historian Professor Jürgen Kocka questioned 
whether a memorial was actually capable of evoking this shame.45 His thought was 
echoed by cultural scholar and author Christina von Braun later the same month when she 
questioned whether there really could be a memorial that remembered national shame, 
because she defined shame as something that resided “in the mortal and incomplete 
individual,” not in a nation or community.46 Second, while not questioning a memorial’s 
capability of expressing shame, historian Heinz Dieter Kittsteiner worried that the 
memorial would focus too much on individual shame and not enough on national shame 
for the event as a whole.47 As I will discuss in Chapters Three and Four, however, the 
consensus was that a memorial would be an adequate medium through which to exhibit 
national shame for the Holocaust. 
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On the other side of the discussion were the Normalizers who believed that shame 
and guilt should have less of a presence in the memorial and German society. Martin 
Walser, a German writer, became a major German public figure in the late 1990’s for 
statements like the following: “instead of being thankful for the incessant presentation of 
our shame, I begin to look the other way.”48 Walser was a perfect example of someone 
who was disillusioned with attempts to memorialize the Nazi crimes and was at the point 
of belief that having no memorial would be better. Some from this perspective were less 
insistent than Walser, but still thought there should be less of a representation of shame. 
Comments from this perspective included those such as “the commitment to guilt must be 
simple and meaningful; not its form, its inscription must stand in the forefront.”49 Some 
Germans regarded “guilt” as such to be a wholly inaccurate portrayal for the memorial 
because “guilt sinks in the grave with the guilty.”50 A present day German could not feel 
guilty about the crimes his or her grandparents had committed; she or he had no control 
over their actions and was therefore not responsible. This raised the unsolvable and 
timeless question of how much responsibility a descendent generation can take for the 
actions of their grandparents. This opposition argument was one of many throughout the 
debate over the DEJE that reveal a continued hesitancy of the Germans in the process of 
dealing with the Holocaust in contemporary memory. 
It would not, however, be individual shame; the memorial would express the 
shame of the German community and allow Germany as a whole to bear the burden of 
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shame and responsibility, so that the individual alone would not have to live with that 
guilt.51 This perspective of, what I call, communal shame was first presented in 1995 but 
was in fact the ultimate consensus reached regarding the memorial’s representation of 
shame. German writer Bernhard Schulz argued that there could be no more individual 
memory once those with the memories had died. “With the death of those involved . . .  
the individual memory is definitively cut off from the collective realization.”52 In this 
instance, it was the generation who had lived during the Third Reich who had died and 
therefore what the Germans were struggling with was the form the collective memory, 
which supersedes any one individual, would take. 
Because those who had been involved in bringing Hitler to power and carrying 
out the policies of Nazi racial genocide had almost all passed away, the ability to 
“perpetuate” that familiarity with the Nazi crimes had faded. The state, then, had to take 
on the role of the antecedent generations by giving the nation a form of collective, 
national memory. Others turned this point of view slightly to say that the test for the 
Holocaust memorial’s success would be whether or not those who had no connection to 
the Third Reich, the newer generations, could still feel concerned with or bound to the 
memory of the Nazi past. “Then it will manifest itself, whether it is an annoyance, taken 
with indifference or truly summoned to remembrance.”53 Thus, memory of National 
Socialist times had to pass into the collective memory realm – where the nation 
remembered an event together as opposed to individually or within a family. Renowned 
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German cultural scholar, Aleida Assmann, defined collective memory as it related to the 
memorial in the following way: “collective memory as a nation is in this sense a trans-
generationally perpetuated knowledge of the history of the crimes that were begun by the 
Germans and remain connected to their name.”54 
Didactic 
 The argument that Germany needed the DEJE as a place for communal Holocaust 
memory and the relief of the individual burden of shame to the nation brings us to 
another important issue: the need for a physical representation of Holocaust memory for 
future generations. The memorial’s original purpose was to remember the Nazi’s anti-
Semitism and its catastrophic results. Arguably, one of the best arguments that Germany 
needed a national Holocaust memorial was that through it “the terrible sorrow of the 
murder of millions of Jews will never fall into oblivion.”55 Especially with the death of so 
many people directly connected to the Nazi era, the younger generations were losing 
direct links to that past. Increasingly, young Germans could not ask their grandparents or 
even parents what had happened from 1933-1945, and therefore the lessons had to be 
taught not from individual memory but through schools and museums. With this issue 
came the concern that should “forgetting” begin to occur, than the Holocaust could 
potentially happen again. According to Der Tagesspiegel, “this imperative alone,” that 
Auschwitz must not be repeated, “justifies the venture of a monument.”56 Therefore, 
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supporters of this perspective argued Germany must take proper precaution to preserve 
the memory of its crimes for future generations. 
 On the issue of forgetting, once again the Normalizer and Resister perspectives 
are useful. Salomon Korn clearly represented the Normalizer position when he said that 
because in the memorial “the individual memory is relieved [to the collective] – the 
comfortable forgetting can take its course.”57 By this Korn, and those who took the 
Normalization position, thought that the best possible path the German nation could take 
was to move past the constant focus on the Holocaust and allow Germans to go on with 
their individual lives without being constantly reminded of the Holocaust. A portion of 
German society was uncomfortable with this type of “forgetting” that Korn described, as 
I will discuss presently. In 1995, after the first competition failed to produce any 
actionable results, journalist Malte Lehming wrote that:  
The historiography of an epoch will often be prefaced 
through the erection of memorials. The holocaust seems to 
escape this historiography. Apparently the past in Germany 
is still too lively to be ready or ripe for a memorial.58 
 
This last point, that the historical past was still too alive in Germany to be concretized, 
seemed to be particularly relevant and true given the vivacity, length and complexity of 
the debate over the Holocaust memorial. The Senatsverwaltung für Bau- und 
Wohnungswesen (Senate Committee for Building and Housing) suggested that Germans 
were afraid to follow through on building the memorial because it would mean “finally, 
                                                 
57
 “Die eigene Erinnerung ist entlastet – das bequeme Vergessen kann seinen Lauf nehmen” - Salomon 
Korn, “Die Tafeln sind zerbrochen,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2/9/1996), 500. 
58
 “Die Historisierung einer Epoche wird oft durch die Errichtung eines Monuments eingeleitet. Der 
Holocaust aber scheint sich dieser Historisierung zu entziehen. Offenbar ist die Vergangenheit in 
Deutschland noch zu lebendig, um schon denkmalstauglich, denkmalsreif zu sein.” Malte Lehming, 
“Grabplatte über Deutschland,” Der Tagesspiegel (7/9/1995), 460. 
 40 
from now on an end must be made to this type of coming to terms with the past.”59 In 
other words, that the memorial would end conversation and the presence of the Holocaust 
in public thought. Based on the opposition arguments I have discussed, this seems to be 
an accurate statement. Most people did seem to be afraid to create a concrete memorial to 
the Holocaust because they did not want to have to deal with the past in that ever-present 
capacity. 
Those I presented in the introduction as wanting to prevent the “normalization” of 
German history saw that the memorial would be important for the didactic role it would 
serve to prevent any forgetting of the Holocaust. The fundamental basis for this didactic 
function was the idea that “the past cannot be mastered” and that Germans must 
continually deal with it for the rest of their history.60 In this regard, the memorial, would 
“instruct people about the crimes committed by their compatriots,” without relying on the 
personal, individual memories that were quickly disappearing.61 By presenting Holocaust 
history collectively, the memorial would prevent “the accustomed practice to blandish or 
distort the history of a nation,” as often happened with individual memories.62 This result 
would come about because the memorial would be an official statement of the shame and 
guilt of the nation that neither past nor future generations could erase or euphemize. With 
such a memorial, Germany could not forget the Holocaust. Because Germans could not 
erase their past, they must pass their history on through the generations. The 
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Senatsverwaltung für Bau- und Wohnungswesen said of the purpose of the memorial that 
“we want to continually tell the story that must be told. We want the truth,” which could 
only be accomplished through a concrete, didactic form of memory.63 
 Even within this anti-forgetting perspective, there was concern that using the 
medium of a memorial to prevent forgetting would cause the inevitable “concretization” 
of memory. Those who used the term were referring to taking a piece of history and 
freezing it in place, in a specific form, communicating a specific message. In other words, 
“memorials are important mosaic stones in the display of memory” because “they are 
static.”64 For fulfilling the didactic purpose of the memorial and for the purpose of 
building national identity, Germany had to decide on the message it wished to 
communicate about the Holocaust. This single unified message was essential to creating 
an historical definition of the Holocaust. However, many found problems with this 
function. Critics suggested that memorials actually “take memory prisoner” by limiting it 
to one finite perspective and portraying it as one, definitive national history.65 Further, in 
doing so, the critics said “memorials ban the unspoken” because they tell you 
“everything” that you need to know about the past; they do not require you to look 
beyond them for further meaning and information.66 By presenting a single message as 
the official national perspective on the Holocaust, as a national Holocaust memorial 
would certainly do, the fear was that a memorial would eliminate the dialectic of the 
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Holocaust that had kept it alive for so long, challenging members of the German society 
not to forget. 
 Those on the extreme side of the anti-forgetting perspective actually thought that 
the memorial would help people to forget and that it would provide an alibi for dealing 
with real history. Roman Herzog, Bundespräsident (President of Germany), saw in 
“every attempt to bring the crimes of the Nazis to historical memory, ultimately only a 
special form of intellectual cowardess.”67 By this he meant that instead of continuing to 
deal with the past and grapple with it in an active way, the memorial condemned German 
memory of the Holocaust to passive memory, where it was looked at but not dealt with. 
This, he considered to be intellectual weakness. Instead of provoking memory, people 
like Herzog thought that the public would use a memorial to excuse themselves from 
active forms of memory, like discussion. Because a memorial would mean “the 
replacement of memory with the rituals of memory,” people would allow themselves to 
consider the Holocaust and Nazi crimes only when they visited the memorial.68  Instead 
of forcing people to carry their historical guilt or shame with them, these byproducts of 
memory were quickly “deposited in “gravestones” of cement and steel” to be forgotten 
there for the rest of time.69 
 Still others argued that, despite this talk of needing not to forget, for fifty years 
the Germans had had no national Holocaust memorial and most had not yet forgotten the 
Holocaust despite this. From this point of view, the memorial would be superfluous, and 
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thus unneeded, for precisely that reason. An article in Der Tagesspiegel postulated that 
the mere fact that German society had spent so long debating the Holocaust memorial 
was proof that no one was going to forget.70 Particularly between the two competitions, 
April 1996 through June 1997, the sentiment was strong that in Germany this national 
Holocaust memorial was unnecessary because “one needs no memory help here;” the 
memory of the past was still too strong and vibrant for a physical memorial to be of 
value.71 Jewish publicist Peter Moses-Krause stated that he did “not need this memorial 
for remembering [his] history in Germany – never mind how important, pretty or 
expensive.”72 This argument may have seemed logical for some who still had a personal 
or close generational connection to the National Socialist past. For them it was not 
necessary to formalize this memory in memorials because it was so clear in their 
individual memories. Professor Peter Reichel even suggested that perhaps “the formula 
that only through memory of the Holocaust will prevent its repetition” was incorrect.73 
He suggested that the Germans look beyond the passive memory that a memorial would 
encourage a form of active historical responsibility in the world that would eradicate the 
possibility of another Holocaust, a topic that I will discuss later in this chapter. 
Because those who supported this perspective believed that the DEJE would quiet 
intellectual debate about the Holocaust, many thought that the concretization of memory 
created by a national memorial would put the Holocaust into the annals of history 
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forever. They saw it as “a gravestone . . . over the German past,” over National Socialist 
times, putting it to rest in the minds of individual Germans.74 Although trying to make the 
opposite point that this was actually a good thing, architect Salomon Korn perfectly 
portrayed the anti-forgetting perspective’s point by saying that “if the memory is 
concretized in the memorial, than it is reified for everyone.”75 In other words, taking the 
memory out of public debate and ritualizing it would make the Holocaust memory a part 
of the past, not the present. A memorial makes history something to be looked at and 
thought about, but keeps it from being living history in the way that events being debated 
in the present are. What would become the ultimate consensus on this topic was what Der 
Tagesspiegel suggested in 1995, that although the “ritualization of memory that 
accompanies the medium of memorials” was not necessarily sought after, it was a 
mandatory “cost for their erection.”76 As discussed earlier, putting the Holocaust into a 
memorial would place the burden of individual memory, thought and shame for these 
events on the community as a whole. Because this DEJE would exhibit the collective 
memory of the German nation, the memorial would help to establish a national identity. 
Thus, ritualization was not all negative because it required an acceptance of history on 
behalf of German society, and this “acceptance of history establishes identity” as CDU 
member Michel Friedman said.77 
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National Identity 
 Germany had been devastated by World War II both physically and 
psychologically and was then thrown into a 45 year period during which it was divided in 
quarters and then in half by conquering nations. As a result, reunification necessitated 
that Germany redefine its identity as a nation, as I discussed in the Introduction. During 
the debate over the DEJE, there was a general consensus that a central Holocaust 
memorial would establish a German national identity. The earliest formulations of this at 
the very beginning of the debate simply requested that the FEDJE make it clear to the 
German nation that the debate over the memorial and the memorial’s construction itself 
would be “a deciding part of their self-understanding in the present as well as in the 
future.”78 During the first design competition, this message changed slightly. Now the 
memorial would be a piece of the new national identity because it was the Germans, 
through their thoughts, artwork and designs, that the memorial would exhibit.79  
In the uncertainty of the second competition, Thomas Lackmann questioned the 
reasoning behind a memorial in the first place, as we have discussed, and in doing so 
wondered if it should represent “‘the society’s understanding of itself.’”80 Lackmann said 
that “the plan to build a DEJE is hardly removed from the process of a new self-
definition of the republic and capital.”81 Political commentator Konrad Schuller called the 
representation of Nazi memory aesthetically “the prerequisite for the new beginning as a 
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nation.”82 While he did not suggest an answer, Jürgen Kocka, whom he was quoting, was 
more confident about what the memorial would mean for Germany: it would be “a source 
of power and an identification of the strength of our community.”83 In other words, he 
located national identity in the nation’s ability to even envision, decide upon and build 
this memorial to such difficult memories. Even Bundeskanzler Helmut Kohl saw the 
memorial as “concerning the kernel of our self-understanding as a nation.”84 Clearly, the 
general consensus was that a DEJE would establish a new national identity and this was 
much needed especially in terms of coming to terms with the Holocaust. 
Because the discussion of a memorial’s purpose showed that the Germans would 
allow it to play such a significant role in determining their national identity, the entire 
debate occurred in light of this idea. In other words, the more the Germans talked about 
the idea that this memorial would establish a national identity, the more true it seems that 
it actually would do so. The more true this became, and the more likely it was that a 
memorial would actually be built, the more there was concern that the DEJE would 
establish a new, negative national identity based on the Nazi past. This whole question of 
really considering the Holocaust forced Germans to rethink their entire past – from the 
great cultural history that produced Goethe, Schiller and Beethoven to the Nazi 
concentration camp Auschwitz. The fear was that, through the memorial, the unhappy 
memory of the Holocaust and all it implied would become the primary foundation for the 
new German national identity.  
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The concern that the DEJE would establish a negative national identity was 
expressed in two ways. The first was that, as discussed, the memorial would embody the 
guilt and/or shame of the German nation, causing Germany to have “a national self-
awareness out of guilt.”85 Christina von Braun questioned whether it was appropriate to 
build a national community based on shame for the National Socialist past, as would 
occur should the government build a national Holocaust memorial.86 These opinions 
represented the paradox of trying to establish a confident, healthy nation when it must 
always know that it committed such dreadful crimes. The second problem presented even 
a bigger issue to German society: a national identity built on the Holocaust victims 
sacrificed the victims once again for the good of the whole. Through this line of 
reasoning, a DEJE would make the Jews double victims. Having been the victims of the 
Nazis from 1933-1945, now they would be the fundamental element of the national 
Holocaust memorial, which would become the foundation of a new German society and 
identity, albeit one in which they were included.87  
 Many articles showed fear that the DEJE “could be used and abused as the 
foundation myth of a Berlin republic.”88 The fear of this stemmed not just from the 
contemporary discussions, but also from the government and public having observed the 
DDR (Deutsche Demokratische Republik – Communist East Germany 1949 – 1990) use 
the memory of Holocaust victims as a method of manipulative control, as I briefly 
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discussed in the introduction, which West Germans saw as “a cheap and cynical act.”89 
However, West Germans like journalist Henryk Broder admitted that the victims were 
“being misused a second time, this time by good Germans for a good purpose.”90 This 
misuse was the concern; this question of whether the establishment of a new German 
national identity really meant the subjection of Jewish victims to the “centerpieces for a 
suitable national collective.”91 The question was whether Germans really wanted to create 
a national identity based on this memorial that would carry German collective memory of 
the Holocaust. 
National Identity: What are we seeking? 
Having firmly established that this Holocaust memorial would be a source of new 
German national identity and self-perception, whether for good or bad, a great deal of 
conversation revolved around what the memorial should communicate. If the memorial 
was going to be the source of a new national identity, what would that identity be? 
Former MdB-CSU and Cultural-political Speaker, Oscar Schneider, said the memorial 
had to communicate “a commitment to the human rights with which all people are 
born.”92 Given the specific wrongs the Nazis committed during the Holocaust, this was 
an understandable request. Peter Conradi, MdB-SPD, wanted the memorial “to incite 
meditation on guilt, shame and sorrow” to show that the nation would not stop 
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considering the Holocaust as a result of the memorial.93 It should additionally “invoke 
humanity and peace” in contrast to the events that it memorialized.94 Dr. Burkhard 
Hirsch, MdB-FDP, wanted the memorial to warn German society of “the fragile line that 
we call civilization that divides us from barbarism.”95 The new German national identity 
would take proper precaution against German society crossing this line because it would 
mean that they were aware that the line actually could be crossed, as it had been in order 
to make the Holocaust happen. Still others required that the memorial convey “the 
heights and depths of our whole story next to each other,”96 allowing “the shared German 
memory [to] be united over the former border strife between East and West.”97 In this 
way, the memorial would establish a national identity that sought to recognize the 
reunification and in doing so bring together both sides of the formerly divided Germany. 
 A second fundamental piece of the memorial’s establishment of a national 
identity concerned not just self-perception and internal identity, but world perception. 
Since the Nazi party had come to power in 1933, through Germany’s division in 1949 
and the dramatic collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the nations of the world had 
observed Germany with both horror and amazement. Thus this new memorial had to 
demonstrate the new national identity of the Germans to the eyes of the world as well. 
The debate established three primary messages that the memorial ought to portray to 
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those beyond their own borders. The first message was that Germany “has learned her 
terrible lesson” through careful consideration of the crimes and the Nazi past.98 As a 
result of this, the world would see that Germany would not be capable of falling once 
again into the patterns that had led to the rise of Hitler.  
The second message was that Germany had definitively accepted the Holocaust 
along with the Nazi-era crimes as a “constituent element of the ethical, political self-
understanding of the Bundesrepublik (Federal Republic of Germany).”99 In the immediate 
post-war period and especially in the DDR, it had not been clear whether Germany would 
ever take responsibility for its crimes. This memorial would allow Germany to “show the 
world that it has assumed without reserve the darkest pages of its past as a part of its 
unique history.”100 Further, this message would demonstrate that the Germans as a people 
“are historical people” in that they recognized they were a part of their national history, 
but a people who now act and make decisions “very differently from their history.”101  
The third message was that Germany was a self-confident nation in its place 
within Europe economically, socially and physically. On the one hand, this message of 
strength was intended to show that Germany was “a ‘self-aware’ nation rather than a self-
aware nation of sorrow.”102 This message would suggest that Germans and the German 
nation were no longer bound by their historical deeds but had reconciled with them and 
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moved beyond. On the other hand, the memorial’s location in Berlin, to which the 
government had relocated in 1991, would symbolize that Germany was confident in its 
location, that it had overcome the last physical effects of its trying history.103  
 The third essential piece of identity establishment that those concerned with the 
memorial wished to see realized was historical responsibility. Of all of the concepts of 
national identity the new memorial was to embody, this was probably the most 
significant, pertaining both to the Germans as a nation and to their role in the world. 
Something on which almost everyone seemed to agree was that no matter what the 
memorial represented or did not represent, no matter for what concepts the memorial was 
built with or without, it could not be built without a sense of obligatory responsibility.104 
By this term, those who used it meant several things. First, that contemporary Germans 
had the responsibility to ensure that future generations would “continue to engage with 
the theme” of the Holocaust and not forget it.105 In another formulation, James Young 
said that Germans had the responsibility to preserve the memory of “the irreplaceable 
void that this persecution left behind.”106  
 Perhaps the most important way of discussing the historical responsibility of the 
Germans was that the memorial would display the German community’s commitment to 
the prevention of fascism and racism, not just in their country, but around the world. 
Volker Beck, MdB-GP, said that the “memorial is a commitment to historical response 
and shame in Germany. It is a memorial against anti-Semitism and each form of racism 
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and, so with it, for human rights, democracy and due process.”107 The German nation had 
the responsibility, as a result of their history, to resist or support these ideas before the 
rest of their world as their eternal penance for their past. Similarly, Bundestagespräsident 
Wolfgang Thierse said that the memorial would embody the responsibility of the 
Germans “never again to allow such a terrible dictator.”108 The prevention of a repetition 
this past in Germany and the world, he said, was the historical responsibility of both 
current and future generations. If the result of the debate over the Holocaust memorial 
brought only one conclusion for German society, this was it: that they had a 
responsibility, as a result of their past, to keep their mistakes from happening again. 
Conclusion 
 Despite an uncertainty as to whether or not Germany actually needed a national 
Holocaust memorial, the debate over that question revealed just how important this 
memorial would be for German national identity. By revealing the issues of guilt versus 
shame, individual versus collective memory, reconciliation and moral responsibility, the 
discussion itself mandated that the memorial would have an impact on the nation’s new 
definition of itself. Whatever the memorial ended up presenting and exhibiting, that 
would be the foundation for the new national identity. During the debate, the intellectuals 
who had participated said that Germany’s success or failure in building this memorial 
would be a testament to its sincerity in wanting to overcome the crimes of their past. In 
order to determine this, the actions Germany has taken in the world to fulfill its historical 
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responsibility must be examined. This would be the real test of German sincerity and of 
the true conclusion to the notion of Vergangenheitsbewältigung. 
This larger question of whether or not Germany actually needed a national 
Holocaust memorial and what meaning it would take on in German society did not stand 
alone in the Denkmalstreit. Rather, it simultaneously raised many other questions about 
the Holocaust and a Holocaust memorial, several of which I have mentioned in the course 
of this chapter. Among those who assumed the necessity of the memorial from the 
beginning, including the majority of victim groups, the FEDJE and the Land Berlin, the 
next question that naturally arose was that of for whom the memorial should be built. If 
Germany was to have this national, central Holocaust memorial, who exactly did the 
Holocaust include? This is the topic of Chapter Two.  
Chapter II 
Defining the Holocaust:  
The Debate to Determine its Victims 
   
 
The Historikerstreit raised, among many other issues, the questions of the 
singularity of Jewish persecution in the Holocaust and of the connectedness between 
living Germans and their ancestors who had committed the crimes. Attempting to deal 
with these questions raised the broader question: What exactly is the Holocaust in 
contemporary German memory? The term Holocaust is one of the most intensely 
contested terms in recent history. Having roots in the Greek word Holokauston, meaning 
a completely burnt sacrificial offering,1 most know the Holocaust specifically as the 
genocide of more than 6 million people classified as Jews by the Nazi regime.2 The 
Nazis, however, persecuted and murdered millions of other people whom they did not 
classify as Jewish under their racial theories, including Sinti and Roma gypsies, Poles, 
Slavs, homosexuals, the disabled and elderly, Communists and Social Democrats. For a 
variety of reasons, discussion, literature and thought about the Holocaust typically does 
not include the senseless murder of these groups of people. Even the name of the German 
national Holocaust memorial, Denkmal für die Ermordeten Juden Europas (DEJE), 
reflected the view that the term should apply primarily to the Jews, the reasons for which 
are the subject of this chapter. 
 In the debate over the national Holocaust memorial, no question plagued the 
participants more nor evoked so much emotion as this: which groups of victims was this 
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central memorial going to remember? Many participants in the debate noted the real 
questions that lay behind this discussion were: “to whom does the Holocaust belong?” 
and ultimately, how do Germans define the Holocaust?3 There were calls to spend time 
clarifying who “the Nazis and their victims” were, the discussion of which deepened the 
debate and enriched its historical importance.4 In the debate over the national Holocaust 
memorial in Germany, these questions were initially in terms of including or excluding 
Sinti and Roma in the dedication of the central memorial. 
By examining the development of the debate over this issue, the two main 
opposing sides became immediately clear. Television personality Lea Rosh and historian 
Eberhard Jäckel, founders of the movement to create a central memorial for the 
Holocaust, intended this memorial to remember the Jewish victims specifically. They 
received support from other notable public figures such as historian Joachim Braun, CEO 
of Daimler-Benz Edzard Reuter, former Bundeskanzler Willy Brandt and author Christa 
Wolf, among others. The opposition led by Romani Rose, Chairman of the Central 
Council of the German Sinti and Roma (ZSR), promoted the position that the memorial 
should not be exclusively for the Jews, and he received a great deal of editorial support 
for the claim.5 The fight to include the Sinti and Roma victims, or even all victims, of the 
Nazis in the memorial was supported most notably by Kultursenator6 Ulrich Roloff-
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Momin, Professor Reinhard Rürup, director of the Topography of Terror exhibit, and 
Heriburt Heuss of the Documentation and Cultural Center of the German Sinti and 
Roma.7  
Before approaching the issues illuminated by the debate over whom the national 
Holocaust memorial should represent, a brief chronology of this argument is essential. 
Discussion about this subject began to appear significantly in printed media during April 
1989, not long after Lea Rosh initially proposed a central Holocaust memorial. At this 
time, both the positions of Romani Rose and of those who argued for a uniquely Jewish 
memorial appeared unwilling to make comprises to their positions.8 As the opposition 
hardened towards dedicating the central memorial to the Jewish victims alone, calls for 
increased discussion before the government made any final decisions resulted in debates 
about the victim groups.9 In late 1991 and early 1992, foreseeing that compromise was no 
longer a possibility,10 many journalists and editorial writers suggested that a design 
competition decide for whom and how the memorial would be constructed.11 The 
argument then began to spiral out of control, moving from a historical debate over the 
Holocaust to accusations of racism on the part of those who wanted the memorial 
exclusively for the Jews.12 Simultaneously, Romani Rose rejected Roloff-Momin’s offer 
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to use government funds to build a second memorial for the Sinti and Roma, similar to 
the memorial for the Jews.13 
In mid-1992, Rose began to reach out to Heinz Galinski, retiring two-time 
Chairman of the Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland (ZJD), which had become 
instrumental in the discussion of the preceding years, hoping to find a solution. 14  The 
ZJD, however, reaffirmed that it would not consider involving Sinti and Roma sufferings 
in the Jewish memorial.15 Finally, in October 1992, the debate seemed to come to an end 
when the Berlin Kultursenator Roloff-Momin declared officially that the memorial would 
be only for the Jews and that the government would support the building of a similar 
memorial for the Sinti and Roma nearby.16 While this initially increased discussion over 
the object of the memorial, eventually it gave way to a new topic of debate: whether this 
memorial, though dedicated to the Jews, was actually more for the German nation as a 
whole.  
While the chronological context of this debate is essential to understand, the 
fundamental thematic issues that constituted each side of the debate are the focus of this 
chapter and I will therefore not be paying strict attention to chronology. When the 
Förderkreis Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europes (FEDJE) was created in 1989, 
and even when Lea Rosh first proposed the idea for a national Holocaust memorial, the 
idea behind it had always been to remember the genocide of the Jews. Initially the 
reasons for dedicating the memorial to the Jews seemed clear. After all, who would 
question such an effort? Over time, however, provocation from the ZSR increasingly 
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required that the FEDJE justify its decision to make the memorial for the Jews alone. Out 
of this, two arguments for an exclusively Jewish memorial developed: the centrality of 
anti-Semitism to National Socialism and the singularity of the persecution of the Jews. In 
the next section I will examine how the leaders of the FEDJE justified both building the 
memorial and its dedication to the Jewish victims along with these arguments of Jewish 
centrality to Nazi policies and the singularity of their persecution.  
Jews as Central and Singular Victims 
In order to discuss the centrality and singularity of Jews as victims, it is essential 
to understand how Jews came to be victims in the first place through Nazi racial thought 
in general and then its special meaning for the Jews. Hitler’s Mein Kampf first published 
in 1925 initially established policies that were later enforced in both word and deed by 
Nazi officials. The Nazis viewed race as an end: the ultimate goal being complete racial 
purity and the domination of the Aryan race.17 The Nazi concept of race itself was based 
on a pseudo-scientific concept of genetics and physical traits. Because race could be 
identified “scientifically,” strong qualities could be developed, while weak ones could be 
eliminated.18 But as long as the weak qualities continued to exist, they “polluted” the pure 
race and risked destroying it. Hitler said, “the lost purity of blood alone destroys inner 
happiness forever” of both an individual and a nation.19 Thus, Nazi racial policy focused 
on two goals: the promotion of the good Aryan characteristics and the elimination of the 
tainted characteristics.  
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While there were many groups of people that ultimately had tainted 
characteristics according to the Nazis, only the Jews were targeted from the beginning in 
Mein Kampf. Hitler considered the Jews to be an “unclean,” “mixed” race with non-
Aryan physical characteristics but who tried to live among the Aryan cultures just the 
same. Because, he said, “the Jew lacks those qualities which distinguish the races that are 
creative and hence culturally blessed,”20 as the Aryan races indelibly were, Jews living 
among Aryans were “parasites” feeding off of Aryan society and contributing nothing 
positive in return.21 In addition to this, Hitler believed that “the Jew has always been a 
people with definite racial characteristics and never a religion.”22 Thus, converting Jews 
to Protestantism could not teach them the sought-after qualities nor eliminate their 
supposed inherent and tainted racial characteristics. The Nazis believed that the mere 
existence of the Jews among Aryan society polluted the Aryans and put them at risk for 
failure as a people. 
Nazi racial thought, however, did not stop at saying that the Jews were a passive 
threat to the Germany Aryan society. Rather, Nazis also insisted that Jews were actively 
trying to bring down Germany. In the wake of the First World War and the humiliations 
of the Versailles Treaty, the Nazi party needed a scapegoat to explain why the Germans 
had lost and the Jews were the perfect victims. Jews were a perpetual minority in every 
country and could easily be turned into an internal enemy without negatively affecting or 
alienating the majority. Thus, the Nazis portrayed the Jews as the backstabbers who lost 
Germany the war; thus, the Nazi party was going to save Germany not only from the 
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horrible post-war conditions, but also from the Jewish threat.23 Further, the Nazis 
capitalized on the visible Jewish presence in banking and consumer industries by arguing 
that via these industries the Jews were trying to ruin the economy.24 At the same time, the 
Nazis illogically associated Jews with Bolshevism, terrifying the public who feared an 
expansion of Communism from Russia, and fueling the notion that Jews were 
subversive.25 Hitler and the Nazis utilized any and every presence of the Jews in German 
society against them. They did this for the dual purpose of promoting the Aryan race and 
the Nazis and eliminating those who were apparently trying to “destroy” German society: 
the Jews.  
As a result, Nazi policy dictated that all Jews had to be removed from Germany 
and contact with the Aryan race. It seems pertinent to mention here that precisely what 
removal meant was up for debate. American political scientist Daniel Goldhagen wrote 
an extremely controversial book entitled Hitler’s Willing Executioners in 1996 that dealt, 
in part, with this subject. Goldhagen’s argument was that the German and Nazi forms of 
anti-Semitism were always “eliminationist” in nature and further that “the eliminationist 
mind-set tended towards an exterminationist one.”26 In other words, Goldhagen argued 
that inherent to German national identity throughout history was the mindset of wanting 
to eradicate all of the Jews, an intent that came close to fruition during the Nazi years. 
Many, however, do not accept Goldhagen’s point of view because of Nazi ideas like the 
Madagascar Plan, which sought to round up all the Jews and ship them to Madagascar. It 
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was certainly still an eliminationist plan, but at the very least it would have been better 
than the Holocaust that resulted.27 
With an understanding of the National Socialists racial policies and how they 
applied to the Jews in particular, it is now possible to discuss Jewish persecution in terms 
of who the Holocaust memorial should remember. The first argument raised by 
supporters of an exclusively Jewish memorial was that persecution of Jews played a 
central role in the National Socialist regime. Both the public and professional participants 
in the discussion used historical events to support this claim. Most frequently cited was 
the Wansee Conference of January 1942, a meeting between the leaders of the Nazi party 
to decide the fate of the Jews. The discussion at this conference centered on the “die 
Endlösung” (the Final Solution) for the so-called “Judenfrage” (Jewish Question).28  
Essentially, it was a warrant for the genocide of all Jews living in German territories. 
Other editorials and articles invoked the boycott of Jewish businesses in 1933, the 
Nuremberg Laws of 1935 that deprived Jews of Reich citizenship among other rights, or 
Kristallnacht (Night of Broken Glass), a state-sponsored pogrom in 1938, during which 
the Sturmabteilung (Nazi paramilitary) destroyed synagogues, Jewish businesses, homes 
and property.29 The purpose of calling up these historical events was to show how 
codified, planned, intentional and ultimately how essential the persecution of the Jews 
was to furthering National Socialist ideals. 
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Supporters of an exclusively Jewish memorial also argued that  Jewish 
persecution was unique. While the argument that the persecution of Jews was central to 
the Nazi regime gave credence to the idea of remembering Jewish victims, it was the 
argument that the persecution of the Jews was singular that provided the primary 
justification for a memorial to the Jews alone. This perspective often appeared through 
comments that suggested the breadth and intention behind the Nazi persecution of the 
Jews was “not applicable for the gypsies.”30 Supporters of the FEDJE like Ignatz Bubis, 
deputy-Chairman and later Chairman of the ZJD for the majority of the Denkmalstreit, 
argued that, while it was true that the Sinti and Roma were victims of Nazi persecution, 
the Jews were “exemplary victims”31 and thus had their own history and sorrows to 
remember.32 One of the most compelling but controversial arguments, proposed by the 
historian Eberhard Jäckel, was that the Holocaust was the “highpoint of centuries of anti-
Semitism” and that no such ceaseless persecution of the Gypsies existed.33 Occasionally, 
even the fact that more than twice as many Jews were killed, some six million, than any 
other group was used to support the singularity of Jewish persecution. The root of this 
argument, however, was the fact that the Nazis intended to eliminate the Jews from the 
face of the Earth, without question or second thought. This was not extensive persecution 
as occurred to other victim groups; it was genocide.34 
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“Eine fatalische Heirarchisierung”   
The alternative side in this discussion, led by the Sinti and Roma, called for a 
single memorial to all victims, as opposed to an exclusively Jewish memorial. Eager to 
prevent the public from forgetting the sufferings of his people, Romani Rose continually 
emphasized that the Sinti, Roma and Jews shared an existential commonality as victims 
of the Nazis.35 Other supporters stated that the sufferings of all victim groups, no matter 
how many of that group were murdered, were the same and should thus be remembered 
together, an argument which I discuss later.36 Perhaps the most important argument in 
favor of a memorial to all victims was that a memorial to the Jews alone would in some 
sense replicate Hitler’s singling out of particular groups of people. Honoring one group 
centrally and with a great deal of public attention would create a hierarchy of victims that 
valued or paid tribute to the sufferings of one group to a greater degree than others. Even 
if the government built memorials for the other victim groups, it would “awaken an 
impression of a hierarchy of victims” as the central, national Holocaust memorial would 
inevitably be more prominent or more frequently visited.37 
The discussion developed as people argued that different memorials would not 
just create an inequality in the number of visitors to the memorials, but that the different 
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memorials would create a permanent, physical, symbolic division between the victims. 
Because all victims were persecuted in the same manner, they argued that there should be 
no “split between the victims of genocide” in the way that they were publicly 
remembered.38 Thus if the memorial ultimately created this permanent physical and 
theoretical split in national memory, it would simultaneously create a concrete class 
system of victims on the inverse racial basis of the Nazis. To many, this perceived racial 
injustice would be a failure on many levels, due to its physical permanence and the 
widespread perception of its legitimacy as a result of government and popular support 
both within and outside of Germany.39 Ultimately, many condemned the building of a 
memorial that remembered the Holocaust but excluded some groups of victims as a “one-
sided, historically false initiative” because of its inherent contradictions.40 In other words, 
those who defined the Holocaust by the totality of victims saw a central, national 
Holocaust memorial that was dedicated only to the Jewish victims as an historical 
misrepresentation. 
Of all of the arguments in the debate over whom to remember in the central 
Holocaust memorial, this argument about hierarchy generated the most emotion. The 
charged language and unusually strong implications of some editorial statements betrayed 
this emotion and showed that there would be no historical objectivity in dealing with this 
question. Romani Rose stated that proponents of the memorial must “make the 
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confession of the historical guilt and special responsibility of the Germans pertain to the 
Sinti and Roma as well as the Jews.”41 In other words, Rose viewed the memorial as 
Germany admitting to their guilt for the murder of Jews, and by not including the Sinti 
and Roma, Rose thought the Germans were refusing to admit their guilt for their crimes 
against his people. It is clear from this statement that the meaning of the memorial had 
moved beyond an expression of remembrance to an admission of German national guilt. 
Clearly, the Sinti and Roma felt excluded from the German nation’s apology for its 
crimes by not being included in this memorial. As historian Anita Kugler bitterly said 
after the decision had been made in favor of an exclusively Jewish memorial, “the end of 
the debate is here: no memorial for the Sinti and Roma . . . because gypsies have no 
lobby even among their fellow sufferers.”42 Thus, for the Sinti and Roma, the debate 
about the memorial came to be about their own sense of victimhood and struggle to have 
the crimes against them remembered. As the liberal-center Berliner Zeitung said in 1992, 
“the Central Committee of Sinti and Roma continues to hope . . . the murdered Sinti and 
Roma will be remembered.”43 
While, for all intents and purposes, the Jews were receiving the first memorial for 
an individual group of victims and they were receiving primary public attention, the 
supporters of an exclusively Jewish memorial did not see it as creating a hierarchy. 
Eberhard Jäckel’s response to the criticisms of hierarchy was to say that the accusations 
were “not right. The victims stand for themselves . . . What we are ordering is the 
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process.”44  More brashly, Lea Rosh responded that the goal of the Sinti and Roma was 
simply to inhibit the building of a Jewish memorial and defame those who supported it as 
racists.45 It is important to note, however, that it was not the government that had initiated 
this memorial, but a private group. Therefore, even though the Jewish memorial was the 
first to receive government funding, it was more because no Sinti and Roma memorial 
had been proposed than because such a memorial was unwanted or, quite clearly, because 
it went without public or governmental support.46  
Different Memorials for Different Histories 
Der Tagesspiegel, a liberal Berlin daily, printed an article that exhibited a second 
argument against an exclusively Jewish memorial: that “on this spot of terror for all 
peoples, it would be wrong to remember just the Jews.”47 Statements like this raised two 
interesting and related points: first, the issue of the memorial’s location and second, the 
issue of collective memory. The issue of location rasised the question of how the 
memorial should relate to the history of Berlin and of Germany by its physical position. 
In 1992, the Berliner Senat approved the location of the grounds of the former 
Reichskanzlei (Reich Chancellery) as the memorial’s location. Hitler had lived and 
worked in this building while in Berlin and the same area of land later held the bunker in 
which Hitler died. Based on the assumption that the Jewish persecution was central and 
singular in the history of the Third Reich, this was the place where the fate of the Jews 
was decided and, according to Eberhard Jäckel, thus belonged to the Jewish victims as a 
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place of memory.48 Jakob Schulze-Rohr, one of the original members of Perspektive 
Berlin, also argued that because the Nazis persecuted the Jews both in Germany and in all 
the lands conquered by the Third Reich, while other victims had particular places of 
persecution, there was no such place for the Jews.49 It seems to me that a memorial to the 
Jews alone in the place from which the persecution stemmed was justifiable. 
Here I will look more closely at this second component of communality. The 
FEDJE and its supporters argued that to have one memorial for all victims would mean 
that the essential differences in means of and reasons for persecution would not be 
recognized and the victims would forever be an enormous, undifferentiated collective. 
Although people like Heinz Galinski, former president of the ZJD, recognized that all 
victims shared an “existential commonality,” 50 FEDJE and its supporters argued that 
“other victim groups have their specific history of sorrows and thus require their own 
memories.”51 To me it seems clear that a memorial combining Jewish and, say, 
homosexual victims attempts to memorialize two radically different social issues: racism 
and homophobia. 
From its inception, the proponents of a Jewish memorial declared that it would be 
“senseless” to have a communal memorial because persecution of the Jews was the 
greatest both numerically and in singularity to the Nazi regime, as discussed earlier.52 In 
turn, a more refined argument developed that said that a memorial to all of the Third 
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Reich victims would not be specific enough to produce any real form of remembrance.53 
An article in the politically centrist Die Zeit went so far as to say that it would be corrupt 
for the FEDJE to support a memorial for all victims because it would undermine the 
organization’s founding principal: the commemoration of the Jewish Holocaust victims.54 
Clearly, many believed existing memorials, such as Steinplatz, where in 1953 the 
government had erected a simple monument reading “1933-1945, To the Victims of 
National Socialism,” to be sufficient central, universal memorials. They were adamant 
that a memorial for the Jews “must not be confused with a central memorial for all 
victims.”55 
The argument for an exclusively Jewish memorial came down to the fundamental 
issue of what Eberhard Jäckel called “different and differentiated historical images.”56 As 
discussed earlier, the Nazis persecuted Jews for different reasons and to a different extent 
than other victim groups. This is a distinction that some other victim groups freely 
admitted. For example, Andrzej Szczypiorski, a Pole who took part in the Warsaw Ghetto 
uprising and was later imprisoned in Sachsenhausen Konzentrationslager (concentration 
camp, KZ) just outside of Berlin, wrote that “a difference freely existed. As a Pole, I was 
not convicted automatically. I had to do something in order to enter the persecution 
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machinery.”57 In this statement, Szczypiorski illustrated the difference between Jewish 
persecution and the next largest group of victims, the Poles: the Nazis imprisoned and 
killed Jews simply because they existed. In other words, the persecution of the Jews was 
qualitatively different than the persecution of other groups. To illustrate the near 
absurdity of the question whether or not it was appropriate to have a memorial just for the 
Jews, Eberhard Jäckel made the following comparison:  
I know of no objection against the Vietnam-memorial in 
Washington that it must memorialize both the Vietnamese 
and South-Asian victims. I also know of no objections 
against the Schiller monument, that it must at the same time 
also memorialize Goethe or even all poets.58 
 
He went on to say that this did or had not happened because each of those instances 
commemorated different historical events, implying that this was the case for the Jewish 
persecution and therefore there should be an exclusively Jewish memorial as well.  
 Those in favor of a single memorial argued, however, that in the context of 
history, memory of the Jewish persecution could not be isolated in that way from the 
memory of the persecution of other victim groups. A German memorial to the Jews alone 
would not represent the “complexity of history,” because the Holocaust was so much 
more than just the Jewish genocide.59  Some went further, saying that not only did a 
Jewish memorial not portray history’s intricacies, but that it would actually have “wide-
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reaching consequences for the understanding of National Socialist times.”60 Because the 
memorial would simply honor the memory of the murdered Jews, it would fail to account 
for the relationships of those Jews to other heritages, to other victim groups, and would 
therefore detach the Holocaust and Nazi persecution from other victim groups. Because 
memorials were physical constructions that made statements about how a nation or group 
of people remembered its past, to ensure that memorials presented the past appropriately 
and completely was essential. In effect, this argument was that a memorial to the 
murdered Jews of Europe would be a false and incomplete history of the Holocaust and 
Nazi times.  
The End of the Memorial for All Victims 
 
 The result of such discussion was that many continued to argue that the memorial 
really “must be dedicated to all victims of National Socialist terror”61 and that it must be 
a “unified memorial for the persecuted.”62 In order to make a final effort to have their 
point heard and taken into account, people like German historian Dr. Reinhart Koselleck 
presented two arguments for the inclusion of all victim groups in the Holocaust 
memorial. First, because the initiators intended this memorial to be the central, national 
Holocaust memorial, it had to be inclusive. If the memorial was to represent the nation, it 
had to be the whole nation and not certain segments. Second, that “as a nation that 
organized this genocide” Germany could not pick and choose which victims it wanted to 
remember in the memorial, particularly because this was to be a national memorial 
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located in the new capital of Berlin.63 Germany was culpable, it was therefore the 
Germans’ “duty to remember everyone” whom they had wronged.64  
 By this time in the debate, however, it was clear that a single, unified memorial 
would not satisfy the organizations that had influence in the decision: at the very least the 
Jewish community, the FEDJE and the Bundestag. In October 1992, the Berliner Senat 
voted that the proposed Holocaust memorial would be for the Jews alone. 
Simultaneously, however, the Senat assured its support for the building of a Sinti and 
Roma memorial in the same location.65 While this was the decision sought by the FEDJE 
and thus satisfied many, it did little to appease the Sinti and Roma and the many other 
proponents of a universal memorial. Bitter remarks continued to surface through the first 
competition for a memorial design. It seemed to some that questions about how there 
could be “existential communality but no communal memorial” would go unanswered.66 
But as Peter Conradi, MdB-SPD (Member of the German Bundestag, 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) and architect, reiterated in 1996, the Germans 
“should not take on the discussion over a universal memorial” because “this question is 
decided.”67 
 By the eve of the second design competition, calls for a universal memorial had 
definitely subsided considerably from the earlier intense debate, although many of the 
concerns that had prompted the desire for a universal memorial remained. In 1997, as the 
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FEDJE and Bundesregierung held open forums about how to proceed with the memorial 
discussion, three important and influential voices in both the Denkmalstreit published 
articles that both upheld and furthered the statements already made by the government. 
American political scientist Daniel Goldhagen stated that while there should not be an 
hierarchical ordering of victims in public memory, “no victim group should be offended 
that another will be remembered.”68  The German history Professor Christian Meier went 
further, saying that “one such memorial for all victims of persecution politics can only be 
built if no one with good reasons protests against it.”69 As I noted earlier, Ignatiz Bubis 
and the Jewish community had opposed a memorial for all victims in favor of a memorial 
to Jewish persecution alone. According to Meier, this should be enough protest to make a 
collective memorial impossible because all parties memorialized must do so willingly for 
the memorial to be legitimate. Finally, Salomon Korn, respected German architect and a 
leader of the German Jewish community, asked that the public “respect that Jews do not 
want to be remembered in the same memorial as others.”70 
 Most importantly, the FEDJE argued strongly that the proponents of a Jewish 
memorial were “not against other victim groups, but for one.”71 They made it clear that 
they wanted a Jewish memorial, but that this did not mean they objected to a Sinti and 
Roma memorial. It is therefore not surprising that the FEDJE and those who supported 
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them also advocated building memorials for all victims groups.72 While a seemingly 
appropriate compromise, many rejected it. In a country already full of symbolic locations 
and memorials, some felt that so many different memorials next to each other would be 
excessive and cause each individual memorial to lose meaning. Finally, while a memorial 
to all victims would incur “no forced feeling for the Jews” or any other individual victim 
group, visitors to unique memorials would be compelled to feel emotions.73 This really 
had to do with the centrality of the memorial’s location in Berlin – in the city center, in 
which people walk and work everyday – where they would now have to see the DEJE 
whether they chose to or not. 
A sign that the public and even dissenting members of Parliament were finally 
willing to accept the exclusively Jewish memorial were the demands that began to appear 
regarding memorials for the other victim groups. Volker Beck, MdB-GP (Die Grünen) 
and GP Speaker for Legal Affairs, admitted that the Jewish genocide was a unique event 
in German history but said that “the other victims of National Socialism must be thought 
of worthily and appropriately.”74 Having previously criticized the idea of a uniquely 
Jewish memorial, Dr. Koselleck stated that if there were to be a uniquely Jewish 
memorial, than the Bundestag’s “word stands for all other victim groups, who were 
extinguished by us, to also receive memorials.”75 Bundestagspräsidentin Rita Süssmuth 
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also acknowledged the claims of the other victim groups to their own memorials and also 
to “reasonable locations” for those memorials.76 She thus ensured that the Bundestag 
would have to implement some measure of quality control in building those future 
memorials. She demanded that the Government and nation not simply push aside the 
public memory of these other persecuted groups, as many feared. Even after the 
conclusion of the second design competition, when energy to build the memorial really 
waned, these mandates were strong. German historian and director of the Topography of 
Terror exhibit Reinhard Rürup most clearly stated this lasting imperative when he said 
“the decision for a memorial for one victim group necessitates a decision for further 
memorials for other victim groups.”77 Such statements would not have been possible 
without some amount of established consensus for a memorial only to the murdered Jews 
of Europe.  
 Despite this acceptance, there were still many who remained skeptical of the plan 
to build a Jewish Holocaust memorial. Concerns about the effect on history of restricting 
public memory of the Holocaust to strictly the Jewish victims remained strong through 
the end of the second design competition in late 1997. In particular, the idea that the way 
in which this memorial represented the Holocaust would have “wide-reaching 
consequences for the understanding of National-Socialist times” and the implication that 
this understanding would be confused by the present form of the memorial was 
troubling.78 Because the memorial was to be the first national statement on Holocaust 
                                                 
76
 “Auch sie brauchen angemessene Standorte.” Rita Süssmuth, Bundespräsidentin, “Ansprache,” 
Senatsverwaltung für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur (Hg.): Dokumentation 1997 (2/14/1997), 661. 
77
 “dass die Entscheidung für ein Denkmal für eine Opfergruppe in der Sache bereits eine Entscheidung für 
weitere Denkmale für andere Opfergruppen bedeutet.” Reinhard Rürup, “Stellungnahme in der öffentlichen 
Anhörung des Ausschusses für Kultur und Medien des Deutschen Bundestages,” Berlin (4/20/1999), 1276. 
78
 “weitreichenden Konsequenzen für das Verständnis der NS-Vergangenheit.” Gerhard Schönberner, 
“Wieviele Gedenkorte braucht Berlin?,” Der Tagesspiegel (4/13/1999), 1273. 
 75 
history in a reunified nation, there was great concern that the statement be correct and 
generally concurred upon. In a completely different sense, the concern remained that after 
building this grand memorial to the Jews, the other victim groups would still be forgotten. 
The fear was not so much that the government would not build memorials. Parliament 
had made it clear that this would not be the case, but rather that their places of memory 
would pale in comparison to that allotted to the Jews. One journalist posed his 
skepticism, questioning whether there would not end up being “a representative super-
memorial for the Jews, a small thing for the Sinti & Roma and a few shapely thought 
corners for all the others.”79 No amount of persuasion would ever answer this question; it 
was one which would only be answered through action.  
The Neue Wache as a Solution  
 
 One possible answer to the question of a collective memorial, as some 
conservatives saw it, already existed in the form of the memorial located inside the Neue 
Wache (New Guardhouse). Built in 1813 on Berlin’s main street Unter den Linden, 
Friedrich Wilhelm III used the Neue Wache, appropriately, as the guardhouse for his 
troops. Since then, it has been rededicated three times: first in 1918 as the “Memorial to 
the Fallen of the War,” second in 1960 by the DDR as the “Memorial to the Victims of 
Militarism and Fascism,” and third in 1993 as the “Central Memorial of the Federal 
Republic of Germany for the Victims of War and Tyranny.” The 1993 memorial 
consisted of a Pieta sculpture by Käthe Kollwitz, at which visitors could look and reflect. 
Käthe Kollwitz (1867-1945) was an internationally renowned German artist and sculptor 
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in the period prior to and during the Nazi regime, known particularly for her depiction of 
victims of injustice.  
Because of the Neue Wache’s generic inscription and the breadth of people, 
groups and cultures it could include, a right-center coalition considered it to be 
comprehensive and therefore satisfactory as a memorial to all victims. Architect Salomon 
Korn suggested that because the Neue Wache represented the victims of genocide in 
totality, it was safe to agree to memorials for individual victim groups.80 His argument 
was that the Neue Wache, in memorializing a concept, also implicitly memorialized the 
complexities of history that many said would be missing by having individual memorials. 
Thus, this Neue Wache was appropriate as the memorial to all victims. 
 Nevertheless, many others deemed the Neue Wache to be largely insufficient as a 
memorial to all genocide victims, especially victims of Nazi policies. Proving social 
historian Professor Jürgen Kocka’s point that “every victim definition implies new 
exclusions and conflicts,” Dr. Reinhart Koselleck argued that the symbolic Pieta statue 
that acted as the centerpiece of the memorial excluded two groups of people. As such, he 
argued that because these victim groups were not included in the mourning represented 
by the Neue Wache, it was not in fact appropriate for all victims. As a place “where 
parents can meditate for their lost sons,” one significant exclusion, particularly in terms 
of the Holocaust, was women who were murdered.81 As Dr. Koselleck argued, genocide 
and the Holocaust did not touch only males, and the Neue Wache was therefore 
inadequate for half of the Holocaust victims. The second group of victims left out in the 
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Neue Wache was the Jews.82 Even though Käthe Kollwitz intended her Pieta to be a 
generic mother and son for all races and cultures, the Pieta itself is a traditional symbol 
of Christianity. Thus, Jews could not really be a part of the memory expressed by the 
Neue Wache.  
 Those who criticized the view of the Neue Wache’s Pieta as an adequate 
memorial for all victims of the Holocaust also did so because the memorial could be 
taken to show Germans as victims. The thought that the mourning mother and dead son 
had the potential to represent Germans, particularly German soldiers, implied the 
memorial also portrayed the Germans themselves as sufferers. As far as remembering the 
Holocaust was concerned, the conservative Frankurter Allgemeine Zeitung saw the Neue 
Wache as unacceptable because Holocaust memorials should represent Germans as “‘the 
survivors of the criminals, not the victims.’”83 Some like Dr. Burkhard Hirsch, 
Bundestages Vizepräsident-FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei), suggested that there was 
actually a larger trend when he stated that as Germans “we have made ourselves into 
perpetrators and victims.”84 Hirsch here referred to the trend of discussion in Germany 
that increasingly spoke of the German casualties in the fire-bombings of cities like 
Dresden as victims of the war.85 
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 In terms of German memory politics, the slightest implication of German 
victimhood was still generally unacceptable to liberals, particularly to those who 
supported the central Holocaust memorial. Germans had not made the appropriate 
reconciliation with their past to begin thinking of themselves as victims. As Professor of 
Art History Dr. Katrin Hoffman-Curtius stated, they were “not entitled to an 
identification with the victims.”86 At least not yet. The ability to identify with the victims 
of Nazism or even worse, as a non-persecuted German to consider oneself to have been a 
victim of Nazism simply because it existed in the nation, was, as Professor Christian 
Meier said, morally wrong “and even shameful.”87 People like German author and Jewish 
spokesman Richard Chaim Schneider described this trend as an attempt to “somehow get 
rid of their burdened heritage” by considering oneself also to have been a victim.88  
Supporters of the new, central Holocaust memorial wanted to keep it from falling 
into the same pattern of criticism that the Neue Wache had. No matter what, they said, 
this Holocaust memorial could not suggest that the non-Jewish, non-victimized Germans 
were capable of empathizing with those whom the Nazis had persecuted.89 The reason 
being, that if Germans could empathize with the victims, then on some level the Germans 
would consider themselves to have suffered equally. In this new memorial, as Professor 
                                                                                                                                                 
Press, 1982). Joerg Friedrich, The Fire: The Bombing of Germany 1940-1945, (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 2006). Dagmar Barnouw, The War in the Empty Air: Victims, Perpetrators, and Postwar 
Germans (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005). 
86
 “Eine Identifizierung mit den Opfern stehe den Deutschen nicht zu.” Dr. Katrin Hoffman-Curtius, 
“Diskussion,” Senatsverwaltung für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur (Hg.): Dokumentation 1997 
(1/10/1997), 618. 
87
 “Ja es ist schamlos.” Christian Meier, “Das Problem eines Berliner Denkmals,” Speech to the German-
Israeli Society, Bonn (6/1997), 863. 
88
 “und so mit ihr belastetes Erbe irgendwie loswerden.” Richard Chaim Schneider, “Fetisch Holocaust,” 
München (1997), 767. 
89
 Here I intend to contrast empathy, understanding through like-experience, with sympathy, sensitivity to 
another’s experiences. I will utilize this distinction throughout the rest of the chapter. 
 79 
Christian Meier stated, “the collective of victims in the Neue Wache must definitely be 
dissolved.”90 
Shifting the Discussion: Victim Memory or Perpetrator Memory 
 
This debate over the depiction of victims and culprits in the Neue Wache 
represented a shift in discussion over for whom the memorial should be built after the 
conclusion of the first design competition. There were always people who continued to 
support a single memorial for all victims throughout the entirety of the debate. However, 
the focus of the “for whom” debate shifted from one of Jews versus Sinti and Roma and 
later all victim groups, to one of memory of the victims versus memory of the German 
nation, the perpetrators.91 As was emphasized so often throughout the course of the 
debate, the public and government had to consider this question so carefully because in 
Germany both the perpetrators and victims of Nazi times were still present, if in 
decreasing numbers. Gradually through the debate, the participants recognized that there 
was a new generation to confront these problems: the descendents of survivors and those 
of victims, who no longer necessarily had a direct connection to their relatives who had 
lived in the Third Reich.  
The participants began to see that there would always be a dialectic between the 
descendents of survivors and those of victims, because those two different perspectives 
would always remember the events differently. As Thomas Lackmann, editor of the 
liberal Berlin daily Die Tagesspiegel and a leading member of the German Jewish 
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community said, “a memorial cannot function without this dissent” between the two 
versions of memory.92 Throughout most of German history, Germans had been either the 
victims or perpetrators, but not both. Therefore, the nation could easily define national 
memory of the event because there was a natural “abyss between them and us, between 
victims and their descendents on one side and murderers and their descendents on the 
other,” as stated in the liberal-center national weekly journal Der Spiegel.93 This 
fundamental issue of defining who was guilty and who needed to be remembered, had not 
needed to be considered until the unique event of the Holocaust arose.  
In Germany however, where the victims were in some cases Germans themselves, 
the question of victim and perpetrator became more complicated and required the 
German public to cope with that complexity. What remained to be decided was precisely 
where the line between perpetrators and victims in the public memory of the Holocaust 
would fall. As we saw with the Neue Wache, the issue of how much the German nation 
should be able to identify with the victims defined this issue. Professor of Theology and 
Philosophy Richard Schröder elucidated this problem when he said, “sympathy for the 
victims is admittedly displayed, however, the empathy can be tactless, if it does not 
distinguish between me and you,” the victim and the perpetrator.94 In the rest of this 
chapter I will examine this problem, looking at the language that established the DEJE’s 
balance between representing the perpetrators and victims.  
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The Victim-Centric Perspective 
 
 Lea Rosh and Eberhard Jäckel originally conceived a memorial to represent the 
victims of the Holocaust and were therefore the leaders of what I call the Victim-Centric 
Perspective. Most people also seem to have envisioned the memorial in this way: “a 
memorial of the perpetrators for the victims,” as stated at the time in the liberal-center 
weekly paper, Die Weltwoche95 Besides the need to pay tribute to the victims of the 
Holocaust, the idea behind a victim-centered memorial was that it was only through the 
victims that one could really remember the crimes as terrible acts without justification.96 
The initiators founded the memorial on this perspective. After all, what is a memorial but 
an object that places an event or group of people in public memory? With that in mind, 
the Victim-Centric perspective said that Germany could not justify honoring the memory 
of Nazi times through any means other than the victims of their nation’s own crimes. 
 Those representing what I call the Unified Perspective, which I will discuss more 
later, found many problems with structuring the memorial as strictly from the 
perpetrators for the victims. Professor Richard Schröder in particular spearheaded the 
skeptical perspective of a victim-centric memorial. Because such a memorial in a country 
of both culprits and victims failed to speak to both perspectives, that memorial would 
“redeem no one.”97 It would simply exist and be unable to establish a productive dialectic 
of reconciliation between the two groups of descendents. Of course, it is difficult to say 
that a memorial dedicated to the victims of such a tragic crime as the Holocaust was not a 
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meaningful or sought after gesture. Schröder said, however, “an exclusively victim-
oriented memorial is well meaning, but not good.”98  
Another, perhaps even more fundamental, problem with a Victim-Centric 
Perspective was that mainly non-Jewish Germans thought of and carried out the process 
of building this memorial. Compared to non-Jewish Germans, the Jewish community 
played an otherwise passive role in building it. How could “a memorial built of the 
Germans in Germany” be a memorial for the European Jewish victims of the 
Holocaust?99 Dr. Reinhart Koselleck was adamant that “a Holocaust memorial is not 
possible without the legitimate cooperation of the Jews.”100 If this was not to be the case, 
the memorial was just as likely to turn out to be one representative only of German 
perpetrator-descendents’ interests because Jewish voices would not be present in the 
design discussion. Koselleck’s argument seems to follow the logic that a memorial 
without Jewish input would almost be an imposition of memory, a place where Jews 
would be told they could come to honor their dead in a way prescribed for them by non-
Jews that might or might not really speak or mean anything to them. If this was to be the 
case, it did not seem that the Victim-Centric Perspective would be the consensus.  
The Perpetrator-Centric Perspective 
 
The opposing argument in this discussion was what I call the Perpetrator-Centric 
Perspective, which argued that the memorial should focus on the German nation and not 
the Jewish victims, or victims at all. Supporters of this perspective believed that the 
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memorial should really concern and speak to the descendents of the German perpetrators. 
Supporters of this view differed, however, about how strongly the memorial should 
present the Germans as criminals. As early as 1991, Günther Freudenberg, a professor of 
philosophy and politician, stated that the Holocaust memorial should not be for the Jews 
or the Sinti and Roma; rather “it should be a monument to the Germans who remember 
the Holocaust performed in their name.”101 As artist Horst Hoheisel said that the 
memorial “must reflect culprit-hood,” nevertheless, there was not much discussion of this 
perspective in the years after 1991.102  
The messages supporting the Perpetrator-Centric Perspective seem to have grown 
stronger in the debate that ensued after the first design competition ended in 1996. In 
trying to develop a new idea of what the memorial should represent, in light of the failed 
competition, Political Scientist Professor Peter Reichel argued that Germans should 
“engage more with the dead culprits, the most unspectacular life history of the mass 
murderers and their helpers.”103 He saw the Victim-Centric Perspective supporters as 
attempting to create “self-righteous solidarism with the victims,” in other words, that that 
perspective encouraged an empathy with the victims that could not exist for the German 
nation.104 Such a memorial would not be productive in coming to terms with the Nazi 
crimes, particularly, as he noted, in the new capital of reunified Germany – Berlin.105 
This sounds similar to the argument made against the Neue Wache that trying to align the 
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country as a whole too closely with the victims was inappropriate. By the dawn of the 
second competition, people like Jewish-German journalist and author Henryk Broder said 
that in Germany, “the land of the perpetrators, the perpetrators must at first and before all 
be spoken of.”106 By the time the Bundestag debated the final design for the memorial, 
the mandate of this perspective had a clear voice through Dr. Reinhart Koselleck: “our 
roll as murderers must be visualized here.”107 
Unified Perspective: For the Future 
 
 The two winning designs of the first competition, one of which represented the 
victims’ perspective and the other, more the role of the perpetrators, prompted some to 
conclude that a memorial would be pointless unless it captured the entirety of the past.108 
What I call the Unified Perspective said that the memorial must portray both victims and 
perpetrators in relation to one another, developed in response to the first design 
competition. Professor Christian Meier, one of the most outspoken advocates for a 
memorial that represented both victims and culprits, said that at a memorial to the crimes 
of the Holocaust located in Germany “one cannot think of the victims without 
remembering the perpetrators and our land as perpetrator” because the two thoughts are 
so intricately connected.109 Or as he later put it: with anything that “concerns the memory 
of the German past of NS times, we must put the perpetrators and victims in one.”110 
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 In this view, because the audience for this memorial would be not only Jews but 
also “the Germans living today,” it could not be “just a memorial for the dead Jews.”111 
In effect, from this perspective it would seem foolish to disregard the truth that non-
Jewish Germans would make use of this memorial and thus their background and history 
as descendents of the culprits could not be ignored in its creation and design. Salomon 
Korn emphasized this when he said that in Germany there must “be a self-understanding 
above all, of the memory of the murderers and their victims” that could only come 
through a memorial that balanced those two perspectives.112 An anonymous article that 
appeared in Der Spiegel during the parliamentary discussion over the second competition 
summed up the switch to this balanced perspective through the tail end of the debate: 
The murderers and their descendents support a monument 
for their victims, that was at the same time a mirror of 
murderer-shame: victim classification and stigma, place of 
sorrows, horror and shame in one, memory of the 
murderers and their victims at the same time.113 
 
It seemed likely that the chosen memorial design would in some way portray a balance 
that had meaning for the victims and the perpetrators simultaneously and equally.  
 The idea of designing the memorial for the future generations of both perpetrators 
and descendents extended this Unified Perspective. The development of a discourse about 
the future began to appear relatively late in the debate. Above all, the idea of building the 
memorial for the future generations was to name it as a preventative measure against the 
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nation forgetting “these crimes and to make sure the descendent generations can never 
repeat it.”114 This idea that Auschwitz and the Holocaust must never be repeated was 
central to the memorial’s foundation, as was discussed more fully in Chapter I. Thus it 
made sense that the people for whom this memorial would be built must be those to 
whom its message would be addressed: the future generation. On a different level, the 
memorial had to be for the future of the nation as it “would stand in the federal capital of 
Berlin.”115 As a newly unified nation, and in a sense a completely redefined nation, this 
memorial would define the physical and historical future of the nation’s new capital. 
 Though at different times, representatives of both perpetrators and victims came 
to agree that the Unified Perspective offered the best chance for success. As Polish 
Holocaust survivor Andrzej Szczypiorski stated, the memorial it was “for them, the not 
yet born . . . and in this sense it is a memorial for the victims and perpetrators. So that 
there are never again victims but also never again perpetrators.”116 Bundeskanzler 
Gerhard Schröder, SPD, said that the memorial should be “a place of memory for those 
who cannot have memories for themselves,” that is, future generations who had no 
memory of the Nazi times themselves.117 Thus, victim and non-victim came to agree that 
the memorial should be built to achieve an equilibrium of memory, one that represented 
both victims and perpetrators by acting in the interest of future generations.  
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Conclusion 
 This first stage of the argument over for whom the central Holocaust memorial 
should be built, either for all victims of National Socialism or for only the Jews, was an 
important discussion within the larger debate over German memory of the Holocaust. 
Working through this discussion forced some kind of public consensus and understanding 
about the Holocaust as an historical event, in other words, it answered the question “wem 
gehört der Holocaust.”118 In order to reach this conclusion, the argument required an 
analysis of victim groups and the reasons for which the Nazis had persecuted them. This 
discussion resulted in a differentiation of Holocaust victims, which included racial and 
political victims, from the many different types of victims of the National Socialist 
regime, which included the Holocaust victims but also young soldiers and resistance 
fighters. Memorials at Steinplatz and the newly constructed, equally controversial Neue 
Wache on Unter den Linden already memorialized this latter group of victims in Berlin. 
By supporting the creation of memorials to each different group that the Nazis 
victimized, the government began to answer the question of how to define the Holocaust 
that had been posed early on in the debate.119 The government defined the Holocaust as 
the totality of the crimes committed against the racial and political victims of the Third 
Reich but recognized that the history and persecution of each victim group within the 
history of the Holocaust was unique. These were differences that required individual 
mourning and remembrance and thus individual memorials. However, this debate also 
brought agreement about the fact that the Nazi persecution of the Jews was unique; 
central to Nazi policies was the erasure of Jews from the earth, which was untrue of any 
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other victim group. Openly discussing and identifying the victims of the Holocaust was 
essential to the formation of German national identity because it finally began to answer 
some of the issues raised during the Historikerstreit. By addressing how to define the 
Holocaust Germans were forced to reckon with the idea of the Jews’ singularity as a 
victim group and with the extent to which descendents of the perpetrators must still be 
aware of their ancestors’ actions. Through this discussion, the Holocaust was beginning 
to take on a more concrete meaning and understanding one with which the public could 
work.  
The second stage of the argument over for whom to build Holocaust memorial 
dealt with a defining question of contemporary German national identity: understanding 
the relationship between the descendents of victims and descendents of perpetrators who 
were now members of the same national community. Focusing solely on the victims was 
inadequate because it ignored the role of the perpetrators and the bias of the perpetrators’ 
input on the memorial’s design. The memorial could also not center itself on the culprits, 
because this did nothing to promote understanding and reconciliation between and the 
descendents of the Nazis and the descendents of the victims. The answer was in finding a 
balance between representing victims and culprits and recognizing that the real group for 
whom this memorial should be built was future generations.  
Having established the discussion over why and whether a national Holocaust 
memorial should be built raised the difficult question of to whom the memorial should be 
dedicated. Even though these discussions occurred simultaneously, the advantage of 
breaking down the Denkmalstreit by theme as opposed to chronologically has thus far 
revealed a consensus, albeit a limited one, on each important issue that the debate raised. 
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In Chapter I we saw that there would be a national Holocaust memorial that would help 
to establish a new German national identity. In this Chapter we have seen the Germans 
begin to decide what this national identity would be by defining the Holocaust as an 
historical event. What we are left with in the Denkmalstreit was the most practical of all 
discussions: the debate over the location and design of the memorial. The question: how 
do we go about putting the Holocaust in a concrete, physical form? This is the topic of 
discussion for Chapters III and IV. 
Chapter III 
Representing the Holocaust: 
The First Design Competition 
   
 
In the German language, there are three different terms used to refer to a 
memorial: Denkmal, Mahnmal and Gedenkstätte. While all three refer to a place of 
remembrance, each has a different nuance. A Mahnmal, for instance, conveys a message 
of warning while a Gedenkstätte usually refers to a preserved historical location. 
Denkmal is the most generic term used and therefore requires the most in terms of 
definition. When the Förderkreises zur Errichtung eines Denkmals für die ermordeten 
Juden Europas (FEDJE) decided to support the building of a national Holocaust 
memorial, they began with a completely blank slate. They had determined to dedicate this 
memorial to the Jewish victims of the Holocaust, but in terms of physical form and 
theoretical message, there were almost no guidelines. 
When the Berlin Wall fell in November of 1989, it ended the artificial partition of 
Germany’s core, not simply politically, but physically. After more than 28 years, 
however, a complete generation of Germans had grown up disunited and the Mauer-im-
Kopf (wall in the head) lasted far longer than the wall itself. In 1991, when the Federal 
Government moved from its Cold War location in Bonn back to its historical location in 
Berlin, it brought to the fore the issue of how to operate a unified country that had been 
physically divided for so long. The juxtaposition of architecture, clothing, religion, or 
lack thereof, and even language threw into sharp contrast Berlin-Ost and Berlin-West. 
How, then, was an event like the Holocaust that occurred in the united Germany of a 
former time, to be remembered in this reunified Germany whose people had been 
socialized so differently? 
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The implications of Berlin’s and Germany’s former division for the debate over 
the Denkmal für die Ermordeten Juden Europas were two-fold. First, a significant 
amount of thought had to go into deciding the location for the memorial. In any other 
country, location would not have played so big a role. But due to the recent past and the 
history of Germany and given the particular past the memorial was to remember, the 
memorial’s location was a key decision. Second, the memorial would have to take a form 
that allowed individuals from both the East and the West of the country and city to feel 
comfortable bringing their individual memories to it. It therefore could not embody a 
solely Eastern or Western perspective on the Holocaust. In this chapter and the next, I 
will examine both of these problems and their role in the overall debate about the national 
German Holocaust memorial.  
Locating Holocaust Memory 
 Because of the historical timeframe in which the debate over the national 
Holocaust memorial took place, the Bund, Land and FEDJE put an intense focus on 
where the memorial would be located both within the Federal Republic of Germany and 
within Berlin itself. Supporters of the memorial felt that only a “nationally important 
place” was appropriate for preserving Holocaust and genocide memory, and that this 
place had to be equally important for both East and West Germany.1 In this regard, 
locating the memorial in Berlin meant putting it in both the capital of the united Germany 
and the place in which citizens had felt the division most acutely. In choosing Berlin as 
the symbolic location for the memorial, its proponents sought to make it clear that 
Germany had reunified, not just in terms of its politics, but also “in terms of its National 
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Socialist locations.”2 The conservatives, and those in support of normalization during the 
Historikerstreit, raised the concern that, by setting this precedent, Berlin would “live only 
as a ‘mile of monuments.’”3 Conceivably, Berlin could become the only place in which 
the government could build nationally important memorials to give them a sense of 
symbolic importance in terms of a unified Germany. Discussion in the Reichstag and in 
editorials emphasized that all “must be observant so that German history will not be 
cleaned up at the cost of Berlin”4 and that this memorial “must not just be Berlin’s issue, 
but a national task.”5 By this they meant that they wanted to preserve Berlin as a city unto 
itself and not consign it to being a graveyard of history by filling it with memorials, 
keeping it from existing in the present. Thus, what I call the Normalizers, who wanted 
Germany to move beyond the past, expressed particular concern for this point of view as 
I have just described.  
 Having decided upon the memorial’s general location, the new capital of a 
reunited Germany, the issue of specifically where in Berlin it would be located came into 
question. Most Germans agreed, as one editorialist wrote, that the memorial “belongs in a 
place that no one can wipe away, that reflects German history.”6  In this regard, the 
discussion about location considered two historical factors equally: the Berlin Wall and 
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the history of the Third Reich in Berlin. For many the most important factor in choosing a 
location for the memorial was that it be near to the former Berlin Wall and thereby near 
both former East and West Berlin. Lea Rosh, initiator of the proposal for a DEJE, for 
instance, proclaimed that “this memorial belongs in the center of the city; it belongs near 
the wall, in the view of East Berlin.”7 Placing the memorial in the center of Berlin, where 
the division of East and West was most visible, would make it clear that the Germans 
recognized the Holocaust as “a deed of all Germans” and was therefore “the guilt of all 
Germany.”8  
 For others, however, the issue of location was really about relevance to the history 
of the Holocaust in Berlin. The initial proposal of Lea Rosh for a permanent Holocaust 
memorial was made with the civic action group Perspektive Berlin, and they wanted it to 
be located on the grounds of the former Gestapo headquarters, called the Gestapo-
Gelände. But in 1989, the Berliner Senat made the decision that the Gestapo-Gelände 
would hold a temporary, informational exhibit about the rise of the Nazis so in 
consequence, the newly formed FEDJE had to look for a new memorial location in 
Berlin. In keeping with their original idea, the FEDJE wanted the memorial to be located 
where Nazi government buildings had dominated Berlin during the Third Reich. The 
FEDJE thought that it would be appropriate for the memorial to be on or near “the former 
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power center of the Nazis between the Brandenburg Gate and Potsdamer Platz.”9 The 
large empty area that had once held the Reichskanzlei in which Hitler, founder of the final 
solution, had lived quickly became the location around which most of the discussion 
centered.10 Lea Rosh suggested that there a memorial to the murdered Jews would allow 
the victims to “arise over the murderers” in a sense of final vindication.11 Conveniently 
located in the center of Berlin, this location could easily satisfy both historical needs: that 
the memorial be centralized between East and West Berlin and that it be in a location 
significant to the Holocaust.  
 Despite the symbolic justification of the former Reichskanzlei on both national 
and historical levels, there were several concerns raised regarding the location. Early on 
in the debate, a member of the German Parliament (MdB) became concerned that the 
grounds of the Reichskanzlei were too “spectacular” a location, implying that it would be 
overly dramatic to have the memorial there. Lea Rosh responded that whether or not it 
was “spectacular” did not matter, it was the “appropriateness” of the location that was 
significant.12 Other commentators raised the issue that the nearby Führerbunker (the 
bunker in which Hitler died) would detract from the DEJE. Some thought that the 
presence of the memorial within fifty feet of the bunker would serve to unjustly preserve 
the bunker as a place of historical importance. As I discussed in Chapter One, many 
others were already concerned about the Führerbunker as a rallying point for right-wing 
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extremists. All sides involved seemed to find the idea that the bunker would now also be 
in the vicinity of the national Holocaust memorial worrisome.13  
Following the cancellation of the first competition in 1996, some called for the 
reevaluation of the location. As we have seen, many people had been dissatisfied with the 
Reichskanzlei in the first place, so it is not surprising that when the first competition went 
awry, the location once again came into question. Peter Conradi, MdB-SPD, even 
suggested that it was the location itself that “was an essential reason for the failure of the 
competition,” and it was thus inescapable as a point of contention.14 Most of the 
arguments against the Reichskanzlei location reiterated earlier concerns. However, the 
arguments did change slightly, becoming more specific and pointed as people were now 
able to make arguments based on a particular design they had observed.  
Some continued to fear that Berlin would become simply a depository for all of 
the nation’s memorials. Der Tagesspiegel editor Thomas Lackmann repeated this 
argument in 1996 when he complained that “Berlin is already long a showplace of 
memorials, ‘a space of memory’.”15 It seems to me fair to say that arguments against the 
memorial’s location, like this one, were merely excuses not to have to deal with the issue 
or Holocaust memory. Berlin, after all, was no different than most of the world’s capitals 
in being a repository for national memorials. Thus, as it had before, this argument 
became more of a vague concern than a seriously considered point. The majority of those 
agreeing with the memorial in the first place, also agreed that there was no more 
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appropriate location in Germany for a national Holocaust memorial than in its newly 
reinstated capital, Berlin. As a result, the truly contentious arguments were about which 
location inside Berlin was the most appropriate. 
The main opponents of the Reichskanzlei location contended that the center of 
Berlin was not conducive to the task of holding a Holocaust memorial. Conservatives 
seemed to find distasteful reserving the center of Berlin for the murdered Jews of Europe. 
Architect Salomon Korn, for example, said that the Reichskanzlei location was “too 
central, because German history is more than only memory of the Jews” and placing this 
memorial there could be seen as reducing German history to that event.16 While using 
this view to further his own memorial-design agenda, Hungarian author and later 
President of the Academy of Art in Berlin Gyorgy Konrad took Korn’s argument in a 
different direction, claiming that a “Holocaust memorial in city center would fuel anti-
Semitism” because it would be so fundamental to the city’s core that it would force 
respect from all members of the nation.17 The idea behind this comment was that, as a 
memorial that sat in the center of Berlin, people would be forced to encounter it on a 
daily basis – whether walking to work, strolling through the Tiergarten or eating lunch in 
a nearby café. Without having a choice as to whether or not they wanted to visit it, 
Konrad feared that people would begin to resent the memorial’s central location and then 
ultimately resent that which it remembered.  
Just steps away from Berlin’s famous icon, the Brandenburg Gate, and its primary 
mainstreet, Unter den Linden, a major concern about the Reichskanzlei location was that 
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it would be overwhelmed by tourists.18 While certainly the point of the memorial was to 
encourage visitors, the FEDJE did not intend it to be to be a place for fun vacation 
memories but for serious reflection and meditation. The chance that this location could 
stimulate the presence of visitors who were not so much concerned with the engaging in 
Holocaust memory led architecture expert Bruno Flierl to question whether this was the 
correct approach to the past.19 A second aspect of this tourist issue, Die Tagezeitung said, 
was that the Reichskanzlei location was situated among some of the most “high traffic 
streets” in Berlin, including Ebertstrasse, Wilhelmstrasse, Strasse des 17. Juni, Leipziger 
Strasse and Unter den Linden.20 Many thought that the “dominance of motorized traffic” 
would distract visitors from serious contemplation at the memorial and make the entire 
effect of an otherwise powerful memorial underwhelming.21 
Many newspapers raised a final argument against the central Reichskanzlei 
location, mainly that among the highly visited streets and powerful historic symbols that 
Berlin-Mitte had to offer, the DEJE would be “an ‘island of sorrow’ . . . cut off from the 
real locations of history.”22 This sentiment resonated in multiple articles following the 
first competition, the most dramatic of which suggested that “it is twisted to block the 
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 See, for example: Bruno Flierl as quoted by Dr. Horst Moritz, “Kommentar,” Senatsverwaltung für 
Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur (Hg.): Dokumentation 1997 (2/14/1997), 665. 
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 Bruno Flierl as quoted by Dr. Horst Moritz, “Kommentar,” Senatsverwaltung für Wissenschaft, 
Forschung und Kultur (Hg.): Dokumentation 1997 (2/14/1997), 665. 
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 “Hauptverkhersstrassen” - Mariam Niroumand, “Berlin: Neuer Wettbewerb für das Holocaust-
Mahnmal,” Die Tageszeitung (7/17/1997), 847. 
21
 “‘Dominanz des motorisierten Autoverkehrs’” - Malte Lehming, “Eine frivole Posse,” Der Tagesspiegel 
(7/17/1997), 844.  
22
“eine ‘Betroffenheitsinsel’ darstellen würde . . . abgeschnitten von den realen Orten des Geschehens.” 
Helmut Böttiger, “Fachleute gegen Pragmatiker,” Frankfurter Rundschau (2/17/1997), 688. See also: 
Mariam Niroumand, “Berlin: Neuer Wettbewerb für das Holocaust-Mahnmal,” Die Tageszeitung 
(7/17/1997), 847. Thomas Assheuer, “Lehrstück,” Die Zeit (2/21/1997), 693. 
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empty space and future city center of Berlin with a monument of sadness.”23 The solution 
to this, as Die Zeit journalist Thomas Assheuer and others suggested was not to isolate 
the Holocaust memorial, but to put it “in the center of power, in the area of the offices of 
the Chancellors.”24 This was the first and really only seriously considered alternative to 
the Reichskanzlei: the Platz der Republik, which is located between the Reichstag 
building and the contemporary Bundeskanzleramt. 
 Historian Reinhart Koselleck argued the Platz der Republik was not only a viable, 
but also a good location for the Holocaust memorial because of its symbolic location 
between the legislature, the Reichstag, and the house of the executive, the 
Bundeskanzleramt.25 Hitler’s role as dictator and his ability to achieve such total power 
resulted largely from his control over and manipulation of the legislative branch. Thus, 
this would be a reminder of the ever-important balance that a democratic government 
must achieve between its branches. Further, the visibility of this reminder of the Nazi 
crimes to the contemporary location of both branches would allow the memorial “to file a 
suit for memory on the place of current political decisions and not on the places of past-
Nazi decisions.”26 Thus, Koselleck argued, forcing politicians to remember this past 
might have a greater effect in keeping Germany on the path of historical responsibility, as 
I will discuss in Chapter One, than leaving Holocaust memory in a non-governmental 
public space. Despite its merits, the Platz der Republik location did not receive a lot of 
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 “Es sei “pervers,” das leergeräumte und zukünftige Stadtzentrum von Berlin mit einem Monument der 
Trauer zu blockieren.” Rolf Lautenschläger, “Der ‘Betondeckel als Machtgeste,’” Die Tageszeitung 
(2/6/1996), 496. 
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 “sondern im Zentrum der Macht, im Repräsentationsareal des Kanzlers.” Thomas Assheuer, 
“Lehrstück,” Die Zeit (2/21/1997), 693. 
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 Reinhart Koselleck, “Vier Minuten für die Ewigkeit,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1/9/1997), 600. 
26
 “um die Erinnerung am Ort heutiger politischer Entscheidungsfindung einzuklagen und nicht an Plätzen 
vergangener Nazigrössen.” Reinhart Koselleck, “Vier Minuten für die Ewigkeit,” Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung (1/9/1997), 600. 
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support from the Land Berlin and FEDJE as they did not consider the Platz der Republik 
as a viable option. Lea Rosh in particular argued against it when she called the Platz der 
Republik “an historically wrong location, because the murder of the Jews did not come 
from the German people, but from a group of Nazis.”27 Alternately, the most significant 
vote of confidence came from Bundespräsidentin Rita Süssmuth who sought “a symbolic 
location of actual German politics in the Government quarter.”28  
The inadequacies of this new alternative threw the benefits of the Reichskanzlei 
location once again into the light. First and foremost, the old arguments about its 
historical location surfaced. As discussed earlier, some preferred the location because of 
its proximity to the “deathstrip between East and West, in the middle of the wryly scarred 
wounds of the previous years.”29 Others still contended that the “location of the deeds 
must play an important role” and because the former Reichskanzlei was the closest Berlin 
had, it would have to suffice.30 Rather than seeing this location in the middle of Berlin as 
a detracting factor, some saw it positively, as providing “the unique chance for the 
memorial to create an entirely new city structure” and to bring the city into a new age of 
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 “sei überdies ein historisch falscher Standort, da nicht vom deutschen Volk die Ermordung der Juden 
ausgegangen sei, sondern von einer Gruppe von Nazis.” Lea Rosh as quoted by Dr. Horst Moritz, 
“Diskussion,” Senatsverwaltung für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur (Hg.): Dokumentation 1997 
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 “‘symbolischen Orte’ aktueller deutscher Politik, hinein ins Regierungsviertel” - Mariam Niroumand, 
“Berlin: Neuer Wettbewerb für das Holocaust-Mahnmal,” Die Tageszeitung (7/17/1997), 847. For another 
vote of support, see: Max Bächer, “Allgemeine Bemerkungen,” Der Ertrag der Colloquien, Dokumentation 
Colloquium (1997), 750. 
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 “auf dem Todesstreifen zwischen Ost und West, mitten auf der schief vernarbten Wunde der letzten 
Jahre.” Thomas Krüger, MdB-SPD, Deutscher Bundestag Plenarprotokoll der Bundestagdebatte 13. 
Wahlperiode 104. Sitzung (5/9/1996), 581. 
30
 “mus spielen die Orte des Geschehens eine wichtige Rolle.” Volker Beck u.a. “Antrag der Fraktion 
Bündnis 90/Die Günen,” Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 13/4544 (5/7/1996), 567. 
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unification.31 Historian and memorial initiator, Eberhard Jäckel supported the location 
precisely because it was “an important link between the inner-city and the Tiergarten, . . . 
a public space in the heart of a German capital,” that “brings the location as a memorial 
into contact with everything.”32 For Jäckel, this contact with and accessibility to the 
public at all times and on any occasion was irreplaceable. In the end, most agreed that the 
DEJE should be located at the former Reichskanzlei because, as Architect Arie 
Rahamimoff put it, most people believed that “the site which has been selected for the 
memorial is correct from the historical perspective as well as the urban context.”33 
Ultimately, most major groups participating in the memorial debate supported the 
Reichskanzlei option. Eduard Beaucamp believed that “the memorial cannot be placed 
more exactly and meaningfully,”34and the Bundesregierung, das Land Berlin, the FEDJE 
and the ZRDJ echoed his sentiment.35  
 At the conclusion of the first competition for the memorial’s design, The Senate 
Committee for Building and Housing explained the choice of location by saying, “we 
want to perpetually tell the story, which must be told, we want to look the truth in the eye 
as best we can, keep alive the warning for the future. The location expresses this.”36  
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 “die einmalige Chance, für das Denkmal einen ganz neuen, das Stadtgefüge verwandelnden Platz zu 
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der Heuchelei,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (8/12/1998), 1088. 
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 Malte Lehming, “Ein entschiedenes Jein,” Der Tagesspiegel (2/15/1997), 684. 
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 “mit diesem Denkmal wollen wir fortwährend die Geschichte erzählen, die erzählt werden muss, wollen 
wir der Wahrheit so gut wir können ins Auge schauen, die Mahnung für die Zukunft wachhalten . . . Der 
Standort des Denkmals . . . bringt dies zum Ausdruck.” Senatsverwaltung für Bau- und Wohnungswesen 
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Reunification highlighted the fact that physical location was clearly still so important to 
the way Germans understood their culture, politics and their own identity. Therefore, the 
location of the memorial had to be appropriate. While there were many issues discussed 
about the suggested location, as there would have been with any place chosen, the 
location at the gardens of the old Reichskanzlei was historically justified both in terms of 
the immediate temporal past, Cold War Berlin, and the immediate historical subject, the 
Holocaust.  
Visualizing A Holocaust Memory: the First Design Competition 
In early 1992, a journalist wrote that she wondered “how much room for 
suggestions with regard to things such as shape, execution and name would still be 
possible with [a design] competition.”37 In retrospect, the answer to this question was 
clear: there was a lot of room for discussion. From 1989 until 1999, there was, in fact, a 
great deal of debate over what physical form the memorial would take. Germans spent a 
great deal of time discussing, in both concrete and theoretical terms, what they thought 
the memorial should be. As a part of this discussion, many brought up Holocaust 
memorials and museums in other countries. In March 1995, after the announcement of 
the first design competition’s winners, Simon Ungers and Christine Jakob-Marks, the 
discussion began to focus on the appropriateness and feasibility of each design. But 
participants in the debate also discussed the public support of a third non-winning design 
by Frieder Schnock and Renata Stih. Later in 1996 when the Bund, Land Berlin and 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Hg.), “Presseerklärung – Wettbewerb Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas endgültig entschieden,” 
Berlin (6/28/1995), 441. 
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 “wieviel Spielraum für Entwürfe bei einer solchen Festlegung von Formen, Wirkungen und Namen in 
einem Wettbewerb noch möglich wäre”-  Stefanie Endlich, “Ereigniswege zum Holocaust?,” ORTE 
(3/1992), 87.  
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FEDJE officially proclaimed that the first competition was a failure, the discussion 
changed once again to a theoretical one about what a DEJE should look like. Finally, in 
1997-1999, as we will see, the discussion returned once more to the concrete designs as 
the newspapers analyzed the results of the second competition. 
 A great deal of the discussion about what form the Denkmal für die Ermordeten 
Juden Europas should take centered around developing a memory model, the form that a 
memorial should take, that would be appropriate for remembering the Holocaust in 
Germany.  Early in the flood of newspaper articles that addressed this subject for almost a 
decade, Gabriele Riedle of Die Woche outlined what she saw as the four types of memory 
models used in Germany at the time. The first model was to take a historical location and 
rebuild so that it was beneficial to a productive modern society. She suggested Berlin’s 
Potsdamer Platz as an example. The allies had destroyed it during World War II, but it 
later became Berlin’s most dynamic and popular downtown area as it had been in the 
1920s. The second model was to create a place of “memory through artificially produced 
authenticity,” such as a museum, which used stories and pictures to evoke emotion.38 The 
third model was to build an abstract memorial to represent a particular historical event or 
concept, one which would allow viewers to interpret and experience that memory in the 
way they chose. Finally, the fourth model was to document the past and inundate the 
viewer with factual information and historical documentation so that he or she would 
remember the past as the facts presented it.39 
 While the Bund, Land Berlin and FEDJE never considered the first model, they 
did discuss the appropriateness of the second and fourth models and used the Holocaust 
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 “Erinnerung durch künstlich hergestellte historische Authentizität” -  Gabriele Riedle, “Eichenlaub und 
Mördergrube,” Die Woche (12/16/1994), 232. 
39
 Gabriele Riedle, “Eichenlaub und Mördergrube,” Die Woche (12/16/1994), 232. 
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museum in Washington DC as a reference point. In 1993 the United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum opened in Washington DC as a documentation and research center 
and additionally as a place of remembrance for the victims of the Holocaust. The 
museum is still open to the public 363 days a year and uses artifacts, photographs, 
personal stories and horrifying historical film to bring visitors into the past. While the 
Germans marveled at its conception as both “a museum and memorial simultaneously,” 
reaction against this type of memorial as appropriate for Germany was strong.40 President 
of the Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland Ignatz Bubis in particular opposed using this 
type of memory model in Germany. He maintained that Germany did not need a museum 
because Germany had “the horrific places before our eyes.”41 He and others saw no need 
for this central memorial to evoke an artificial sense of the past when visitors could visit 
the “places of horror” themselves.42 The fear was that the government’s focus on creating 
museums instead of on preserving real historical sites would lead to the development of 
the artificial instead of the real, both literally and in terms of memory.43 This is a topic I 
discussed more fully in Chapter One. According to Bubis and others who agreed with his 
perspective, a museum was not an appropriate or acceptable memory model for a national 
Holocaust memorial in Germany.  
 The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum was not a complete loss, though, 
as a model for Germany’s form of Holocaust remembrance. One journalist contended that 
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 “als Museum und Gedenkstätte zugleich” - Bernhard Schulz, “Das Denkmal,” Der Tagesspiegel 
(1/18/1995), 240. 
41
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und Wohnungswesen (Hg.) Kurzdocumentation, Berlin (5/11/1995), 245. 
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 Jürgen Dittberner, “Schaür einer fernen Zeit,” Der Tagesspiegel (1/3/1995), 235. 
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“the success of the D.C. Holocaust museum speaks for itself. The desire for information 
is vast,” and thus the German Holocaust memorial should be somewhat instructive. 44 
While Lea Rosh and the FEDJE refused to have a memorial based on a pure 
documentation model, they also did not want “a thing that only evokes emotions.”45 The 
German Holocaust memorial would have to incorporate both informational and thought-
provoking elements. Director of the Kunsthalle Bern and art critic Harald Szeemann 
described the balance, it must be a synthesis “of the time-transcendent memories of 
individuals and emotional inner-turbulance.”46 It would have to be a different type of 
memorial, “a reflection place.”47 While these thoughts were expressed early on, at least 
initially the Bund, Land Berlin and FEDJE seemed to agree that only through the means 
of the abstract, through art, would it be possible to achieve Holocaust memory. Because 
the Bund, Land Berlin and FEDJE had rejected the museum and documentation models, 
most agreed that “the artistic form must be particularly thought about.”48 
 The idea of a work of art as a memorial was a prevalent topic of discussion. Some 
discussed art as “a symbolic language” that was the most appropriate way to convey the 
meaning and importance of the Holocaust to the German nation.49 Especially, some 
proposed, because the memorial would be in the center of the city, and therefore visible 
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 “Der Erfolg des Washingtoner Holocaust-Museums spricht für sich. Das Bedürfnis nach Information ist 
riesengross.”  Bernhard Schulz, “Die Kunst der Erinnerung,” DerTagesspiegel (9/13/1994), 227.  
45
 “‘bloss ein Ding dahin zu stellen, das nur Gefühl ausdrückt’” - Lea Rosh as quoted by Bernhard Schulz, 
“Holocaust-Denkmal – Im Rückblick,” Der Tagesspiegel (5/8/1994), 221.  
46
 “ des überzeitlichen Gedenkens und des individuellen, emotionalen Aufgewühltseins verbinden” - Harald 
Szeemann, “Ein Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas,” Texte und Skizze i.A. des FEDJE Berlin 
(4/26/1991), 74. 
47
 “der Besinnungsstätte” -  Harald Szeemann, “Ein Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas,” Texte 
und Skizze i.A. des FEDJE Berlin (4/26/1991), 74. 
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 “die symbolische Sprache der Kunst” - Bernhard Schulz, “Das Denkmal,” Der Tagesspiegel (1/18/1995), 
239. 
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to both intentional and unintentional visitors, it was “ever the more important that the 
aesthetic artistic exhibit display the heart of the content.”50 In other words, it was 
essential that the artistic design of the memorial immediately and clearly communicate 
the abstract concept it was representing: the Holocaust.51 Not everyone, however, lauded 
artistic representation as appropriate for the memorial. Early on in the discussion about 
art Christoph Stölzl, director of the Deutsches Historisches Museum (Museum of German 
History) in Berlin, stated that it was difficult for Germans “to talk about art in 
combination with the Jewish persecution.”52 He went on to say that Germans still wished 
to present themselves as being incapable of articulating their feelings about this past, that 
they wanted to remain in a form of historical amnesia as the immediate descendants of 
Nazi times had been.  A variety of newspapers agreed saying “there is no artistically 
appropriate expression of the Holocaust;” they questioned the capacities of art throughout 
the entirety of the debate.53  
 One of the biggest concerns about an artistic memory model was how it would be 
interpreted. As historian Peter Ambros said, “in the end, a work of art remains dependent 
upon the pair of eyes that observes it,” highlighting the fact that it was the viewer and not 
the deciding committee or even the artist who would have the final word in what the 
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memorial conveyed.54 Particularly as the design competition drew to a close, there was 
much talk about what message the memorial should send to the viewer. Walter Jens, a 
President of the Academy of Art in Berlin, said that the Denkmal für die Ermordeten 
Juden Europas should not simply say “‘it was so,’” but rather force the viewer to 
consider the question of “‘how was it possible?’”55 Similarly, an article in the 
conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung suggested that the memorial should not 
merely convey a warning like “‘you should not murder’” because the Constitution and 
other laws were in place for that reason.56 Instead, the memorial had to compel visitors to 
“sincerely argue with the past,” a result that only abstract artistic expression could 
procure by forcing visitors to question themselves and their pasts.57 Only through this line 
of internal questioning and soul-searching would visitors be able to come to terms with 
the Holocaust, for some, their national history. As some pointed out, this would require 
that the memorial be completely open to the public at all times.58  
Simon Ungers’s Blueprint 
 When the design competition came to a close and the winners were announced, 
discussion moved away from the theoretical questions of “what should the memorial be?” 
to scrutiny and debate over each of the first place designs for the memorial. One of the 
competition’s two winners was Simon Ungers, an architect from Cologne. His design 
included a massive, elevated square comprised of four steel beams supported by four 
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concrete blocks, which were to be located in 
the corners. In the beams, the names of 
Konzentrationslagern (KZs, concentration 
camps) were carved out in such a way that 
sunlight would shine through the holes and 
project the names of the KZs onto the 
ground or anything in the path of the sunlight. The square would be 279 feet squared and 
it would be elevated twenty feet, giving it gargantuan dimensions.59  
 People either loved Simon Ungers’s design or hated it. Those who favored it saw 
it as a complete success, saying that Ungers had designed a memorial that communicated 
the artistic message to those viewing it from a distance and kept the message’s 
significance even upon closer examination. The memorial projected the KZ names onto 
the ground, large enough so that non-visitors would see them from a distance. Close up as 
well, a visitor would be able to see the number and individual names of all the KZs.60 
Ignatz Bubis preferred this design for its artistic symbolism and appropriateness, and 
supported its construction throughout the post-competition debate.61 The vast majority, 
however, considered Ungers’s design inadequate to communicate the meaning of the 
Holocaust because it failed to cause Germans to really struggle with their past. Micha 
Brumlik, a German educationalist, suggested that the design would merely serve as “a 
warning against the murders concocted by the Germans and collectively carried out by 
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 Salomon Korn, “In der Schieflage,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (3/22/1995), 418. 
61
 Ignatz Bubis, “Millionen Namen sind nicht genug,” Interview by the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (6/29/1995), 442. 
 108 
the masses.”62 This would be a passive form of memory as opposed to one that engaged 
the viewer to consider himself or herself in relation to his or her past. He went on to say 
that because the design communicated only an admonition, it failed to evoke a “dialectic 
of horror and escaping oneself.”63 It seems to me that this design did not satisfy the 
demand that the memorial ask a question of its visitors, one with which they must 
struggle internally. Instead, Ungers’s design simply made a statement about the horrors of 
the Holocaust.  
Christine Jakob-Marks’s Blueprint 
 The second first-place winner of the first design competition was Christine Jakob-
Marks, an architect from Berlin. She proposed a 328-square foot and 23-foot thick 
concrete block that tilted upwards on a diagonal to a height of 36 feet.64 Atop this 
concrete block, were large pieces of rock and dirt from Masada, a location in Israel where 
the Jewish inhabitants had killed themselves in 
order to avoid capture by the Romans. 
Additionally, the names of the Jewish 
Holocaust victims were to be engraved in the 
concrete with blank space left to remember 
unknown victims. Among the names and 
Masada rock, the design showed paths on which visitors could walk. Because of its 
appearance and shape, many called this the “gravestone” design, giving darker overtones 
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to an already ominous subject. Of the two first place designs Jakob-Marks’s aroused by 
far, the most discussion and controversy.  
The first controversial issue was that of size; the dimensions of the concrete block 
were massive, filling the entire given area and rising to a height of almost two building 
stories. Before the design competition took place, Ignatz Bubis stated that he was 
skeptical of making the DEJE an average size, as “average” memorials were prevalent in 
Germany and especially in Berlin. He therefore sought a memorial the sheer size of 
which would force people to notice it, a memorial that was not just ordinary.65 Lea Rosh 
echoed this argument later when Solomon Korn reported her as supporting the idea “that 
the crimes were monumental and so must the memorial be monumental.”66 Most people, 
however, rejected Jakob-Marks’s idea. Peter Conradi stated that “it is a mistake, to 
accept, that a crime of incomprehensible dimensions must be thought of in a monumental 
way.”67 He suggested that the dimensions would draw the visitor attention to the wrong 
characteristics; the belief that quantity assured quality was an incorrect foundation for a 
memorial design.  
In another argument regarding the proposals size, Klaus Hartung, a member of the 
Office of the Federal Press, suggested that the thought “that genocide could be answered 
with cubic capacity” threatened the basis for real reconciliation between victims and 
perpetrators.68 In other words, he expressed the fear that by building an enormous 
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memorial, Germany would stop feeling the need to reconcile with the former victims in 
other ways, as I discussed more fully in Chapter One. Further, it carried the implication 
that if such a wrong could be committed and made up for so simply, then what would 
prevent its recurrence? Many did not receive this criticism well and retorted, as Der 
Tagesspiegel did, that “to awaken suspicion that the size of the memorial could in any 
way symbolize the size of the crimes is tasteless, even more: obscene.”69 Many believed 
that it was unjust to accuse the FEDJE and Jakob-Marks’s team of trying to symbolize 
the enormity of the Holocaust, as they were simply working within the space allotted to 
them. Peter Conradi agreed with this and even suggested that the reason for the failure of 
the both first-place designs and therefore of the first competition was that the location 
provided to the artists and architects was so large, with the implication that they could not 
help but design something to fill that whole space.70 
 Another argument against the size of the memorial was that people considered 
large memorials to be vestiges of 19th century remembrance. To them, the idea of a large 
memorial recalled the time of the Kaiser and undue grandiosity in self-praise for 
conquests. This was inappropriate for an enlightened remembrance of the Holocaust.71 
Others suggested that the physical size of the memorial’s design would detract from or 
even be greater than the symbolic message Jakob-Marks originally intended to 
communicate.72 In other words, people would marvel at the size of the memorial and miss 
the concept behind it in doing so. Because the size of this proposed memorial received 
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more attention than the concept behind it, it seems clear that it would not be capable of 
creating an ongoing national and individual self-examination of the Holocaust. Most 
agreed that size was an issue with which the German public and FEDJE would have to 
deal, as even the mere chance of stifling visitors’ memory of the Holocaust with grandeur 
was enough to condemn the design.   
The second controversial issue regarding Jakob-Marks’s memorial design was her 
decision to have all of the names of the Jewish Holocaust victims engraved on the cement 
block. In Germany, Holocaust remembrance focused on giving a name back to the 
Holocaust victims, whom the Nazis’ dehumanized in death camps like Auschwitz by 
trading their names for numbers, so it seems clear that Jakob-Marks had good intentions. 
However, from the very earliest discussions over what the memorial should be, Lea Rosh 
and others stated that it should not be “all the names of the dead, no eye breaking 
statistics;” rather, it should be purely art.73 The most common complaint against the 
engraving of the millions of names on the concrete stone was that it would have the 
opposite effect of what the artist intended, because engraving millions of names in one 
place would bring anonymity.74 In other words, there would be too many names for any 
one to attain significance. Therefore, each of the individual victim’s names would be lost 
in the mass of names, just as they had been in the concentration camps. Even those who 
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rejected other criticisms of Jakob-Marks’s design saw the issue of anonymity to be “at 
least largely understandable as an objection.”75  
Nevertheless, even after the Bund, Land Berlin and FEDJE definitively rejected 
Jakob-Marks’s proposal in 1996, using names in the memorial remained under 
discussion. When determining what qualities a new memorial should have, Dr. Julius 
Schoeps reiterated that by specifying all of the names, “millions of victims would remain 
anonymous.”76 The conversation did, however, shift slightly to look at more positive 
factors. Eberhard Jäckel, for example, explicitly stated that there was nothing wrong with 
naming names as long as it was done in the appropriate medium.77 Richard Schröder saw 
that “no one can give the victims back their individuality” because “the individual 
memory of individual fates is namely, in the best sense of the word, something private.”78  
Finally, Dr. Julius Schoeps suggested the alternative that the Boston Holocaust memorial 
had utilized: the victims’ numbers.79 
Making the issue of using names more complicated was the fact that only around 
4.2 million names were obtainable. The German Army kept no records of Jews murdered 
early during the war on the Eastern Front.80 Further, even gathering the available lists and 
compiling them would be “difficult to perform” as they would have to be obtained from 
all of the concentration, death, and work camps in the many countries occupied by the 
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Third Reich.81 In the midst of this discussion, scandal broke out because the director of 
Yad Vashem in Israel, Avner Shalev, complained that no one from the FEDJE or from 
the German government had spoken to him about the project. He stated that the memorial 
“in this design is absolutely impossible to realize.”82 Peter Conradi and Jewish religious 
philosopher Dr. Ernst Ludwig Ehrlich agreed, saying that “denoting 6 million names on 
the memorial” was a “personal and technical impossibility.”83 
As one could imagine, finding and engraving all of the names of the murdered 
Jews would be an incredibly difficult task.84 When the Nazis officially declared their 
racial policies in the 1935 Nuremburg Laws, they defined a Jew as anyone who had more 
than three grandparents without Christian baptismal certificates. Because the Nazis 
believed “Jewishness” to be a racial characteristic that could be genetically inherited, it 
did not matter whether the persecuted considered themselves to be Jewish, practiced 
Judaism or even if they themselves had a Christian baptismal certificate, a topic I 
discussed more fully in Chapter Two. By calling the memorial the Denkmal für die 
Ermordeten Juden Europas and engraving the names of the murdered “Jews” on the 
memorial, the memorial would “allude to the members of the Jewish religious 
community – or, it follows, would laminate the National Socialist definition of the Jews 
as a race.”85 This line of criticism implied that supporters of the design would then be 
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guilty of the same racist categorization of Jewishness as the Nazis, as I discussed in 
Chapter Two. I think it is clear that Lea Rosh and the FEDJE were trying to, in a way, 
build an environment of reconciliation for the Holocaust victims and that therefore this 
accusation is extreme. 
In fact, the idea of engraving 4.2 million names on the cement block was one of 
the biggest deciding factors in Chancellor Kohl’s ultimate veto of the design.86 However, 
the issue of the names was not forgotten after Jakob-Marks’s proposal was rejected. 
During the forums of 1997 that occurred between the two design competitions, which I 
will discuss in Chapter Four, many people suggested that the idea of using the names of 
the victims was actually a good idea, but that it needed to be presented in a more formal 
way. Ignatz Bubis, for example, suggested that “the names must naturally be captured in 
a documentation center and not together with a memorial.”87 This would give the sense 
that the names were part of an ongoing research-gathering process rather than the 
definitive list of Jewish victims whom the memorial remembered.  
 Not all of the criticisms of the memorial were particularly controversial. Many 
simply thought that Jakob-Marks’s design was insufficient on both artistic and symbolic 
levels. Salomon Korn stated that “the giant gravestone has little to do with art”88 and later 
said that “a gigantic plate through its tilt has nothing to do specifically with the National 
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Socialist genocide of the Jews.”89 Both statements communicated the feeling that the 
design, symbolism and message were misaligned and therefore that the design failed in 
its purpose. If visitors could not consistently connect the symbolism in the form to the 
Holocaust all the way through the memorial’s design, than it could not communicate its 
meaning. If the design failed as a piece of art by leaving confusion instead of inspiring a 
dialogue about the Holocaust, than it would not fulfill its proposed function within 
German society.  
The Bus Stop! Proposal 
 Having liked neither the design by Simon Ungers or Christine Jakob-Marks, 
newspapers reported that a large part of the German public had actually preferred a third 
design, one that had taken third place in the first design competition. Frieder Schnock and 
Renata Stih proposed a conceptual memorial that they called Bus Stop!, which did not 
work within the limitations given to them through the competition. They proposed to 
create a series of public transportation buses painted red, which would leave from 
locations in Berlin and take passengers to concentration camp sites. These buses would 
be highly visible to members of the 
general population in their everyday 
lives and the design itself would take 
advantage of the historical locations 
that Germany had to offer. Further, a 
central bus terminal would offer 
general information about the destinations and the Holocaust. The public lauded this 
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proposal because it would not be just another memorial in Berlin and would make use of 
the real physical locations used in the Holocaust. Further, it would provide information 
and generate discussion about the Holocaust.  
The difference between this memorial and others, as Peter Reichel pointed out, 
was that it was both interactive and communicative rather than obscure and 
monumental.90 The Bus Stop! proposal showed that “memorials should be more than 
monuments” and could invite their visitors not simply to take pictures and stare, but to 
involve themselves and become a part of an experience of memory. The public, to a large 
degree, did not engage in a critical debate over this proposal.91 This seems to have been 
the case largely because it was never actually under serious consideration, as the two 
winning designs were.92 As Editor Thomas Lackmann made clear, intellectuals saw this 
memorial as being primarily a tourist attraction because of the high level of interaction 
that it provoked. 93 This was precisely the result that they were trying to avoid. As such, 
he said, “hardly anyone took this grotesque proposal seriously.”94  
With this last significant proposal of the first design competition, I will end my 
discussion of this competition itself. What we have seen by following the issues of design 
and location chronologically through early1996 is the remaining difficulty of the German 
people with coming to terms with their past. They were still unable to construct a 
monument or even pick an adequate design because, as we saw in Chapters One and 
Two, they still could not sufficiently articulate the meaning this memorial would hold or 
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even what the Holocaust was in their eyes. In Chapter Four I will examine the post-
design competition discussion and continue on to look at the second design competition. 
There I will show that as these issues I discussed in Chapters One and Two gradually 
moved towards a consensus, so did the Germans ability to decide upon the form their 
collective memory of the Holocaust would take.
Chapter IV 
Representing the Holocaust: 
The Second Design Competition 
   
 
In April 1996, the Bund, Land Berlin and FEDJE decided to end the first 
competition, essentially declaring it a failure. As I have shown, none of the memorial 
designs satisfied these three stakeholders, Bund, Land Berlin and FEDJE in the 
competition. The liberal Süddeutsche Zeitung stated “the awarded memorial is too 
monstrous . . . the planned location is inappropriate . . . the whole memorial is even 
superfluous,” a view I discussed more completely in Chapter One.1 Peter Conradi, MdB-
SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands), called the two options “too big, too 
loud, too grand”2 and literary critic Helmut Boettiger agreed when he said the DEJE must 
be “smaller, quieter and more meditative” than the proposed designs.3 Because the years 
of debate had still produced no national Holocaust memorial, historian Heinz Dieter 
Kittsteiner said that the whole issue of the DEJE had become a “laughing stock” in 
Germany and the eyes of the world.4 While the Süddeutsche Zeitung called the DEJE 
“the ‘impossible’ memorial,” the continuing discussion over what the memorial’s design 
implied that hope for the memorial was not completely lost.5 
Renewed Debate on what the Memorial Should Be 
From the end of the first competition in mid-1996 through the beginning of the 
second design competition in October 1997, the discussion once again became a debate 
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over the ideal concept for the memorial. The highpoint of this discussion occurred 
between January and April 1997 as during this time, the Bund, Land Berlin and FEDJE 
held three separate daylong colloquiums to discuss the memorial process. Over the course 
of the three sessions, the group of invited artists, architects, historians and intellectuals 
discussed the following topics: “why does Germany need this memorial?,” “the location, 
its historical and political context, its future involvement in the city space,” “typology 
and iconography of the memorial, way to realization.” The first topic I examined in 
Chapter One, I examined the second topic in Chapter Three, and the final topic I will 
discuss here. While the 1997 forum was the highpoint of this discussion, those 
participating in the debate argued the question long before and long after the colloquium 
ended.  
The argument over what the memorial should be after the first competition existed 
primarily between supporters of, what I call, a dialectical memorial, one that provoked 
discussion, and supporters of, what I term, a didactic memorial, one that educated. Walter 
Jens captured the essence of the difference between dialectical and didactic memorials 
when he said that a memorial to the memory of the murdered Jews of Europe should not 
evoke “it was so,” but it should produce the difficult questions of how and why.6 A 
didactic memorial would simply state “it was so” because it would explain very clearly 
the historical facts of the Holocaust. A dialectical memorial, however, would force the 
viewer to ask him or herself a question and struggle with it in trying to come to terms 
with an answer. It would be ambiguous, unclear and would force the viewer, not the 
memorial, to play the active role in the visit to the memorial. As Professor of Art 
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Philosophy Robert Kudielka said, “a holocaust memorial for Germany cannot simply be 
only a place of mournful thoughts and historical warning;” it must change its viewers.7 
Art scholar Tilmann Buddensieg explained that in the proper design, “the viewer 
is part of the memorial; the ambivalence of the meaning of the symbols is wanted” 
because it would incite the variety of individual responses that such a memorial should 
seek.8 Those who sought a dialectical memorial believed that the meaning a visitor 
derived from the memorial should be individual and not imposed but inspired by the 
memorial. Salomon Korn agreed that the DEJE would only be successful “if it is 
dialectical.”9 A memorial that calls for a coming to terms with the horrific crimes of the 
Nazis “must address something in the viewer that rudimentarily exists in him,” in this 
case knowledge of his or her ancestors’ connection to these crimes, “and leave him to 
respond.”10 Without such a dynamic, the nation would be unable to overcome the horrors 
of its past.  
The opposition argued that this memorial must be didactic, that it must explain to 
the viewer what he or she is observing.11 For example, social historian Jürgen Kocka, 
who had aligned with the liberal historians in the Historikerstreit, supported a didactic 
memorial and said that the visitor “needs information: about victims and perpetrators, 
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about cause and associations, he needs explanation and meaning.”12 In this argument, 
Kocka turns the viewer into a passive observer who is incapable of interpreting a more 
ambiguous representation of the past on his or her own. Not all arguments went that way, 
however. Peter Conradi, for example, did not argue that the visitor needed such 
information but that “the memory and thought of the victims of the Holocaust should be 
stronger,” that it would be enhanced “when bound with the documentation and 
information center about the crimes.”13 Historian Werner Hofmann took the position that 
anything but a documentation center was “an aesthetic falsity,” arguing against the ability 
of art to communicate the crimes of the Holocaust, a position I will explore in detail later 
in the chapter.14 
 When the Land Berlin decided in 1996 that it “should not bind the project of a 
Holocaust memorial to a documentation and information center about the crimes,” 
discussion quickly shifted back to an artistic, symbolic and conceptual version of a 
DEJE.15 In part, this argument said that no one historical location or museum could 
“represent the totality of memory”16 and that it was the job of a memorial to do so, 
because “art alone is in the condition to broker the senses.”17 During the 1997 forums 
about how to proceed with the Holocaust memorial following the first design 
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competition, Heinz Dieter Kittsteiner said that “the majority of the discussants pled for a 
symbolic,” as opposed to the purely informative, approach to the memorial.18 However, 
not all agreed that it was possible to find “an iconography for the collective persecution 
of a people.”19 What we see here is the emergence of a much larger shift in the debate 
over memorial designs from the purely intellectual dialectic versus didactic argument to a 
discussion over the appropriateness of art for the purposes of a Holocaust memorial.  
The Role of Art 
 As we saw in statements like “art alone is in the condition,”  meaning that art is 
the only medium capable of expressing the feelings associated with the Holocaust, many 
Germans wanted art to be successful and the solution to their Holocaust memorial 
problems.20 However, following the failure of first design competition that attempted to 
draw out purely artistic models, it was time for society, according to art critic Eduard 
Beaucamp, to stop being “bound to blind trust in ‘art’” and to begin to question its 
appropriateness.21 This question was formulated in several different ways. Art scholar 
Heiner Bastian asked why “has no one really asked the question of whether art can give 
an adequate picture of the agony of catastrophe and calamity” that occurred during the 
Holocaust.22 The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung’s architecture critic Dieter Bartetzko 
questioned whether contemporary art was in the position to give shape to the complaints 
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and accusations that arose after the first competition.23 Art critic Eduard Beaucamp asked 
whether or not “art, as it is provided today in all its varieties, willful and competent” of 
and for the task of representing the Holocaust.24 In other words, is art capable of 
expressing what it means to remember the Holocaust? Implicit in all of these questions 
was the opinion that art historian Werner Schmalenbach gave: “our trust in art is sunk.”25 
 As early as 1996, Peter Conradi had said that “one will give consideration to the 
competition, if one is clear that the task of remembering the Holocaust through artistic 
means is almost impossible.”26 He thought, and others agreed, that the Holocaust was too 
horrific, too complex and too incomprehensible for art to express. “No picturely 
depiction,” Jens Jessen, Features editor for the Berliner Zeitung, said, “can be 
appropriate” for this type of memory.27 Historian Michael Wolffsohn went so far as to 
say that art was not just an inappropriate means, but made a Holocaust memorial 
“artificial because art can only express that horror through means of aesthetics” and not 
with harsh realities as the real locations and factual descriptions could.28 Whereas Werner 
Schmalenbach said that “only a singular artist can bring about the spectacular task,”29 
holding out hope that one such an artist existed, Jürgen Kocka’s statement, “art alone is 
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not enough,” seemed to reverberate for most people.30 Even Lea Rosh said that “a 
memorial that is only art is not wanted” after the failure of the first competition.31 
Second Competition Results 
 After the year of discussion following the first design competition, the Bund, 
Land Berlin and FEDJE decided that having a second design competition was the best 
way to proceed with the memorial building process. This second design competition was 
held from June to November of 1997 and judged by a Findungskommission that 
inducluded architect and memory expert James Young, director of the Deutsches 
Historisches Museum in Berlin Christoph Stölzl, director of the Museum of 
Contemporary Art in Bonn Dieter Ronte, art historian Werner Hofmann, and architecture 
expert Josef Paul Kleihues.32 Instead of inviting anyone to participate, this time the 
competition was opened only to twenty-five artists and architects from around the world. 
The newspapers showed that the general reaction to the second competition’s results was 
definitely more positive than the reaction to the first competition’s results had been. 
Responding to the earlier issue over the size of the memorial designs that had come out of 
the first competition, Konrad Schuller said that “the dimensions are in most cases more 
moderate,” and thus more acceptable.33 Interestingly, while the intellectuals seemed to 
find the results of the second competition to be more appropriate, the public was less apt 
to be pleased. At the public viewing of the memorial designs, a guestbook was available 
in which visitors could record their thoughts. One visitor outright disagreed with 
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Schuller’s point and stated that “the four suggested memorials are too big.”34 Another 
guest said that “these memorials speak to no one,”35 a view perhaps also reflected in the 
comment that “one needs too long to understand” any of the designs.36 
Non-Winning Options 
 Before discussing the designs that the Jury selected as finalists, I will discuss four 
interesting memorial options that the Bund, Land Berlin and FEDJE decided not to 
consider as a result of the competition, either because the designs were suggested 
between competitions or failed to be chosen as finalists. The first plan, the Silent Minute, 
came out of belief that the memorial “that disappears or that one cannot and should not 
see, because it is only in the heads of the people” is the best kind of memorial, as stated 
by Joachim Riedl of Die Zeit.37 The thought behind this statement was that the memories 
of the Holocaust were everywhere and could not exist solely in one place. During the 
second day of the 1997 colloquiums held to discuss how to proceed in the memorial 
debate, documentary-film director Jacqueline Görgen suggested developing a “silent 
minute, that is a quiet collective commemoration of the victims of the Holocaust.”38 This 
silent minute would be held “in unity with the Israelis on Holocaust Remembrance Day 
‘as a sign of the solidarity of our sorrow and wishes never to forget.’”39 There were two 
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primary criticisms of this idea. The first was that it would be a “horrid embarrassment” if 
most people did not partake in the moment of silence.40 If that were the case, there would 
effectively be no Holocaust memorial in Germany. This revealed the second criticism, 
really a flat out rejection, for Lea Rosh the Silent Minute was “a completely other 
question. We want to build a memorial.”41 For the FEDJE, only a physical object would 
satisfy, a legitimate request, because a monument is a form of permanent memory that 
cannot be modified without a great deal of approval or funding. 
The second plan was proposed after the 1997 colloquiums were over, prior to the 
beginning of the competition. In April, journalist Henryk Broder proposed that the land 
of the former Reichskanzlei be offered to the State of Israel as a location on which it 
could build a new Embassy in the new capital. Israel was already a contentious issue for 
its instability as a nation and questionable foreign policy initiatives in Lebanon and with 
Palestine, the idea of creating the embassy as “a form of ‘living memorial’” raised much 
controversy.42 Peter Conradi responded critically that the Holocaust embassy memorial 
"could attain a completely different distinction: the Holocaust as a ‘foundational  
sacrifice’ for the State of Israel.”43 As I discussed in Chapter One, one criticism of the 
Holocaust memorial in Germany was that through the memorial it would use the 
Holocaust victims to establish a new German national identity. Here, Conradi takes this 
same idea and says that should the embassy idea come to fruition, than the Holocaust 
victims would become the basis for Israeli identity and not for German identity. Also, 
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Conradi made the point that if the memorial became an Israeli embassy, than "the 
memorial would be there not as a memorial of the Germans, but as a memorial of the 
State of Israel."44 According to him, a memorial that did not act for the German nation 
was unacceptable. Interestingly, only people who were actually interested in seeing the 
proposal through were Germans. According to Henryk Broder, “the Israelis – the 
embassy in Bonn and the consultancy in Berlin -- want to have nothing to do with it."45 
The proposal was quickly forgotten. 
  The third proposal for a Holocaust memorial that artist Horst Hoheisel proposed 
in 1995 was to destroy the Brandenburger Tor. His idea was to destroy an important piece 
of historical German identity that had helped lead to the rise of National Socialism and 
which remained an ever-present reminder of these earlier times. Symbolically, Hoheisel's 
idea was to put an empty space in the 
middle of Berlin, a representation of the 
void in the heart of German society caused 
by the deaths of the Holocaust victims. 
Obviously, such a radical plan was not 
likely to be carried out by any of the 
involved parties. Besides this, Salomon Korn argued that such a suggestion was 
inappropriate for the Holocaust because you cannot destroy an object of art built to honor 
one event, in order to symbolize another event.46 Having been built by Friedrich Wilhelm 
                                                 
44
 “Das Denkmal würde dort nicht als ein Denkmal der Deutschen, sondern ein Denkmal des Staates Israel 
gesehen.” Peter Conradi, "Informationsbrief vom 26. Mai 1997," (5/26/1997), 746. 
45
 “Nur die Israelis – die Botschaft in Bonn und das Konsulat in Berlin – wollen damit nichts zu tun haben.” 
Henryk M. Broder, "Unten und oben," Der Spiegel (4/21/1997), 744. 
46
 Salomon Korn, "Durch den Reichstag geht ein Riss," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (7/17/1997), 529. 
 128 
II as a sign of peace, it really had nothing to do with the Holocaust and therefore by 
destroying it, no real Holocaust memory would be achieved.  
  The fourth proposal, the Cobblestone Autobahn (highway) Kilometer was actually 
a product of the second design competition and very much a favorite at the two-month 
long public viewing of the designs that began in December 1997.47 Artists Rudolf Herz 
and Reinhard Matz developed this proposal. Their idea was to take one kilometer of the 
Autobahn, pave it with cobblestones and have a giant road sign at the beginning of the 
kilometer that said “Mahnmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas.” The German 
Autobahn system had been built in the 1930s by the Nazis. While the Weimer Republic 
had conceived it, it was the Nazis who 
actually carried out the project, one of 
Hitler’s attempts to bring about economic 
recovery. The Autobahn project had been 
extremely successful, providing thousands 
of jobs and the benefit of improved 
infrastructure. Reconstructing a kilometer of the Autobahn to be a memorial for the 
Jewish Holocaust victims would remind German drivers of the cost of such incredible 
achievements. Based on the arguments made against memorial designs throughout the 
first and second competition, I think it is likely that the major reasons for this proposal’s 
failure, were that the memorial would be driven on, sped through and easily passed over 
entirely. 
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 Competition Winning Designs 
 While the designs I just described received a lot of attention in newspapers, they 
were not under serious consideration for the prize of the second competition. In 
November, 1997, the jury selected four proposals as competition finalists to examine 
more closely. The memorial jury requested that the architects and/or artists of each of 
these proposals give a presentation explaining their designs. In this section I will examine 
these four remaining proposals in detail. 
 The first of these proposals came from Jochen Gerz, a German conceptual 
architect. His memorial design was entitled “Warum?” (Why?) and his memorial literally 
embodied the dialectic this question invoked. The first part of his memorial was an area 
dominated by thirty-nine steel poles, atop which would be the question “why?” in each of 
the languages of Jewish victims from throughout Europe. Beneath this, the ground would 
be paved with the responses of visitors to this 
question, which would be engraved in the stones 
that made up the surface. The second part of the 
memorial was an enclosed building in which 
visitors would verbally be asked “why?” and then would respond both in writing and 
through conversation with each other. This conversation and these responses would be 
recorded with the possibility that a foundation would “design a library for the memorial 
with the texts that will come out of conversations with visitors.”48 
 Gerz’s memorial was favored by the FEDJE because it was an “interactive 
memorial” that not just allowed but forced its visitors to become a part of the memories it 
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portrayed.49 Gerz chose to center his memorial around the question “why?” because it 
was not a “question only for the victims or only for the criminals, but a question for 
everyone.”50 This was such a refreshing option from those given in the first competition 
because no one was excluded from the thoughts; it was for neither the victims’ nor the 
perpetrators’ descendants but for the entire German community and perhaps even for the 
world. Not everyone agreed with Gerz’s theory, however. Memory and architecture 
scholar James Young, for example, publicly stated that he believed the question of “why” 
was “exclusively the question of the criminals.”51 Some feared that it would actually 
inspire contemporary right-wing anti-Semites to answer the question according to their 
Nazi-inspired beliefs, thus defeating the memorial’s overall purpose.52 Besides this, the 
jury seemed to think that this proposal was not artistically symbolic enough and too 
straightforward. The FEDJE, however, did support “the pedagogically inspired work of 
Gerz” as one of their top choices. 53  
 The second design proposal finalist was Daniel Libeskind, an American architect 
born in Poland in 1946. Libeskind’s design for Berlin’s Jewish Museum had been chosen 
for construction just prior to this second competition. Libeskind believed that the core of 
a Holocaust memorial must represent “the emptiness that the Holocaust left behind,” a 
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concept that both his museum and memorial proposals reflected.54 By emptiness he 
meant that the Holocaust had killed so many people who could have led otherwise 
productive and meaningful lives. Thus, the art 
they would have produced, solutions they would 
have created and cures that they would have 
found remained empty spaces in history. Named 
Steinatem (Stonebreath), Libeskind’s design 
consisted of five enormous concrete blocks in a straight diagonal line, parallel to one of 
the streets that defined the memorial’s property. The central feature of these stones would 
be the holes cut from them and encased in glass, voids that represented this “emptiness” 
Libeskind sought to convey. According to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the 
Berliner Senat favored Libeskind’s proposal.55 
 While Libeskind’s memorial design was praised for its conceptual design and 
“high aesthetic qualities,” it was also criticized for precisely the same reasons.56 Author 
Julia Naumann wrote that his design “could appear to be too pretty,” a criticism that 
many made about the memorial designs produced for the second competition.57 That 
Libeskind found and explicated something symbolic and representative about every piece 
of his memorial design caused some, like art scholar Heiner Bastian, to be “astonished, 
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horrified at so many free metaphors.”58 Bastian seemed to argue that Libeskind’s 
memorial was too complicated, overly symbolic, and therefore that it lost its meaning in 
the visitors’ efforts to interpret. It honored the memory of that which never existed as a 
result of the Holocaust. Perhaps Klaus Hartung presented the harshest criticism when he 
said that “Libeskind’s design is probably the weakest . . . his design works like a self-
quotation of a deconstructivist catalogue.”59 This latter comment suggested that 
Libeskind was concerned more with furthering his own architectural concepts and 
theories than with conveying Holocaust memory. 
 The third design finalist was German architect Gesine Weinmiller and her 
Davidstern (Star of David) proposal. Just as the name implied, this design was a large 
Star of David made of high stonewalls. However, this Star of David was no longer intact, 
it was shattered and the concrete walls that would have formed the sides of the star were 
staggered and tilted so that they presented only a vague resemblance of what the “whole” 
once was. Weinmiller intended this scattering 
of the stones to “symbolize the barbaric acts of 
destruction” that left the identity and people of 
Judaism shattered and broken.60 Her goal was 
to leave the visitors with their own thoughts in 
order to bring about feelings of reconciliation.61 
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She intended not to provide the definitive, historical answers of a museum; as she said, 
“here there is definitely not clarification.”62 Die Tageszeitung lauded her design for its 
ability to “isolate the visitor and force him or her to grapple with the questions of 
Holocaust memory in an internal dialectic that museums could not provide.”63 
Additionally, in contrast to some of the other proposals, as we will see next, many 
thought Weinmiller’s to be a good choice because it was a wide-open space that was easy 
to protect, and relatively safe from vandalism.64 
 There were two distinctive criticisms of Weinmiller’s design. The first concerned 
the symbol of the Star of David as it was “feared that Jews would be stigmatized” by 
such a symbol.65 Such a view implied that the Star of David had become such a 
stereotypical symbol of Jewish culture, that in terms of memory it had very little 
meaning. In fact, it was this symbol that the Nazis had used to label their Jewish victims. 
Should this symbol really be the permanent one of Holocaust memory? The second 
criticism, as the Berliner Zeitung said, was that the design was “too simple and 
arbitrary.”66 The whole proposal was merely a “scattered Star of David that says 
nothing;”67 the design did not hold any deeper meaning and did not cause serious 
reflection on the Jewish victims. Julia Naumann described it as “too pretty and in this 
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way also too harmless.”68 She implied that it did not force visitors to really struggle with 
the Nazi past. Some attributed the design’s weakness to the fact that Weinmiller was only 
34 at the time of the competition and was thus “not yet ready” to produce a design fitting 
for Holocaust memory.69 In his Informational Letter in 1997, Peter Conradi stated that 
Weinmiller’s design appeared to him “to be the weakest . . . a decision of the jurors for 
this work would be a compromise.”70 Despite the support she had received, Weinmiller’s 
proposal failed. 
 The fourth and last design finalists were American sculptor Richard Serra and 
architect Peter Eisenman and their proposal Feld der Erinnerung (Field of 
Remembrance). This design consisted of four thousand concrete pillars that varied in 
height from ½ inch to around 15 feet. These columns were arranged in such a way that a 
visitor could, and indeed was intended to, get 
lost inside of the memorial. The memorial 
would further disorient the visitor by the 
ground that would rise and fall throughout. The 
Eisenman/Serra design notably lacked any 
particular reference to Jewish culture or religion, a quality which Eisenman/Serra 
intentionally left out because they did “not want to produce a Jewish memorial.”71 When 
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the design came out, it immediately captured broad interest.72 The Berliner Zeitung called 
it “the first persuasive Holocaust-memorial”73 design presented to date and the 
Süddeutsche Zeitung said that their design had “so frighteningly perfectly accomplished 
the task” of an appropriate memorial to Holocaust memory.74 
 There were two primary features of the Eisenman/Serra design that led to such 
complements. The first centered on the proposal’s “high aesthetic qualities.”75 While 
aesthetic, the memorial did not actually depict anything; it did not bring the visitor to a 
conclusion or even suggest a range of possible feelings or questions. Eisenman and Serra 
intended this to be the case because they did not want “nostalgia;” they wanted, as they 
said, “simply living memory, namely that of individual experience.”76 They did not want 
visitors to have to focus on the past, though they could if they so chose; their idea was to 
focus on the Holocaust, equally as it existed in the present day thought. They also wanted 
their memorial to force the visitor to reckon with something internal, not with something 
that they, the designers, suggested. Eduard Beaucamp reflected this when he said about 
the design that “only here is the visitor not an object of mental acrobatics and didactical 
procedures” because “here the art of impression dominates.”77 Here again we see the 
rejection of a didactic memorial that imposed particular messages in favor of a abstract 
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memorial. Eisenman went so far as to say that his “design is anti-symbolic” because even 
a symbol intends to communicate some kind of message. Eisenman wanted his memorial 
to “become an experience of the body” where the visitor developed his own meaning 
inspired via but not developed by the memorial.78 
 The second aspect of the design that elicited complement was the so-called “zone 
of instability” that the memorial created for the visitor, as he or she wandered through the 
disorienting columns that rise and fall along the way. Eventually, becoming so deeply 
trapped amongst the columns, there would appear to be no way out as the street and 
sometimes even sky were no longer visible. Out of this isolation came the instability 
Eisenman and Serra wanted to produce.79 Architecture scholar James Young supported 
and explained this effort by saying that German “memory begs no reassurance but 
disorientation.”80 This disorientation, and thus the memorial, would “strengthen the 
singular role of thought anchored in itself,” that is to say thought for its own sake, 
inspired by the visitor and for the visitor alone as opposed to a didactic memorial that 
gave thoughts and answers.81 Because the visitor is isolated in the memorial, it leaves 
endless possibilities for the thoughts and conclusions the visitor can draw. This, James 
Young said, is perfect because it “means an ongoing process” of Holocaust memory, “a 
continual question without a definite answer.”82 
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 While lauded far more than any of the other memorial designs, Eisenman and 
Serra’s proposal was also highly criticized. On an aesthetic level, many found the design 
to be too abstract. Particularly President of the Academy of Art in Berlin Walter Jens and 
author Günter Grass led the opposition to the memorial based on the point that this 
“abstract installation” could not be appropriately “a place of quiet sorrow and memory.”83 
Because it was so abstract, many people would not find any real meaning in its design. 
The liberal Berlin daily, Der Tagesspiegel contended that there was nothing “more to 
read in the suggestion of Eisenman and Serra than a computer determined concrete-
learning forest.”84 Some went further to criticize the fact that the design had no direct 
reference to the fate of the Jews and thus was questionable as a Holocaust memorial.85 
Arguably, the title of the memorial was not enough to ensure that the memory provoked 
in the memorial actually connected to the Holocaust.  
 The most talked about and acted upon criticism of the Eisenman/Serra design 
concerned maintaining the memorial’s integrity through security. Newspaper articles 
raised the concern again and again that “it will be dirtied by people and their dogs” as 
they walked through, making cleaning crews necessary or condemning the memorial to a 
perpetually disgusting state.86 Further, adults would need to keep small children and dogs 
from running around and creating undue noise that would disturb the experience.87 There 
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was concern that the inability to see beyond a certain number of columns, and the ability 
to hide so well in the memorial meant that it was “an ideal place for graffiti” that would 
sullen both the superficial exterior and the ability of a visitor to reflect.88 For these same 
reasons, the memorial might be unsafe because people could easily be attacked without 
warning and without the comfort of rescue or chance of escape.89 Many newspapers said 
that something like Eisenman/Serra’s memorial would have to be guarded at all times and 
be well lit in order to be safe for public use; no plan for this had been made in the 
memorial’s original design.90  
 Though widely criticized for the above reasons, the support for this design was 
such that “it seem[ed] to create itself already” without any official decree, as the 
Süddeutsche Zeitung said.91 Almost all recognized that “it only [had] a chance in 
modified form,” but unlike the other memorial proposals, the Bund, Land and FEDJE 
were willing to consider a modification of this proposal.92 Out of the criticisms came a 
new memorial proposal from Peter Eisenman called Eisenman II. Unwilling to consider 
the possibility of modifying the memorial design, Peter Serra dropped his name from the 
proposal and left all rights to Eisenman. The most significant changes had to do with the 
columns themselves. There would now be 2,600 of them, down from 4000 and the 
highest would only be around 8 feet tall, as opposed to 15 feet tall. Most importantly, 
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these columns would no longer be randomly placed, but aligned in long rows so that the 
end of the memorial was always visible throughout. This was intended to preserve the 
feeling of instability while adding the possibility 
of its being guarded, at least from the perimeter. 
Also in terms of security, the columns would be 
covered with anti-graffiti chemicals as well as to 
light the memorial from underneath.93 Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl also had the desire for the memorial 
to include trees, largely outside of the columns, 
but that would also begin to mix with the columns themselves.94 Eisenman saw no 
problem with this and jokingly said that he would be okay with pretty much anything but 
“naturally, no Christmas trees.”95 
Alternative Options 
 While Eisenman and Serra’s design was by far the favorite and most discussed of 
the four finalist designs, the flaws I have examined and new government elections in 
1998 kept even the Eisenman II design from winning in its revised form. As the 
discussion evolved following the announcement of the finalists, and as disappointment 
mounted, three new alternatives arose that I will now discuss. First, György Konrád, 
president of the Academy of Art in Berlin-Brandenburg, proposed an entirely new type of 
memorial. His thought was to create a Garten (Garden) which would have a playground 
for small children and a reflection park for adults. This idea came out of both his belief 
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that “shame and sorrow are not loud” and seemingly a reaction to the criticisms of 
previous memorial designs that they would contort the center of Berlin.96 Rather than 
this, Konrád wished “for a friendly memory place in the middle of Berlin.”97  
 Those who supported Konrád’s design did so primarily for its new language of 
memory, which Konrád himself had described as “friendly.” Klaus Hartung who had so 
harshly criticized particularly Libeskind’s memorial design said that Konrád’s idea 
“shows more wisdom and humanness than the German memory debate has until now.”98 
He implied that the previous nine years’ debate about shame, disgrace, sorrow, and horror 
was not actually what Germany needed and that Konrád’s proposal for a happier place 
would actually be more productive. On the other hand, those who criticized Konrád’s 
idea did so for this same reason. Journalist Harald Martenstein simply stated that “a 
Holocaust memorial will not be fun.”99 James Young had elaborated on this point before 
Martenstein when he said: 
But a place that succeeds out of the screeches and smiles of 
living children’s happy relief, will not suffice as a German 
memorial for the murdered Jews of Europe. . . the Germans 
must realize that it is impossible to compensate for 
genocide in so playful a way.100 
 
                                                 
96
 “Scham und Trauer sind nicht schrill” - György Konrád, “Ein jüdischer Garten für alle,” Berliner 
Zeitung (11/28/1998), 1157. 
97
 “einem freundlichen Erinnerungsplatz in der Mitte Berlins” - György Konrád, “Ein jüdischer Garten für 
alle,” Berliner Zeitung (11/28/1998), 1157. 
98
 “Sie zeigt mehr Weisheit und Menschlichkeit, als der deutsche Erinnerungsstreit bislang zuliess.” Klaus 
Hartung, “Verspätetes REchtbehalten,” Die Zeit (2/13/1998), 1023. See also: Marianne Heuwagen, “Nazi-
Bunker steht Holocaust Mahnmal im Weg,” Süddeutsche Zeitung (1/28/1998), 1007. 
99
 “Ein Holocaust-Mahnmal macht keinen Spass.” Harald Martenstein, “Gegen-Darstellung,” Der 
Tagesspiegel (12/10/1998), 1177. 
100
 “Aber ein Ort, der aus dem Kreischen und Lachen lebender Kinder frohe Erleichterung gewinnt, wird 
als deutsches Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas nicht ausreichen. . . die Deutschen müssen 
einsehen, dass es unmöglich ist, Massenmord auf so spielerische Weise zu kompensieren.” James E. Young, 
“Gegen Sprachlosigkeit hilft kein Kreischen und Lachen,” trans. Reinhard Kaiser, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung (1/2/1998), 976.  
 141 
The press, Bund and FEDJE had criticized Weinmiller and Libeskind’s proposals for 
precisely these same reasons, so it was unlikely that such a tame form of memory of the 
Holocaust was going to satisfy the majority that was looking for a real call to memory.  
 Michael Naumann, the new German Minister of Culture beginning in 1998, 
proposed the second new type of memorial after the second competition. As I stated 
earlier, Naumann was very much in favor of a highly didactic and less representational 
memorial. Thus, his plan consisted of three primarily informational parts. The first part 
was an interactive explanation for small children, a hands-on experience to which they 
could relate. The second part was a building that would house a satellite office of the Leo 
Bäck Institute. With locations already in New York, London and Israel, this institute 
documented and conducted research on Jewish history and culture. The third part would 
be a library of Holocaust history.101 Naumann’s proposal was a relief for those who had 
so long sought a didactic memorial that did not place so much import on art and 
symbolism. The sentiment expressed by Gerhard Kurtze “let us develop a memory library 
instead of stone monuments!” seems to suggest the wish for a transition from traditional 
types of memory to those that would produce learning and concrete thought as a library 
undoubtedly would.102 
 There were several arguments against Nauman’s proposal, beginning with the 
simple fact that “a foundation is a foundation and not a memorial.”103 As I suggested 
earlier, the FEDJE, Bund and Land Berlin sought a physical memorial to the Holocaust 
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victims and not a substitute. A further argument against replacing “a lasting monument 
with some sort of institution for historical instruction” as Naumann proposed to do, was 
that such a place “can tacitly turn into something else once the climate shifts.”104 Jürgen 
Habermas made this argument, by which he meant that an institution that carried out 
memory primarily via human instruction was not a permanent thing. Human discretion 
and the interpretation of those who were teaching or presenting there would determine 
the memory they presented. As a result, should they decide not to focus on Holocaust 
memory, than the Holocaust would have no memorial in Berlin. Finally, Reinhard Rürup 
made the argument that a decision to follow through on Naumann’s proposal would 
“weaken and not strengthen” the existing memory places, as a representational memorial 
would, because it could be even more easily seen as a replacement.105 The general 
opinion seemed to be, as the Berliner Zeitung said, Naumann’s proposal was a 
“stupidity”106 and leaders of the Holocaust memorial debate like James Young stated that 
“the Holocaust memorial must not collapse on the witty suggestions of Michael 
Naumann.”107 
 The third and final alternate proposal for a Holocaust memorial came from 
German theology Professor Richard Schröder, very late during the discussion in 1999. 
Schröder’s idea was to have the phrase “Du sollst nicht morden” (you should not murder) 
written in Hebrew script stand on the open area. Schröder believed this idea fulfilled the 
need for a physical memorial while at the same time alleviating the problem the DEJE 
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had created from the beginning, “namely the hierarchy of victims.”108 Because, he said, 
the message was one of universal appeal, it applied equally to all of the victims of the 
Holocaust. Meanwhile, the message would be written in Hebrew script, which recognized 
the singularity and uniqueness of the Jewish persecution.109 While his idea was received 
positively by many, including Mayor Eberhard Diepgen and author Thomas Schmid, as 
being the design “to have the greatest radiance,” at this point in the debate, those who 
were to make the decision found it to be all wrong.110 Lea Rosh was quoted as saying of 
the plan that it was “not only stupid and banal,” but also a late suggestion that was “at 
least misunderstood if not wrong.”111 Despite these objections, Schröder’s design was 
actually the only serious competition in the Bundestag for the proposal I will examine 
next: Eisenman III.  
Conclusion: Eisenman III  
What developed in mid-1998 was a combined version of Eisenman II and 
Naumann’s proposal. Because Naumann was the new Minister of Culture, supported by 
the new chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, his thoughts and opinions could not be ignored, in 
the same way that Eisenmann II could not simply be dropped from the table. What 
resulted was Eisenmann III. This proposal limited the Eisenman design to 1,600 columns 
in order to make room for a glass wall that would contain books, connected to a 
Holocaust research foundation. Beneath the memorial, there would be a network of 
lecture halls and offices which would didactically present the Holocaust. While some, 
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like Stefan Reinecke, believed that “not art or didactic, but art and didactic” had “every 
chance to be realized,” many really thought that Eisenmann III went too far in modifying 
the original Eisenman proposal.112 In a letter to Peter Eisenman, Jürgen Habermas spoke 
emphatically against integrating the Nauman proposal into Eisenman II.113  Reinhard 
Rürup said that “the suggested museum would not strengthen but weaken the 
memorial,”114 a view which was reflected also by the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
that said a documentation center would “rob the memorial of its power.”115 There was 
further concern that now 
visitors would simply walk 
through the memorial without 
even thinking, because it was 
so small and well aligned.116 
In June, 1999 on a 314 – 209 
vote, despite immense 
criticism, Eisenman III was approved by the Bundestag.  
 This decision did not represent the end to the Denkmalstreit. All of the issues 
surrounding the memorial continued to be discussed in Germany well after the 
memorial’s dedication in May 2005. This memorial, therefore, did not represent the end 
of debate over Holocaust memory in Germany as some had feared. Rather, the memorial 
showed that the Germans were capable of coming together to discuss an extremely 
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difficult issue from their history: the Holocaust. Further, it showed that the Germans were 
able to reach some type of consensus on the issues surrounding the Holocaust even 
though it made some people uncomfortable and even though not everyone was 
completely satisfied. The physical existence of the Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden 
Europas represents both that consensus and the continued debate. It represents 
Germany’s coming to terms with the Holocaust.  
 Conclusion 
 Germany as a Model for Dealing with the Past 
   
 
The debate over the Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas (DEJE) was an 
often tedious discussion lasting more than a decade that sought to bring a national, central 
German Holocaust memorial to fruition. The debate over the DEJE made it clear that 
Germany still had huge identity issues following reunification, issues that dated to the 
Second World War and that were clearly articulated.  
In Chapter One, I examined the debate over the necessity and meaning of the 
Holocaust memorial. Despite the Bund, Land Berlin and FEDJE’s insistence throughout 
the decade-long debate that the memorial would be built, the question of whether 
Germany needed a Holocaust memorial was never resolved. Flowing from the 
conservative revisionism of the Historikerstreit, some argued that a memorial was good 
because it would allow Germany to forget, and even that the whole debate was bad for 
Germany because it continued to emphasize German shame. Those representing a more 
liberal perspective argued that the memorial was good because it would mean Germany 
would never forget and would teach and open discussion about the Holocaust for future 
generations. Some who supported this perspective also argued the memorial was 
unnecessary because it would mean a historicization of the past that would take the 
Holocaust out of contemporary memory. The ultimate consensus was that a Holocaust 
memorial would help to establish a much needed sense of German national identity. Not 
an identity based on forgetting the Nazi past or based on perpetual shame for the 
Holocaust but one of responsibility to promote democratic freedoms in Germany and the 
world.  
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In Chapter Two, I examined the course of debate about for whom the memorial 
would be built. This discussion raised the questions of the singularity and uniqueness of 
the Holocaust as the persecution of the Jews alone, or whether other victim groups like 
the Sinti and Roma should be included as well. Over time, the discussion changed to 
question whether the memorial should speak to the Jewish victims or to the perpetrators – 
the German nation. Ultimately, debate participants from both the victims and perpetrators 
perspectives reached a consensus that the memorial must really be for the future 
generations of Germans – the children of both victims and perpetrators – so that everyone 
might be called to memory of the Holocaust.  
 Finally, in Chapters Three and Four, I explored the debate over the form that the 
national Holocaust memorial should take. The course of this debate depended directly on 
the decisions the Bund, Land Berlin and FEDJE made about how they wanted the 
memorial design process to proceed. At first, the discussion was theoretical and 
rudimentary and reached the conclusion that the national Holocaust memorial should be 
an artistic memorial as opposed to a museum or information center. When the first 
competition ended, participants debated how the specific features of the awarded 
proposals met or failed to meet their ideas for what the Holocaust memorial should be. 
This led to a second theoretical discussion lasting a year and half, which focused on the 
capability of art to capture the horrors of the Holocaust. Finally, the discussion following 
the second design competition led to the consensus on the Eisenman/Naumann proposal, 
which combined both artistic, symbolic, and informational, and instructive features. I also 
examined the discussion about the proposed location of the memorial and how deeply the 
Germans considered this historical importance of the ground on which the memorial 
   
 148 
would stand. The determination that the memorial must be on a location that held 
symbolic importance both with regard to the Nazi past and to the more contemporary 
Cold War division of Berlin showed an eagerness to incorporate both the current and 
historical path in moving forward. 
 As we have seen, the Germans, through the course of the Denkmalstreit, really 
dealt with the significant issues left over from the Historikerstreit. They discussed the 
singularity of the Holocaust, the need for continued shame, the fear of forgetting the 
crimes and the desire for a new national identity. In order for Germany to build the 
national Holocaust memorial, Germans had to come to some sense of agreement on those 
issues and they did. There was always and remains a strong current opposed to the 
decisions made regarding the DEJE as these issues continue to be discussed today. It was 
not, however, the fact that not Germans even came to an agreement but that they dealt 
with these issues publicly and openly at all that is so significant. The Germans were able 
to build the DEJE even though the decisions they ultimately made caused some people to 
be uncomfortable. 
The success with which Germany has dealt with its past is really illuminated 
when it is compared to other nations that have similarly tragic crimes in the past. Among 
the many horrors of the last three centuries were the Japanese genocide of the Chinese at 
Nanking, the United States’ genocide of the Native Americans and the Turkish genocide 
of the Armenians. Yet none of these perpetrator nations has come close to dealing with 
the crimes of its pasts as genuinely as the German nation has explored and come to terms 
with the Holocaust. In the following pages I will briefly examine the Japanese, United 
States’ and Turkish genocidal actions in terms of how the events exist in collective, 
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national memory. As we will see, at this point in time the Germans really have done a 
good job, perhaps the most exemplary, in the process of Vergangenheitsbewältigung.  
Japan and Nanking 
 The Japanese attack on the Chinese capital of Nanking occurred in December of 
1937, just before World War II, resulting in its fall on December 13th. Over a period of 
six weeks, the Japanese army committed terrible atrocities including massacre and rape 
of noncombatant Chinese people resulting in the historical term for the event: the 
“Nanking Massacre” or the “Rape of Nanking.”1 Hatred and racism between the Japanese 
and Chinese had been deep-seeded over the centuries.2 The Japanese army did not seek to 
exterminate every living Chinese, but to finally subjugate China to Japanese will. 3  In the 
process, however, they murdered an estimated 300,000 men, women and children.4  
 For the rest of the Second World War period, the Nanking Massacre was not 
discussed in Japan, or even in China and the West. With one notable exception, this trend 
of silence continued in the post-war period. No reparations were paid; first and second 
generations did not really question their responsibility for the crimes; generally Japan 
avoided the issue of guilt entirely. The one exception was the Tokyo Trials of 1946, the 
Pacific Theater equivalent of the Nuremberg Trials in the European Theater. During these 
war crimes trails, the allies tried and executed Japanese generals and military chiefs for 
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their participation in atrocities. Out of these trials the allies established that the crimes 
committed at Nanking precluded Japan’s sovereign right to wage war.5 In other words, 
the fact that the Japanese had committed this crime meant, on a fundamental level, that 
they had lost the ability to declare war as a nation. Notably, the allies did not hold the 
Japanese emperor responsible for the crimes at Nanking. The United States attempted to 
shield him in order to establish a positive relationship with Japan going into the Cold 
War.6  
Throughout the entire post-war period, the Japanese government and mainstream 
Japanese society focused completely on the Japanese role as victims in the atomic 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.7 They ignored their role as perpetrators of the 
crimes in China. Only in the early 1970s did reports begin to flow in from China 
regarding the number of deaths at Nanking. Then, for the first time, progressive Japanese 
historians began to realize the atrocities committed at Nanking were greater than the total 
number of deaths from both Atomic bombings combined.8 It must be emphasized 
however that conservatives, who wanted to forget Japan’s criminal actions in China and 
focus on its role as a victim, controlled the rest of Japanese society and government.9 The 
textbook controversy of 1982 revealed the role of the Ministry of Education in 
minimizing the Nanking atrocities when it changed the wording in all Japanese textbooks 
from “invasion” of China to “advance into.”10  
                                                 
5
 Li, Sabella, Liu, Nanking 1937, 4-5. 
6
 Li, Sabella, Liu, Nanking 1937, xiii. 
7
 Li, Sabella, Liu, Nanking 1937, 61. 
8
 Li, Sabella, Liu, Nanking 1937, 58. 
9
 Li, Sabella, Liu, Nanking 1937, 58. 
10
 Li, Sabella, Liu, Nanking 1937, 8. 
   
 151 
 Almost paralleling the Historikerstreit, the early 1980s produced the Nankin 
Ronso or Nanking Debate in Japan. This debate was held between non-historians 
including journalists, writers, publicists and as a result the debate was largely non-
historical and was instead political in nature. Begun by the conservative revisionist 
historians who sought to regain Japan’s right to wage war lost during the Tokyo Trials, 
the articles they published largely negated the factual basis for the Nanking atrocities.11 If 
they did not deny the occurrence of the Nanking Massacre completely, they said at least it 
was not in the numbers China had put forth and that it was the result of soldiers who had 
run amok as opposed to a direct military order.12 Some progressive scholars and even a 
few politicians rebuked these conservative claims, but the progressive viewpoint 
expressed itself in only a comparatively small portion of the large amount of Japanese 
literature published on the Nanking Massacre.13 Since then, while the minimizers or 
deniers have experience almost complete freedom of speech, progressives have faced 
difficulty and impediments from the government and conservative scholars and 
journalists.14 
 As late as November 1998, at the time of the Chinese Head of State’s visit to the 
Japanese Prime Minister, Japan still refused to extend even a written apology to China for 
the massacre at Nanking.15 It seems clear that Japan has not faced up to its past as 
murderers in any significant way. Like the Germans, the war-time and immediate post-
war period met with almost complete silence on the subject. After the immediate post-
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war period, however, during which the West Germans focused almost exclusively on 
coming to terms with their crimes, the Japanese considered themselves only as victims. 
The Japanese government even sought to repress the history of the crimes, which the 
German government has never attempted to do. The Japanese have a long way to come in 
terms of dealing with the memory of their wartime crimes.  
United States and Native Americans 
 Given the genocide that has occurred on America’s own soil, I suppose criticism 
of any other nation’s problems with coming to terms with their past crimes is an ironic 
stance for an American to take. While mistreatment of the Native American populations 
dates back to 1492 and Columbus’s discovery of America, I will begin my discussion 
from a much later date and will only discuss a few specific policies and actions among 
the many that have occurred. In 1830 the United States government declared the Indian 
Removal Act, which allowed Native Americans to be forcibly uprooted from desirable 
land that was then given to settlers. The Native Americans were secluded from American 
society and put on reservations and/or sent off to remote parts of the country including 
via the Trail of Tears, among many other fates. Families were split up, children were 
often left behind or separated from their parents, and people were not usually given 
warning to grab belongings or even a coat. Initially, tribal leaders were able to bargain 
with government officials to delay or avoid the deportations, in March 1871 however, the 
government declared that Indian tribes were no longer sovereign and therefore did not 
have bargaining power with the United States government.16  
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In the 1890s a whole new set of policies were enacted to begin to “civilize” the 
Native Americans. This included the 1891 Indian Appropriation Act that had two effects. 
First, it meant that Native Americans were “given” land that they were supposed to farm 
– a violation of their cultural traditions. Second, it meant the transferring of Native 
American children to white boarding schools where they were taught white values while 
being forcibly stripped of their heritages. If families refused to send their children to 
these boarding schools, they gave up their right to receive rations.17 Perhaps the most 
barbaric of all policies was begun in 1930s when the Bureau of Indian Affairs began to 
sterilize Indian women under a false medical guise. This was a part of a broader policy of 
sterilization of minorities and handicapped persons in the United States begun in the early 
1900s. By the 1970s there was an entire Indian Health Services division that had 
sterilized more than 42% of the Native American female childbearing population.18 If 
this, in addition to the forced seclusion, removal of rights and the tragic reduction of the 
Native American population from between 9 and 18 million in the 15th century to 
237,000 in 1900, is not genocide, it is difficult to imagine what could be.19 
 Yet, no individual or agency has ever been held responsible for the transgressions 
against the Native American population.20 That is not to say, however, that no actions 
have been taken. In 1946, the United States held an Indian Claims Commission to ensure 
that the Native Americans received just reparations for the expulsions over the centuries. 
Because the United States was largely unapologetic, however, many see this as an 
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attempt to quickly cover up the past in light of the discoveries occurring across Europe 
after World War II.21 In 1978, the Indian Welfare Act ended the policy of transferring 
Indian children to boarding school, acknowledging the injustices that such a policy had 
created. The Indian Child Welfare Act created at the same time sought to prevent future 
transfers and to put adoption procedures in place to help re-assimilate taken Native 
American children into tribes.22 
 Throughout the 20th Century, Native Americans and their tribes slowly regained 
their rights to sovereignty and of citizenship in the United States. In September 2000, on 
the 175th anniversary of the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ creation, the Assistant Secretary of 
Indian Affairs admitted that the problems that plague Native American societies today 
stem largely from the Bureau’s actions in the past. His speech also included a formal 
apology for its role in the crimes.23 Despite this, albeit slight, progress, in my experience 
the horrific treatment of the Native Americans is still largely not taught in schools or 
included in textbooks. If it is, it is often minimized to the Trail of Tears and Battle of 
Wounded Knee and “Conflict with Native Americans” is often couched in language 
about needing space for settlers. The crimes of the 20th Century are almost completely 
ignored and instead Indian-United States relations are portrayed as positive with the 
regaining of rights and achievement of reparations.24  
While several individual tribes did receive reparations for the land that was 
appropriated from them, there has been no reparations effort made by the government 
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that would cover all appropriations, relocations and sterilization.25 It bears repeating that 
the United States government will not admit to criminal responsibility and will not 
prosecute the organizations that performed these deeds.26 For almost a century the world 
has looked to the United States as the most advanced, most civilized country on earth. 
Yet, we refuse to come to terms with the atrocities of our past in any meaningful way. 
For us, perhaps the process of German Vergangenheitsbewältigung would be a useful 
model for establishing a new identity for our nation both internally and within the world 
in the 21st century.  
Turkey and the Armenians 
 During World War I, the Ottoman Empire committed terrible atrocities against 
many minority populations under its domain. Particularly notable were the crimes 
committed against the Armenian population. In April 1915, the government began 
deporting Armenians from their homes and shipping them towards the front lines, 
sometimes leaving them directly behind the battle lines. There were no real plans laid for 
caring for the deportees or ensuring that the reached their resettlement destinations.27 The 
ultimate result were the deaths of almost 1.5 million Armenians at the hands of the 
Ottoman troops as a result of starvation, beatings and shootings.28 If this was not enough, 
Armenian property was stolen by the Ottoman government and troops and redistributed 
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to the majority population in the hopes of creating a Muslim bourgeoisie.29 The general 
historical opinion today is that the crimes committed against the Armenians 
unquestionably constitute genocide.30 
 Following the war, the new government formed in 1918 pinned the war crimes on 
the Unionist party, the leaders of which had fled following the war. The hope of the new 
government was that by blaming the exiled Unionist party, Turkey as a nation would be 
freed from criminal burden.31 In the years following the war, in a much different scenario 
than we have seen, the press and deputies in Parliament sought the punishment of those 
who were responsible for the genocide: the Unionist party.32 In fact, the Ottoman 
government itself, prior to its dissolution, ordered war crimes trials to be held beginning 
in November 1918. This was not, however, in any way an admission of guilt or a way of 
reconciling with the crimes. Rather, the trials were held in the hope that the Ottoman 
Empire would receive a more favorable treatment at the Paris Peace conference. 
Unsurprisingly, after the conference ended and the Treaty of Sèvres was signed in 1920, 
the trials were disbanded by the Turkish nationalists.33 
 When Turkey was established as a sovereign nation in October 1923 the official 
Turkish position remained disappointing. The government stated that there was no 
genocide, that the death of between 300,000 and 600,000 Armenians was regrettable but 
unintended.34 They claimed that the Armenians posed a danger to the army and therefore 
had to be removed; their deaths were simply a tragic result of a necessity for the war.35 
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There has therefore been not just nearly complete silence and a failure to achieve or even 
attempt any type of dealing with this past in Turkey, but the government has actively 
sought to teach a different version of history than that which actually occurred. The 
unique problem in Turkey is that the Turkish nationalists responsible for creating the 
Republic of Turkey are the same people responsible for the Armenian genocide. This has 
had two primary effects. The first is that, to protect their own position, they have 
obviously attempted to make open conversation about the genocide difficult. Second, in 
Turkey these people are honored as heroes for achieving independence from the allied 
occupiers. To implicate them in this terrible genocide would threaten the very foundation 
of Turkish national identity.36 
 Even as recently as 2007, the Turks have reinforced their position on the 
Armenian genocide. In this particular case, they threatened to withdraw their support for 
American troops in Iraq if the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in the United States 
passed a resolution that condemned the genocide.37 There seems to be no question that 
Turkey has not in any way come to terms with its past. For a democratic nation seeking 
full acceptance into the European Union, however, this amnesia about the past that 
Turkey continues to exhibit is unacceptable. Until Turkey really struggles with this issue 
and faces up to the term genocide and the realities of its crimes against the Armenians, it 
will never establish its identity as a true democracy.38 
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German Memory in the 21st Century 
 Though I ended my discussion of the Denkmalstreit in 1999 as the government 
approached the final vote on the memorial’s design, the conversation over the memorial 
and Holocaust memory has not ended. In keeping with the Germans’ forward progress in 
coming to terms with their past, the completion of the Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden 
Europas has allowed Germany to look beyond just the Nazi past of the war years. While 
the other nations I have briefly discussed have not found a way to deal with the issue of 
their own crimes, in 2007 the German Federal Crime Office started an investigation into 
its founders – men with a past in the Nazi Stutzstaffel (SS).39 In another capacity, the city 
of Munich is thinking specifically in terms of how to teach the coming generations, 
Germany’s future, about the past, knowing they have no direct connection to the Nazi 
past.40 
 In fact, the German education system has really brought the issue of teaching 
about the Nazi past and the Holocaust to a fore; it has been institutionalized. According to 
The New York Times, “the Holocaust remains a subject taught as a singular event and 
obligation here, and Germans still seem to grapple almost eagerly with their own historic 
guilt and shame.”41 Despite concerns about increased apathy among the younger 
generations, there are counter reports that suggest the younger generations are engaging 
with the subject of the Holocaust enthusiastically through the medium of education.42 As 
I have shown in Chapter One, the Denkmalstreit indicated the hope of intellectuals and 
politicians for younger generations to move beyond guilt for their past to having a sense 
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of responsibility in the world because of their past. The New York Times reporting from 
Germany suggests that this is precisely how the younger Germans are viewing the issue 
of the Holocaust contemporarily.43 
 Overall, the Germans seem to be making good on the goals they set for 
themselves during the Denkmalstreit. Germany has begun to redefine itself to a point 
where German society can feel pride once again, for at least its current state of being. 
Education about the Nazi crimes and the feeling of responsibility to achieve the “nie 
wieder” (never again) throughout the world resounds among the younger generations. 
The completion of the Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas has not only occurred, 
but so far has done anything but quell discussion about the Holocaust. An even more 
telling testament to progress is that the Bundestag’s Minister of Culture Bernd Neumann 
announced in January 2008 that construction would begin on two monuments in the 
center of Berlin, one for the Sinti and Roma and another for Gays and Lesbians killed in 
the Holocaust.44 Amidst this optimism, however, are growing concerns about the rising 
radical right in some areas of Germany that have won seats in local parliaments though 
not enough to have a presence in the Bundestag. In terms of this project, the most visible 
signs of the radical right have come in the way of Swastika graffiti found on the DEJE as 
recently as February 2008.45 
 This issue of the waxing radical right-wing is one that Germans will certainly 
have to struggle with in the coming years. As a full-fledged democracy, there is a limit to 
which free speech and political parties can be stifled. Yet, at what point does this conflict 
with Germany’s self-proclaimed responsibility to promoting peace, freedom and justice 
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in the world? Already Germans have taken this issue of responsibility to mean engaging 
in discussions about historical responsibility with regard to actions in Kosovo in the late 
1990s. More recently it has come up in terms of the presence of German troops in 
Afghanistan and, along with the rest of the world, in the question of the Iraq War. 
 Another interesting way that this issue has represented itself is in terms of the 
growing Turkish population in Berlin and Germany overall. Currently, Turks account for 
24.2% of the non-German population in Berlin.46 In light of the case I presented about 
Turkish memory of the Armenian genocide, I believe this opens up a whole new area for 
exploration. The question of how the feeling of German responsibility to the world is 
affected by the strong presence of the Turks in its capital is one worth considering. It 
seems to me that watching how this growing Turkish population influences the discussion 
about the memory of the Holocaust in Germany and about dealing with genocide in 
general. So far, Germany has shown itself to be exemplary in coming to terms with its 
past. It remains to be seen whether this will continue into the future.  
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 Glossary of Key Terms 
   
 
Akademie der Künste: the Academy of Art in Berlin that serves as the exclusive arts 
council for the federal government.  
 
Berliner Senat: The lower house of parliament for the state of Berlin.  
 
Bundeskanzler(in): The federal Chancellor of Germany elected by a majority of the 
Bundestag. 
 
Bundeskanzleramt: The Office of the Federal Chancellor located in the 
Regierungsviertel near the Bundestag.  
 
Bundespresseamt: The Office of the Federal Press which holds all of the press 
conferences for the federal government. 
 
Bundesregierung: The federal government of Germany. 
 
Bundesrepublik: Federal Republic, as in of Germany. 
 
Bundestag: The lower house of the German parliament, which meets in the Reichstag.  
 
Bundestagspräsident(in): President of the German Bundestag, second in importance to 
the Chancellor and voted into power by all members of the Bundestag. 
 
Bus Stop!: one of the third-prize winners of the first artistic competition designed by 
Frieder Schnock and Renata Stih. It consisted of red public transportation buses that 
would bring visitors to KZ sites around Germany and was favored by the public. 
 
Denkmal: a memorial, usually taking the form of a monument to an historical event. 
 
Denkmal für die Ermordeten Juden Europas: Memorial for the Murdered Jews of 
Europe. 
 
Denkmalstreit: debate over the Denkmal für die Ermordeten Juden Europas. 
 
Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR): the communist government of East Germany 
during the Cold War, from 1949-1990. 
 
Deutsches Historisches Museum (DHM): the national Museum of German History 
located in Berlin. 
 
die Endlösung:  the final solution to the “Jewish question,” the problem, according to 
anti-semites, of what to do with the Jews – with the subtext of how to get rid of them. 
 
   
 162 
Dokumentations- und Kulturzentrum Deutscher Sinti und Roma (DKSR): 
Documentation and Culture Center of the German Sinti and Roma, a cultural center and a 
place of memory created by the ZSR. 
 
Dokumentations Zentrum: documentation center, a place in which information about a 
subject can be found and explored, typically associated with a museum or memorial. 
 
Feld der Erinnerung: Field of Memory, the title of Peter Eisenman and Richard Serra’s 
original design proposal for the 1997 design competition. 
 
Findungskommission: Findings Commission, appointed by the government to 
investigate and give a report on specific subject, like what to do with the land on which 
the former Gestapo headquarters stood. 
 
Förderkreis für die Errichtung eines Denkmals für die ermordeten Juden (FEDJE):  
Society for the Promotion of Building a Memorial for the Murdered Jews of Europe, the 
larger public organization that developed out of Perspektive Berlin. 
 
Führerbunker: Leader’s Bunker, the bunker in which Hitler is believed to have 
committed suicide in 1945. 
 
Gedenkstätte: Place of Memory, usually an historical location that has been turned into a 
museum or research center open to visitors. 
 
Gestapo-Gelände: Located in Berlin next to Potsdamer Platz, this piece of land was 
where the headquarters of the Nazi Gestapo once stood. In the late 1980s there was a 
Findings Commission to determine what to do with that land, which was when 
Perspektive Berlin first made a proposal for a permanent memorial. The Findings 
Commission chose to go with the proposal by Real Museum to put a documentation 
center on the location. That documentation center is now the exhibit Topography of 
Terror. 
 
Historikerstreit: The Historians Debate, a debate that occurred in the 1980s through 
newspaper articles and publications between historians who argued about how Germany 
should deal with the Holocaust and Nazi times. 
 
Judenfrage: Jewish question, the Nazi question of how to get rid of the European Jews. 
 
Kaiser: Emperor. 
 
Konzentrationslager (KZ): Concentration camp. 
 
Kristallnacht: Night of Broken Glass, the1938 attack by Sturmabteilung on Jewish 
businesses and synagogues. 
 
Kultursenator: Senator of Cultural Affairs, in the Berlin Senate. 
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Land Berlin: The State of Berlin, or Berlin’s regional government. 
 
Leo Baeck Institute: A research, lecture and exhibition center about the history and 
culture of German-Speaking Jewry. 
 
Mahnmal: A memorial usually of a negative historical event, meant to convey a warning 
message to the future. 
 
Mauer-im-Kopf: wall in the head, a term used to describe the psychological phenomenon 
in Berlin which proposes that Berliners continue to feel the effects of physical separation 
despite the wall being gone. 
 
Mein Kampf: My Struggle, Adolf Hitler’s autobiography and the text in which he first 
laid out his racist, anti-Semitic ideology.  
 
Ministergärten: The Garden of the former Reichskanzlei located near the Tiergarten, 
Parisier Platz and the Brandenburg Gate. This is where the Denkmal für die ermordeten 
Juden Europas is currently located. 
 
Mitglied des deutschen Bundestag (MdB): Member of the German Bundestag, elected 
every four years coming either through their party or by their constituency. 
 
Neue Wache: a memorial built in 1993 to the Victims of War and Tyranny consisting of 
a Pieta sculpture by Käthe Kollwitz. 
 
Nürnberger Gesetze: The 1935 Nuremburg Laws enacted by Hitler and the Nazi regime, 
which specified that a Jew was anyone with 3 or more grandparents who did not have 
Christian baptismal certificates, prevented Jews from marrying with other Germans and 
declared the Jews to not be citizens of the Reich.  
 
Perspektive Berlin: Originally organized as a citizens initiative to support building a 
permanent memorial on the Prinz-Albrecht Palace, former Gestapo headquarters. It was 
started by Lea Rosh and Eberhard Jäckel in 1988. However, after the opening of the 
provisional documentation on the Gestapo-Gelände, their activities were integrated into 
the new FEDJE in 1989, which then sought a Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe.  
 
Pieta: A Christian symbol depicting the Virgin Mary holding her dead son, Jesus. The 
similarity of Käthe Kollwitz’s “Mother with Dead Son” to the well-known Pieta in the 
Neue Wache was an issue of controversy. 
 
Platz der Republik: The empty plaza that is in the middle of the Reichstag, the 
Bundeskanzleramt and other federal government buildings. At one point, this was a 
proposed location for the Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas. 
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Potzdamer Platz: Once the cultural dowtown center of Berlin, it was destroyed during 
World War II and was rebuilt as the economic powerhouse of Berlin. 
 
Reich: Empire. 
 
Reichskanzlei: Reich Chancellery, the building where Hitler lived and worked as 
Chancellor while in Berlin. It is located next to Parisier Platz, the Brandenburg Gate 
between the Tiergarten and Potsdamer Platz, and stood above the bunker in which Hitler 
committed suicide. 
 
Reichstag: The building that houses the Bundestag, Germany’s lower house of 
Parliament. It is located in the Regierungsviertel and bears the famous inscription “Dem 
deutschen Volke” or “to the German People.” 
 
Senatsverwaltung für Bau- und Wohnungswesen: Senate Committee for Building and 
Living, a committee of the Berliner Senat in charge of all art projects in public spaces at 
the time of the Denkmalstreit. 
 
Senatsverwaltung für Kulterelle Angelegenheiten:  Senate Committee for Cultural 
Affairs, a committee of the Berliner Senat in charge of all artistic and cultural projects in 
Berlin. 
 
Sinti and Roma: an ethnic group often referred to as Gypsies that was persecuted on an 
social and later a racial basis by the Nazis. 
 
Steinplatz: a square in Berlin in which the federal government built a monument to the 
victims of National Socialism in 1953. 
 
Stele: concrete columns, used in the chosen design for the Denkmal für die Ermordeten 
Juden Europas. 
 
Sturmabteilung: the Nazi paramilitary organization. . 
 
Tiergarten: The giant area of forest located in the heart of Berlin. It is full of walking 
spaces and monuments to important figures from German cultural history. 
 
Topography of Terror: Built in 1993 on the grounds of the former Gestapo 
headquarters, this exhibit once started as an outdoor temporary documentation center of 
the rise of the Nazi party and the control they held over Germany. The exhibit will now 
be housed in a permanent building, pending its construction. 
 
Unter den Linden: Berlin’s main street, which runs down the center of Berlin-Mitte from 
East to West. Along the street, many of Berlin’s historical sites can be found including 
the Neü Wache and the Brandenburg Gate. 
 
   
 165 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung: a term commonly used to describe the process of the 
German nation coming to terms with its Nazi past. 
 
Volk: the German people. 
 
Wehrmacht: The German army, navy and airforce during the Third Reich. 
 
Weissensee: A Jewish cemetery located in East Berlin and is the second largest Jewish 
cemetery in Germany. 
 
Yad Vashem: The official Holocaust memorial of Israel built in 1953 and consisting of a 
museum, educational centers, archives, memorial chambers, outdoor exhibits and art 
galleries. 
 
Zentralrat der deutschen Sinti und Roma (ZSR): Central Council of the German Sinti 
and Roma, a rights group based in Heidelberg, Germany and headed by Romani Rose.  
 
Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland (ZJD): Central Council of the Jews in Germany. 
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Ambros, Peter: A German historian. 
 
Assheuer, Thomas: Journalist for Die Zeit. 
 
Assmann, Aleida: (1947-) Renowned German cultural scholar. 
 
Avidan, Igal: Journalist 
 
Bartetzko, Dieter: Architecture critic for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
 
Bastian, Heiner: Art Scholar. 
 
Beaucamp, Eduard: Art Critic. 
 
Beck, Volker: (1960-) Member of the German Bundestag, Die Grünen. He served as 
their speaker for Legal Affairs from 1994-2002. His leadership in the Bundestag has 
resulted in the decision to erect a memorial to murdered homosexuals. 
 
Boettiger, Helmut: (1956-) Features editor for the Frankfurter Rundschau. 
 
Brandt, Willy: (1913 – 1992) Bundeskanzler, SPD from 1969-1974, after which he was 
the leader of the SPD in the Bundestag until 1987. His best known legacy was for his 
program of Ostpolitik, with which he tried to improve relations with East Germany and 
the Soviet Union.  
 
Braun, Joachim:  
 
Broder, Henryk: (1946-) Author and journalist for Der Spiegel and Der Tagesspiegel.  
 
Broszat, Martin: (1926-1989) German historian and Professor at the University of Köln 
who argued against Ernst Nolte during the Historikerstreit. 
 
Bubis, Ignatz: (1927-1999) 6th president of the Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland 
(ZJD) from 1992 -1999 and tended to side with the FDP politically. 
 
Buddensieg, Tilmann: Art scholar. 
 
Conradi, Peter: Member of the German Bundestag, SPD, from 1972 – 1998 and served 
as President of the Architektenkammer, the Chamber of Architecture responsible for 
architectural issues throughout Germany, from 1999-2004. 
 
Diepgen, Eberhard: (1941-) Mayor of Berlin, CDU, from 1984-1989 and 1991-2001. 
 
Ehrlich, Ernst Ludwig: (1921-2007) German Jewish philosopher. 
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Eisenman, Peter: (1932-) American architect who, in combination with Richard Serra 
and later Michael Naumann, devised the winning proposal for the Denkmal für die 
ermordeten Juden Europas. 
 
Fischer, Fritz: (1908-1999) German historian who was one of the first to challenge the 
conservative historian perspective that the Third Reich was an aberration from German 
history. 
 
Flierl, Bruno: (1927-) Architect critic and historian. 
 
Freudenberg, Günther: Professor of philosophy and politician. 
 
Friedrich Wilhelm II: (1744-1797) King of Prussia from 1786-1797 greatly devoted to 
the arts and responsible for building the Brandenburg Gate. 
 
Galinski, Heinz: (1912-1992) 1st and 5th president of the Zentralrat der Juden in 
Deutschland (ZJD) from 1954 – 1963 and 1988 – 1992. During World War II he was a 
prisoner at Auschwitz, Buchenwald and Bergen-Belsen. 
 
Gerz, Jochen: (1940-) A German artist and one of the 25 artists invited to participate in 
the 1997 design competition. His proposal, “Warum?” (Why?), was one of the four 
finalists for the Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas. 
 
Goldhagen, Daniel: (1959-) American political scientist and former Harvard Professor. 
He is best known for his controversial book, Hitler’s Willing Executioners (1996), which 
argued that ordinary Germans knew about and supported the Nazi extermination policies. 
 
Grass, Günter: (1927-) German author and play-write and an active supporter of the 
SPD. Much of his work has been devoted to the German need to come to terms with its 
Nazi past. 
 
Habermas, Jürgen: (1929-) A German philosopher and sociologist. He was first in the 
public eye when he began the Historikerstreit by attacking the arguments of historians 
Ernst Nolte, Michael Stürmer and Andreas Hillgruber in Die Zeit.  
 
Herzog, Roman: (1934-) Bundespräsident, CDU, from 1994-1999. 
 
Heuss, Heriburt: leader of the Zentralrat der deutscher Sinti und Roma (ZSR). 
 
Hildebrand, Klaus: (1941-) German historian who sided with the conservative historians 
during the Historikerstreit. 
 
Hillgruber, Andreas: (1925-1989) A conservative German historian whose book 
Zweierlei Untergang helped to provoke the Historikerstreit.  
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Hirsch, Dr. Burkhard: (1930-) Member of the German Bundestag, FDP, and served as 
its Vice-President from 1994-1998. 
 
Hofmann, Werner: A German art historian. 
 
Hoheisel, Horst: (1944-) A German artist whose proposal to destroy the Brandenburg 
Gate in order to commemorate the Holocaust memorial received a great deal of attention. 
 
Jäckel, Eberhard: (1929-) A noted German historian and professor of Third Reich 
history, closely aligned with the SPD. He became well-known during the Historikerstreit 
in which he stood opposed to the conservative historians and better known for working 
with Lea Rosh to build the Denkmal für die Ermordeten Juden Europas.  
 
Jakob-Marks, Christine: An architect from Berlin and co-winner of the second artistic 
competition with a design for an enormous gravestone with the names of the 4.5 million 
Jewish victims of the Holocaust engraved on it. 
 
Jens, Walter: (1923-) From 1989-1997 he was President of the Akademie der Künste. 
 
Jessen, Jens: (1955-) Editor of the Features section for the Frankfurter Allegemeine 
Zeitung from 1988-1994, he served the same role at the Berliner Zeitung from 1996-
1999, and at Die Zeit since 2000. 
 
Kittsteiner, Heinz Dieter: German historian and Professor at Frankfurt University. 
 
Kleihues, Josef Paul: (1933-2004) A German architect who had a major influence on 
Berlin’s reconstruction post-reunification. He also sat on the jury that decided upon 
Daniel Libeskind’s design for the Judäisches Museum Berlin. 
 
Kocka, Jürgan: (1941-) A German historian who sided with Jürgen Habermas and other 
liberal historians in the Historikerstreit. 
 
Kohl, Helmut: (1930-) Bundeskanzler, CDU,  from 1982 – 1998. He was the Chancellor 
throughout the majority of the Denkmalstreit. 
 
Kollwitz, Käthe: (1867-1947) German artist and sculptress, renowned for her portrayals 
of the injustices of the world. Most significantly, a model of her sculpture Mother with 
Dying Son was used in the Neue Wache.  
 
Konrad, Gyorgy: (1933-) Hungarian essayist and journalist, also became the first non-
German president of the Akademie der Künste. 
 
Korn, Salomon: (1943-) Respected German architect, Professor at the University of 
Heidelberg, leader of the Jewish Society of Frankfurt am Main, and Vice-President of the 
Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland. 
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Koselleck, Dr. Reinhart: (1923-2006) One of the most influential German historians of 
the 20th century.  
 
Krüger, Thomas: (1959-) Member of the German Bundestag, SPD, from 1994-1998. 
Before that, he served in the Berliner Senat from 1991-1994. 
 
Kudielka, Robert: (1945-) A German art scholar and a member of the Akademie der 
Künste since 1997. 
 
Kugler, Anita: A German author. 
 
Kurtze, Gerhard: Former president of the Borsenverein, the German Association of 
Publishers. 
 
Lackmann, Thomas: (1954-) Editor of Der Tagesspiegel since 1991 and the artistic 
director of the Jewish Culture Day in Berlin in 2004. 
 
Lehming, Malte: Journalist for Der Tagesspiegel. 
 
Liebeskind, Daniel: (1946-) A Jewish-Polish-American architect who is best known for 
his designs for the Judaiesches Museum Berlin and the World Trade Center site. He also 
submitted a proposal called Steinatem for the 1997 design competition, which became a 
finalist but was ultimately not selected. 
 
Martenstein, Harald: (1953-) A German author and journalist, first for Der 
Tagesspiegel from 1988-1997 and then for Die Zeit from 2002 onwards.  
 
Meier, Christian: (1929-) A German historian and Professor at the University of 
Munich.  
 
Moses-Kraus, Peter: A German-Jewish journalist. 
 
Nachama, Andreas: (1951-) A German-Jewish journalist and Rabbi, best known for his 
role as the Director of the Topography of Terror exhibit since 1987. He was also the 
Artistic Director of Jewish Culture Day in Berlin from 1992-1999 and from 1997-2001 
was the Leader of the Jewish Society of Berlin. 
 
Naumann, Julia: German author. 
 
Naumann, Michael: (1941-) Served as Editor for Die Zeit and became the 
Kulturminister, SPD, in 1998 until 2001. His proposal for Die Denkmal für die 
ermordeten Juden Europas to include a documentation and research center, a library and 
a classroom section came after the 1997 design competition but was integrated into Peter 
Eisenman’s winning proposal. 
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Nolte, Ernst: (1923-) A German historian whose article “Vergangenheit: die nicht 
vergehen will” argued that the Holocaust arose from a Bolshevik precedent and was 
therefore comparable to other historical events. This conservative position provided the 
foundation for the Historikerstreit. 
 
Rahamimoff, Arie: Israeli architect and urbanist who participated in the three-day 
colloquium regarding Der Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas. 
 
Reichel, Peter: (1942-) A German political scientist. 
 
Reinecke, Stefan: (1959-) Editor of Der Tagesspiegel and author. 
 
Reuter, Edzard: (1928-) Mayor of Berlin from 1948-1953 and CEO of Daimler-Benz 
from 1987 – 1995 and proponent of the Denkmal für die Ermordeten Juden Europas.  
 
Riedl, Joachim: Office Director of the Vienna office of Die Zeit. 
 
Riedle, Gabriele: German writer.  
 
Roloff-Momin, Ulrich: (1939-) Served as the Kultursenator, FDP in the Berliner Senat 
from 1991 – 1996 and played a large role in the government’s decisions regarding the 
Denkmal für die Ermordeten Juden Europas.  
 
Ronti, Dieter: Director of the Kunstmuseum Bonn and one of the five jurists for the 1997 
design competition. 
 
Rose, Romani: (1946-) Director of the Zentralrat Deutscher Sinti und Roma (ZSR). 
 
Rosh, Lea: (1936-) A German television journalist and co-founder of the movement to 
create a central memorial for the Holocaust, along with Eberhard Jäckel.  
 
Rürup, Reinhard: Professor of Modern History at the Technical University Berlin (TU-
Berlin) and author. 
 
Schmalenbach, Werner: (1920-) A German culture historian who from 1962-1990 was 
the Director of the Kunstsammlung Nordhein-Westfalen.  
 
Schmid, Thomas: (1945-) A German journalist and Chief Editor of Die Welt.  
 
Schneider, Oscar: (1927-) An MdB-CSU from 1969-1994 and from 1991-1994 was the 
Cultural-political Speaker for the CDU/CSU faction. 
 
Schneider, Richard Chaim: German author and spokesman for the Jewish community. 
 
Schnock, Frieder: co-designer of the Bus Stop! proposal along with Renata Stih. 
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Schoeps, Julius: (1942-) A German historian. 
 
Schröder, Gerhard: (1944-) Served as Bundeskanzler, SPD, from 1998-2005. 
 
Schröder, Richard: A German Professor of Theology and Philosophy. 
 
Schuller, Konrad: Journalist for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 
 
Schulz, Bernhard: A German writer.  
 
Schulze-Rohr, Jakob: A Berliner architect and one of the original members of 
Perspektive Berlin.  
 
Serra, Richard: (1939-) An American sculptor and artist who submitted the proposal 
“Feld der Erinnerung” together with Peter Eisenman. He later gave full rights to the 
proposal to Eisenman and removed himself from the competition. 
 
Shalev, Avner: Director of Israel’s Yad Vashem. 
 
Stih, Renata: A co-designer of the Bus Stop! proposal along with Frieder Schnock. 
 
Stölzl, Christoph: From 1987-1999 he served as the Director of the Deutscher 
Historiker Museum and from 1999-2000 he was Deputy Editor-in-Chief and Head of the 
Features Section of Die Welt. 
 
Stürmer, Michael: (1938-) A conservative German historian whose 1986 essay Land 
Ohne Geschichte published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung was one of the three 
that provided the foundation for the Historikerstreit. After 1989, he became chief 
correspondent for Die Welt.  
 
Süssmuth, Rita: (1937-) From 1988-1998 she served as Bundestagspräsidentin, CDU. 
 
Szeemann, Harald: (1933-2005) Director of the Kunsthalle in Bern, Switzerland and an 
art critic. 
 
Thierse, Wolfgang: (1943-) Served as Bundestagspräsident, SPD from 1998-2005. 
 
Ungers, Simon: (1957-2006) An architect from Cologne and co-winner of the first 
artistic competition with a design that projected the names of concentration camps onto 
the ground with sunlight. 
 
von Braun, Christina: (1944-) A German cultural scholar and author.  
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Walser, Martin: (1927-) A German writer famous for his speech in which he suggested 
that the lessons of the Holocaust were being misused to make demands for German 
shame. This immediately sparked controversy with Ignatz Bubis, beginning the Walser-
Bubis debates of 1998-1999. 
 
Weinmiller, Gesine: A German architect who proposed the Davidstern design for the 
1997 memorial design competition. 
 
Wolf, Christa: (1929-) German author, famous for her work from a former DDR 
perspective and a supporter of the DEJE. 
 
Wolffsohn, Michael: (1947-) An Israeli-born German historian typically aligned with 
the conservative perspective. 
 
Young, James: A Professor of English and Judaic studies at the University of 
Massachusetts Amherst. His body of academic work focuses on how architecture and 
memory are connected to create national identity. He also served as one of the jurists for 
the 1997 design competition. 
 
 
 Appendix D 
 Publications and Political Parties 
 
   
1981  1974 - 1982 
Helmut 
Schmidt 
SPD 
1982  
10/1980 – 
3/1983          9th 
Voting Period 
CDU/CSU 
 
1983  
Mayor: 
Richard von 
Weizsäcker, 
CDU 
1984  
1985  
1986  
3/1983 – 1/1987          
10th Voting 
Period 
CDU/CSU/FDP 
1987  
1988 August: Lea Rosh suggests 
a permanent Holocaust 
memorial on the ToT site. 
November: Berlin SPD 
suggests a memorial to the 
Jews in front of the 
Reichstag.  
Mayor: 
Eberhard 
Diepgen, 
CDU 
1989 January: Perspektive 
Berlin led by Lea Rosh 
makes the first suggestion 
for a memorial to the 
murdered Jews on the ToT 
site. It is supported by 
Willy Brandt, Walter Jens, 
Günter Grass and Christa 
Wolf 
February: Berlin SPD led 
by Wolfgang Nagel 
suggests building a national 
Holocaust memorial instead 
of a national history 
museum 
April: Romani Rose makes 
first criticism of a memorial 
to only one victim group. 
New Berlin Mayor Walter 
Momper. Red/Green Senat 
supports Perspektive Berlin. 
October: The finding 
commission to decide how 
to use the ToT site rejects 
Perspektive Berlin’s 
memorial proposal. 
November: FEDJE is 
founded taking on 
Mayor: 
Walter 
Momper, SPD 
1/1987 – 
12/1990             
11th Voting 
Period 
CDU/CSU/FDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10/1982-
10/1998 
Dr. Helmut 
Kohl 
CDU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 174 
Perspektive Berlin’s 
initiative to build a 
memorial to the murdered 
Jews on a new site. 
1990 January/February: 
FEDJE suggests building 
the memorial on the 
grounds of the former 
Reichskanzlei. 
July: Cultural Committee 
of the Berlin House of 
Representatives suggests 
the FEDJE find a less 
spectacular location. 
October: East and West 
Germany are formally 
reunited. 
Mayor: 
Walter 
Momper, SPD 
1/1987 – 
12/1990             
11th Voting 
Period 
CDU/CSU/FDP 
1991 March: ZdSR proposes a 
memorial for the murdered 
Sinti and Roma in Berlin to 
the Berliner Senat. 
September: Berlin Mayor 
Walter Momper guarantees 
that in deciding whether to 
build a memorial for the 
murdered Jews of Europe, 
they will also consider the 
proposal for memorial to 
the murdered Sinti and 
Roma. 
1992 January: Founding of the 
Topography of Terrors 
foundation with the support 
of the Land Berlin and 
Bundesrepublik. Haus der 
Wansee-Konferenz opens as 
a museum. 
February: Two memorials 
for murdered and 
persecuted MdB’s are 
unveiled.  
March: (10th) Federal 
Minister of the Interior 
Rudolf Seiters, in 
conversation with the 
FEDJE, gives federal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mayor: 
Eberhard 
Diepgen, 
CDU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12/1990 - 
10/1994 
12th Voting 
Period 
(1st Reunifcation 
vote) 
CDU/CSU/FDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10/1982 - 
10/1998 
Dr. Helmut 
Kohl 
CDU 
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support to building a central 
Holocaust memorial in the 
Ministergärten – victims to 
be remembered will be 
decided later. 
April: (24th) The Federal 
Ministry of the Interior, the 
Senate Committee for 
Cultural Affairs (Land 
Berlin) and the FEDJE 
agree to build an 
exclusively Jewish 
memorial and to its location 
on the grounds of the 
Reichskanzlei in the 
Ministergärten.  
May: Tension between the 
ZdSR, FEDJE and the SJD 
increases after the press 
announces an exclusively 
Jewish memorial. 
July: The Federal Ministry 
of the Interior and the 
Senate Committee for 
Cultural Affairs (Land 
Berlin) agree to build two 
memorials, one for the Jews 
and one for the Sinti and 
Roma. 
October: (13th) The 
Berliner Senat votes for an 
MMJE and MMSR. The 
sites remain undecided. 
November: (27th) Berliner 
Senat approves the location 
of the Ministergärten for 
the MMJE. 
1993 June: the memorial to the 
Jews in the Bayerischen 
neighborhood of Berlin by 
Renata Stih and Frieder 
Schnock becomes public. 
November: the Neue 
Wache opens on Unter den 
Linden.  
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Eberhard 
Diepgen, 
CDU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12/1990 - 
10/1994 
12th Voting 
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(1st Reunifcation 
vote) 
CDU/CSU/FDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10/1982 - 
10/1998 
Dr. Helmut 
Kohl 
CDU 
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1994 February: Building 
Senator Wolfgang Nagel 
and Culture Senator Ulrich 
Roloff-Momin suggest the 
area between the Reichstag 
and Brandenburg Gate for 
the MMSR. 
April: Artistic competition 
for the MMJE through the 
Senate Committee for 
Building a Housing opens, 
supported by the Bund, 
Land Berlin and FEDJE. 
May: Memorial at the KZ-
Aussenlager Sonnenallee 
opens in Berlin. 
December: Memorial at the 
KZ Columbia-Haus opens 
in Berlin. 
13th Vote 
Mayor: 
Eberhard 
Diepgen, 
CDU 
Coalition: 
CDU/SPD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13th Vote 
Mayor: 
Eberhard 
Diepgen, 
CDU 
Coalition: 
CDU/SPD 
1995 January: (18-20th) The Jury 
(led by Prof. Dr. Walter 
Jens) of the artistic 
competition for the MMJE 
reviews 528 submissions 
and agrees to a second 
session. 
March: (15-16th) The Jury 
meets again and awards two 
first prizes to Simon Ungers 
and Christine Jakob-Marks 
et al. (17th) The press 
conference announcing the 
decision brings heavy 
criticism  Roman Herzog 
heads a public Foundation 
for the MMJE to raise 
money for building the 
memorial. A memorial 
concerning the Nazi book 
burnings opens in Berlin. 
April: (12th) A month-long 
exhibition of all artistic 
competition designs opens 
to the public. 
May: (8th) 50th anniversary 
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of Germany’s liberation 
from Nazism  Ground 
stone laid for the new 
permanent Topography of 
Terror exhibit.  
June: (7th) Spiegelwand 
memorial for the expelled 
Jews of Berlin-Steglitz 
opens in Berlin. (8th) Ignatz 
Bubis publicly favors 
Simon Ungers design for 
the MMJE, speaking out 
against Christine Jakob-
Marks’s design. (25th) 
Bund, Land Berlin and 
FEDJE vote to build 
Christine Jakob-Marks’s 
design. (26th) The Initiative 
Schwulenmahnmal proposes 
a memorial for the 
Homosexual victims. (30th) 
Bundeskanzler Kohl speaks 
out against building 
Christine Jakob-Marks’s 
design. 
1996 January: (27th) 
Bundespräsident Roman 
Herzog declares “Memorial 
day for the Victims of 
National Socialism,” 51 
years after the liberation of 
Auschwitz. 
April: (24th) Berlin Senator 
Peter Radunski has a 
conversation with the 
Berliner Senat, the 
Bundesregierung and 
FEDJE in which they 
decide to move forward 
with a MMJE on the given 
location, but begin a new 
process. 
May: (9th) The Bundestag 
engages in its first debate 
over the MMJE.  
August: (30th) Bund, Land 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13th Vote 
Mayor: 
Eberhard 
Diepgen, 
CDU 
Coalition: 
CDU/SPD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 10/1994-9/1998          
13th Vote Period 
CDU/CSU/FDP 
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Berlin and FEDJE agree to 
a multi-stage colloquium on 
the location, content and 
meaning of the MMJE. 
November: The Berliner 
Senat votes to remove the 
Topography of Terror 
exhibit, but revokes the 
decision after massive 
protests.  
1997 January: (10th) The first 
colloquium meets with the 
topic “Why does Germany 
need the Memorial?”. 
February: (14th) The 
second colloquium meets 
with the topic: “The 
Location, its historical and 
political context, its future 
involvement in the city 
space”.  
April: (11th) The third 
colloquium meets with the 
topic: “Typology and 
Iconography of the 
Memorial, Way to 
Realization”. (18th) Peter 
Radunski speaks for Bund, 
Land Berlin and FEDJE in 
saying that a findings 
commission will be created 
that will name 9 artists to 
create new MMJE designs. 
June: (17th) The Findings 
Commission [Prof. Dr. 
Werner Hofmann, Prof. 
Josef Paul Kleihues, Prof. 
Dr. Dieter Ronte, Prof. Dr. 
Christoph Stölzl and Prof. 
Dr. James E. Young] decide 
to invite 16 artists/architects 
and the 9 prize-winners 
from the first artistic 
competition to submit 
designs for a second design 
competition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13th Vote 
Mayor: 
Eberhard 
Diepgen, 
CDU 
Coalition: 
CDU/SPD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10/1994- 9/1998          
13th Voting 
Period 
CDU/CSU/FDP 
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October/November: 
(31st/14-15th) The Findings 
Commission, Bund, Land 
Berlin and FEDJE review 
the 19 design proposals. 
The Findings Commission 
votes for the designs from 
Eisenman/Serra and from 
Weinmiller. The Bund, 
Land Berlin and FEDJE 
vote for the designs from 
Gerz and from Libeskind. 
These become the four 
design options.  
December: (11th) A two-
month long public 
exhibition opens of all the 
submitted proposals.  The 
four chosen design teams 
give presentations to the 
Bundestagspräsidentin, 
Members of all Bundestag 
factions, representatives of 
the Bund, Land Berlin and 
FEDJE and art critics over 
the same two-month period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13th Vote 
Mayor: 
Eberhard 
Diepgen, 
CDU 
Coalition: 
CDU/SPD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1998 January: (21st) 
Bundeskanzler Kohl, 
Bundestagspräsidentin 
Süssmuth and Mayor 
Eberhard Diepgen meet 
with representatives of the 
Bund, Land Berlin and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10/1994 - 9/1998          
13th Voting 
Period 
CDU/CSU/FDP 
 
 
10/1994- 
9/1998 
13th Voting 
Period 
CDU/CSU/FDP 
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FEDJE. They decide to 
pursue a revised version of 
the Eisenman/Serra 
proposal. (27th) The Gleis 
17 memorial at the 
Grunewald Bahnhof opens 
commemorating the 
deportation of the Jews. 
February: Kohl and 
Süssmuth want a quick 
decision for the memorial. 
Diepgen wants more time.  
May: (22nd) A conversation 
is held between Kohl and 
Eisenman/Serra in which 
they discuss the details of 
reworking their proposal. 
June: (3rd) Richard Serra 
backs out of the 
Eisenman/Serra design 
team. 
July: The revised Eisenman 
proposal arrives in Berlin 
and is classified. (21st) 
Michael Naumann, 
designated SPD cultural 
representative, calls for 
abandoning the memorial 
concept. 
August: (4th) Gerz pulls out 
of the competition.  The 
Berlin SPD wants a quick 
decision about the MMJE. 
(24th) Kohl and Diepgen 
agree to postpone the 
decision on the designs 
until after the national 
elections on September 27th, 
although they set no 
specific date. (26th) A three-
week exhibit of the four 
design options, in addition 
to the revised Eisenman 
Proposal, the Libeskind 
model for the new Jewish 
Museum and the design of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13th Vote 
Mayor: 
Eberhard 
Diepgen, 
CDU 
Coalition: 
CDU/SPD 
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the new Topography of 
Terror Foundation building.  
September: (3rd) Berlin 
House of Representatives 
decides for the building of a 
MMJE, without agreeing to 
a design or a location.  
October: (11th) Martin 
Walser speaks out against 
the MMJE. (20th) The 
Red/Green coalition 
confirms that the MMJE 
will be discussed.  Andreas 
Nachama, leader of the 
Jewish Society of Berlin, 
speaks against the building 
of the MMJE and instead 
for the building of a 
University of Jewish, 
Catholic, Protestant and 
later also Islamic theology. 
November: (24th) Diepgen 
speaks against the 
Eisenman design. 
December: (14th) Michael 
Naumann proposes his 
design for a museum, 
library and research center 
instead of the MMJE.  
 
 
 
13th Vote 
Mayor: 
Eberhard 
Diepgen, 
CDU 
Coalition: 
CDU/SPD 
 
1999 January: (17th/19th) 
Eisenman and Naumann 
present a combined design 
of memorial and 
information center at a 
press conference. (26th) The 
head of the foundation for a 
German Holocaust 
Memorial, Hans-Jürgen 
Hässler, supports the 
Naumann/ Eisenman model. 
Lea Rosh resigns from the 
foundation. (27th) 
Bundespräsident Roman 
Herzog asks for a quick 
decision on an MMJE 
design. 
 
 
 
 
 
14th Vote 
Mayor: 
Eberhard 
Diepgen, 
CDU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9/27/1998 – 
9/2002              
14th Voting 
Period 
SPD/GP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10/1998 - 
11/2005 
Gerhard 
Schröder 
SPD 
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February: (8th) The CDU 
publicly criticizes the 
Naumann/Eisenman model. 
March: (3rd) First hearing 
by the Committee for 
Kulture and Media in the 
Bundestages. (16th) The 
Berliner Senat, led by the 
CDU majority agrees to 
stop the competition 
proceedings. 
April: (20th) 2nd 
Bundestages hearing 
occurs. 
June: (25th) Date for the 
final Bundestag vote on the 
MMJE. 
 
 
 
 
14th Vote 
Mayor: 
Eberhard 
Diepgen, 
CDU 
 
 
 
 
 
9/27/1998 - 
9/2002              
14th Voting 
Period 
SPD/GP 
 
 
 
10/1998 - 
1/2005 
Gerhard 
Schröder 
SPD 
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Name Circulation Frequency Region Politics 
Frankfurter Allgemeine National  Daily Frankfurt Conservative 
Suddeutsche Zeitung National Daily Bavaria Progressive 
Die Welt National Daily Berlin Conservative 
Die Zeit National  Weekly Berlin Liberal-Center 
Der Tagesspiegel Local Daily Berlin Liberal 
Der Spiegel National Weekly Hamburg Liberal-Center 
Die Tageszeitung Regional Weekly Bremer Liberal-Center 
Frankfurter Rundschau National Daily Frankfurt Progressive 
Focus National Weekly  Conservative 
Merkur  Monthly  Liberal 
Berliner Zeitung Local Daily Berlin Liberal-Center 
Die Woche National Weekly Berlin Center 
Berliner Morgenpost  Daily Berlin  
Neue Zürcher Zeitung National Daily Zurich Liberal 
Die Weltwoche National Weekly Zurich Liberal-Center 
 
 
 
Party Political Affiliation Color 
Die Grünen (GP) Green – left/liberal Green 
Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) Liberal Yellow 
Sozialdemokratisches Partei Deutschlands (SPD) Social Dems – left/center Red 
Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU) Christian – right/center Black 
Christlich Sozialische-Union in Bayern (CSU) Christian – right/center Black 
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